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The alternative is to affirm a pluriversal global nomos in favor of their realist – a type of third space, a plurality of coexisting independent entities, differentiated but interdependent, recognizing one another as juridically equals with the same rights of non-intervention, war-making, and neutrality – culminating in a global order that is anti-Eurocentric and antagonistic to the current state order.

Kalyvas, A. (2018). Carl Schmitt's postcolonial imagination. Constellations, 25(1), 35-53. Accessed 10-12-22 CSUF JmB

Tellingly, and rather paradoxically in light of his severe criticism of anticolonialism and his apparent nostalgia for the Eurocentric interstate order, Schmitt’s post-war writings do not advocate a return to the spatial structure and territorial distinctions of international public law. The first global nomos, its statocentrism, and the hegemony of Europe, he acknowledged, belonged irrevocably to the past and as much as he lamented their collapse, his work adapted and responded to the profound changes that were transforming world politics, including the new postcolonial reality brought about by the process of decolonization. During this period, the possibility of a new global nomos of the earth, beyond the Cold War’s bipolar system, emerges as his main theoretical and political preoccupation.116 His concerted attempts to think the contemporary global situation from the perspective of the vanishing colony are undoubtedly tentative, inconclusive, characterized by an occasional experimental quality, with sweeping positions, and often puzzling conclusions. But even though they lack the analytical rigor and conceptual sharpness of his previous studies on the history of international law and world politics they remain pertinent to the degree that they interrogated the geopolitical dualism of West and East by exploring the political promises of a post-Eurocentric world without formal colonies, that is, a world order lacking the territorial divisions, spatial distinctions, and zones of exception that defined the classical interstate system. Thus, while he traced the origins of European public law to the colonial encounter and explained its demise in terms of the abolition of the colonial difference, he also contemplated how order and balance might be restored in a global age where the formal colonial frontiers were dissolved and Europe itself displaced. In spite of the many criticisms that can be made of Schmitt’s work, his post-war reflections evoke alternative futures and open up the space for a post-European postcolonial order in the contradictions and conflicts he delineated between the movement towards world unity and the pluralization of autonomous greater regions. It is more or less around the time of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia that Schmitt begun to consider systematically the former colonies as potential harbingers of a new division of the global space and a new nomos. 117 In so doing, he revised and gave a new concrete historical and spatial content to the general idea of “pluriverse,” which he had initially proposed during the inter-war period in his theory of the political and further developed in the direction of a doctrine of greater spaces or pan-regions (Großräume) as a member of the Nazi party and in the context of Germany’s expansionist policies. 118 After the war, he posed afresh the question of a new nomos by identifying the former colonies as growing regional blocks and a possible basis for a post-European spatial ordering that will succeed the bipolar interval. 119 Already in 1952, for instance, he argued explicitly for a “third factor” (dritte Faktor), as a viable political alternative against the bleak prospect of the universal humanism of a single world sovereign. 120 He considered India, the Arab block, the Luso-Hispanic world, and China emerging international actors that could potentially break away from the transitional hegemonic phase of the two nuclear superpowers to inaugurate a new stage in world history, an era of “real pluralism” among several grand spaces capable of establishing an equilibrium of forces that will regulate and bracket war, thus instituting “a new international law of new dimensions.”121 Ten years later, he observed a “surprising number of new African and Asian states” and described the “undeveloped” and “uncommitted nations or regions” as “the neutral states of the anticolonial space” and placed them at “the point of departure of a new world order.”122 He attributed their privileged geopolitical positioning as worldhistorical actors of global change to the fact that “The previously colonized space seems to be the predestined environment for a new kind of neutrality.”123 The same year, in his treatise on the partisan, Schmitt lauded the spatial particularism and territorial dimension of anticolonial struggles by observing that “the names of Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi-minh, and Fidel Castro indicate that the tie to the soil, to the autochthonous population, and to the geographical particularities of the land” could signal the possibility of a new respatialization of the earth, resulting from a telluric politics grounded in specific places. He also praised Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese-Asiatic struggle against capitalist colonialism and endorsed his pluralistic image of a new nomos of the earth by approvingly quoting from his 1935 poem “Kunlun”: If I could stand above the heavens, I would draw my sword And cut you in three parts: One piece for Europe, Once piece for America, One piece left for China, The peace would rule the world.124 Likewise, in his last published article, in 1978, Schmitt associated the “third sphere” with the “non-aligned states” and saw again in their efforts to affirm their neutrality a clear albeit contradictory historical movement towards a new plural nomos characterized by a balance between several autonomous and politically integrated regions representing a polycentric spatial structure of the earth.125 The political spaces that decolonization has open up against the West-East bipolarity could provoke a radical restructuring of the world order, a new special revolution. Schmitt’s hypothesis of a postcolonial pluriversal spatial order, “an international order of the Grossraum,” is predicated on the assumption that it possesses all the formal attributes of his general theory of nomos and has similar effects.126 It represents a model of balanced and equitable interdependence that seeks to reconcile spatial division and political difference.127 In opposition to a boundless and spaceless universalism, and like the defunct international interstate order, the new post-Eurocentric nomos of the earth will consist of a plurality of coexisting independent entities, in this case, larger regions or continental blocks encompassing the whole earth instead only of the European states, each of which would be prohibited from intervening in the affairs of the others. Internally, each unit will have to be historically and culturally homogeneous with their own distinct political and legal forms of collective life; externally, in relation to each other, they will need to remain differentiated but interdependent, recognizing one another as juridically equals with the same rights of non-intervention, war-making, and neutrality, that is, in other words, each in possession of the monopoly of the political. The sharing of a set of common ordering principles and rules of engagement will entail new “just measures” and “sensible proportions” that will sustain an equilibrium of power among the several independent Großräume and achieve a balanced relationship of relative peace and bracketed wars without having recourse to a single hegemon or a superior sovereign standing above them.128 Schmitt expected that such a post-universal, post-state world order will carve new spatial divisions and re-establish the link between law and space by providing binding reciprocal guarantees, crucial for the maintenance of the autonomy and particularity of each distinct regional block and for the pluralism of the system as a whole. Hence, Schmitt envisions a new post-European nomos as a non-universal global law among Großräume, with the parts recognized as equal legal and political subjects, based on the non-intervention of extra-regional parts, all partaking on a common spatial order.129 In short, Schmitt’s postcolonial imagination expresses the transformation of global relations into a mutually beneficial interdependence, a new “normative order of the earth” consisting of several expectations, such as peace, stability, multilateralism, and coexistence.130 Clearly, this postcolonial vision of a new re-territorialized planetary “pluralist and multipolar” spatial order resembles and reproduces the logic, function, and effects of the older interstate public law but now mediated through the experience of the Monroe Doctrine and projected onto a bigger scale, as it would be truly global, consisting of political units much larger than the territorial state.131 A great deal can be said about Schmitt’s hypothesis, its traditional realist presuppositions, its underlying method of analogy, its globalized multi-cultural tendencies, and its indeterminate dialectics of difference and sameness. I cannot venture here into these vast and complex debates. I can only comment briefly on two evident problems that Schmitt failed to adequately address and much less to resolve. The first refers to his general account of the origins and foundations of any nomos as such; the second pertains to its conditions of possibility. Regarding the first problem, it’s important to recall that all concrete spatial orders are preceded by a spatial revolution, that is, every international order in the broader sense of the term is premised on an original and constitutive act of land-appropriation that establishes an ultimate radical legal title that determines subsequent divisions, partitions, and distributions.132 The concept of an alternative postcolonial global system of greater political spaces, however, seems to lack such a pre-juridical founding moment since, as Schmitt came to recognize, in the post-war age, land appropriation is not anymore a political option.133 Although appropriations have occurred in sea and air, and may occur in outer space with the conquest of planets, he seems to have insisted on the terrestrial, telluric dimension of human politics.134 But with the option of colonization foreclosed, he did not provide a clear alternative account of what might be the great primeval act that will usher a spatial revolution generative of the postcolonial order. The idea of a second spatial revolution is poorly theorized, elusive and uncertain to the effect that Schmitt lacks a theory of transitions from one nomos to the next. As a result, the foundations of his post-European global pluriverse remain indeterminate. Unspecified also remains the concept of the enemy that would correspond to and could sustain a new nomos of the earth. As for the second problem, an essential structural condition for the existence of a concrete order of the earth was the demarcation of a bounded space, geographically and culturally situated, of an inside that is clearly distinguished from an outside - even if the latter is included in the former - separated by divisional lines that provide a sense of orientation, measure, and commonality in relation to and against the background of what lies beyond. The hypothesis of coexisting regional or continental blocks on a planetary scale based on mutual recognition eludes the operation of a constitutive outside.135 Can a comprehensive and common global spatial order generate internal coherence, a minimum of commonality, and a shared symbolic consciousness among its diverse members without external zones of exception? Can postcolonial non-discriminatory wars among greater spaces remain limited and bracketed in the absence of free anomic conflict zones? Confining disorder to an exterior while keeping peace in the interior appears as an indispensable attribute of any concrete spatial order for the management and limitation of conflict but does not fit well with Schmitt’s allusions to the new postcolonial nomic pluriverse, which seems all inclusive and thus incapable of generating a inside/outside distinction, especially so since the soil of each and all the regional powers of the earth is conceived as juridically equivalent and equally protected. Schmitt sought to tackle both problems by introducing the idea of new industrial appropriations as an epochal equivalent of sorts to the primordial act of land taking. “Industry-appropriation,” he asserted, is the new form of appropriation that corresponds to the industrial-technical age.136 The forces that will appropriate and control the “spaces of development” (Entwicklungräume) will also divide anew the earth to determine the possibility of a postcolonial order.137 He concluded that “the space of industrial development and the division of the earth into industrially developed and underdeveloped regions and peoples” is decisive for the future nomos. 138 This is why he regarded the Third World as a foremost geopolitical terrain, “an area of conflict,” where the concrete planetary struggles for the coming nomos are fought out over industrial development and where alternative futures are enacted. 139 These incomplete and fragmented commentaries, the last Schmitt wrote on world politics, reiterate his claim that the main political question of his times is what and who will succeed the interval of the Cold War. He saw a clear opposition between the two likely outcomes: On the one hand, he denounced the dangerous prospects of “a planetary appropriation of industry” by one of the two contending Cold War super-powers emerging victorious to become the world’s sole sovereign, “the great appropriator, the great divider and distributor of our planet;” on the other, he ascertained a balanced pluralism among autonomous regional powers, unfolding in the anticolonial spaces of the postcolonies, in the combined efforts to appropriate their natural and industrial resources and break the binary spatial structure. 140 For Schmitt, eventually, the historical resolution of the antithesis between unipolarity and multipolarity, a global monopoly of a single power and a pluralism of coexisting Großräume, has a world-disclosing significance as, It will then be seen that certain nations and peoples have sufficient strength to endure within industrial development and to remain faithful to themselves, while others lose face and sacrifice their human individuality to the idol of a technicized earth.141 Reading Schmitt from the perspective of the concept of the colony opens up his political and legal theory of international law to a postcolonial horizon and indicates its contemporary actuality. What remains so interesting in Schmitt’s approach is the uncompromising attitude with which he exposed the colonial underpinnings of the modern nomos and interrogated relentlessly Western universalism in his quest for alternative post-Eurocentric global futures. One does not have to accept his political motivations and choices, or agree with all of his philosophical assumptions to recognize the significance of the insights his historical reconstruction offers in rethinking critically about world politics. By arguing with Schmitt beyond Schmitt, engaging in a kind of post-Schmittian exercise, I draw some preliminary conclusions pertaining to the relevance and limitations of his insistence that the colony is essential for the spatial constitution of political modernity. For one thing, Schmitt’s account incorporates the violent colonization and exploitation of the Americas into a broader global narrative that highlights the constitutive role of conquest in the making of the international interstate system as an originary moment of modernity. Probably the first to do so, his narrative runs against the dominant idea that the modern world order developed first within Europe, immanently, and then gradually spread outwards, exported to the rest of the world through colonial force and postcolonial imitation. Schmitt’s history of the relationship between international law and the nonEuropean world allows for a better understanding of how the global spatial revolution, which gave birth to and elevated modern Europe to the center of the world, was created by the colonial encounter and sustained with the difference between state and colony. This descriptive account includes what Bhupinder Chimni has insightfully named “a foundational critique of the history of international law,” which he associates with the Third World Approaches in International Law (TWAIL) that, like Antony Anghie, situates colonialism at the very heart of international law. 142 A similar influential critical discourse resonates powerfully in the philosophical and epistemological writings of Enrique Dussel, Aníbal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, and the decolonial perspectives from Latin America.143 It also reverberates in the original analyses of colonialism and imperialism developed from the African continent, like Samir Amin, Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, and James Thuo Gathii. 144 Correspondingly, Schmitt’s plural and mutlipolar new nomos of the earth prefigures in later debates on a polycentric order, the transcivilizational perspective in international law, and in visions of plural legal orders and Third Worldism’s pan-regionalism as anticolonial alternatives to Western domination.145 These and other unexpected encounters between Schmitt’s theory of international law and anticolonial and postcolonial critical perspectives occur and become intelligible through the primacy assigned to the colony. It is a political primacy as well as an epistemological and historical one. Its centrality - as exception, foundation, and constitutive presence but also as a destructive force and a negative absence– animates both Schmitt’s unconventional theory of international law and the anticolonial and postcolonial radical rethinking of modernity. The colony is treated correspondingly, as essential for the making of international law, itself a fundamental determination of modernity. This shared understanding indicates the point of a certain convergence, a common position that accentuates the formative role of colonialism as the real foundation and the inescapable condition of possibility of the modern. Colonialism becomes constitutive of modernity to the extent that the modern age is regarded as irrevocably colonial. Recognizing this common ground between Schmitt and critical postcolonial approaches does not erase obvious differences, irreconcilable disagreements, and an unbridgeable chasm that expectedly and for good reasons separates them. Although points of encounter should not be neglected neither acknowledging them can cover up the obvious presence of a Eurocentric paradigm at work in Schmitt’s history of international law. This is not only because of his well-known admiration of European civilization and the praise of its superiority. It is also that his metropolitan gaze departs from the center to reach the periphery in order to return back to this very same center, whose demise he lamented. For instance, his idea of a post-Eurocentric, pluralistic, and multipolar order, a balanced coexistence among distinct regional blocks forming an equilibrium of forces, does not escape the grasp of Europe as it reproduces a model of a mechanical order based on a specific statist rationality and ontology, historically and geographically determined. This realist rationality he applied it to larger entities and at global level but organized along modern European philosophical principles, norms and rules. Schmitt’s legal and political international theory faces here an important limitation as it reproduces what it sets to repudiate. A similar impasse appears in the glaring absence of the indigenous and the colonized. This is captured by Benno Teschke’s poignant criticism of Schmitt's account that indicts him, rightly so, for “the absence of an inquiry into the inter-political nature of the encounter. The native Amerindians remain missing from his account.... They are not even acknowledged as passive bearers and victims of the incoming Spaniards and Portuguese, but nullified and written out of history.”146 It is true that Schmitt’s discussion of the conquest of the Americas ignores the standpoint of the oppressed. His, remains a European perspective, built from the singular position of the colonizer. As such, his heterodox world history is not heterodoxical enough to accommodate the political agency of the colonized. 147 Indeed, Schmitt’s postcolonial imagination is neither pure nor complete. It can be partial and flowed, contradictory, aporetic at times, cynical and ideological, occasionally distorted and distorting, even prejudicial. Notwithstanding these limitations, his international theory of politics and law and the primacy of the concept of the colony suggest three clear conclusions with a certain critical and emancipatory orientation. The first pertains to the colonial foundations of the interstate system, state sovereignty, and political modernity as such. Simply put, for Schmitt, modernity is both Eurocentric and colonial. The second refers to the opposition between anticolonialism and decolonization, on the one hand, and the modern Eurocentric international order, on the other. The former is described as a real political negation of the latter: the spatial structure of anticolonialism is inherently anti-Eurocentric. The last conclusion involves the political significance of the postcolonies as alternative spaces where greater regions and geopolitical blocks might develop into becoming founding participants and equal members of a pluriversal global nomos. As a categorical description of the intimate relationship between colonialism and modernity and their complicity in the making of colonial modernity all three of Schmitt’s conclusions register at the core of his thought the modern horizon opened by colonialism and point, however dimly, at possible decolonial global futures. 148

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