Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

The political imagination of the 1AC’s standard as a metric to resolve violence or conflict results in a global nomos of colonization since 1492 the Europaeum have plagued the world that maintains the distinction between the global north and the global south

Kalyvas, (2018). (Andreas is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at The New School for Social Research. Carl Schmitt's postcolonial imagination. Constellations, 25(1), 35-53. Accessed 10-12-22) CSUF JmB TDI

It is certainly true that Schmitt often described the age of conquest in the conventional and celebratory language of the “discovery of a new world,” the “achievement of newly awaked Occidental rationalism,” “the product of an intellectual and scientific culture,” suggesting it was the necessary and legitimate outcome of a presumed European superiority (Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 59, 1950/2003, p. 132). As many commentators have rightly noted, there is a nostalgic yearning that elevates the age of conquest into a great, epic moment of European history, an unprecedented civilizational accomplishment, which Schmitt depicted as one of the highest manifestations of human reason and “the last great heroic act of the European peoples” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 151, 1957/2003, p. 349). It seems reasonable to infer that Schmitt saw the global rise of Europe as the result of a purely endogenous and autonomous dynamic, internal only to that continent, caused by the intrinsic tendencies of an already formed higher geopolitical and cultural totality. At times he sounds almost Hegelian as if the global rise of Europe was a foretold story, justified by a pre-established superiority that was fated to conquer the world (Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 59). These statements, however, do not adequately represent the novelty of Schmitt's history of international law. Notwithstanding an explicit celebration of a bygone age and the concomitant lamentation for its irrevocable demise, there is a parallel narrative that runs through his writings on the modern spatial order and world politics and hints at a different historico-political understanding and geographic imagination. What I wish to emphasize is this tendency to give an account opposed to the conventional theories of the history of international law, which is signaled by Schmitt's insistence on the centrality of the category of the colony as indispensable to the spatial constitution of the international system of states and the geopolitical rise of Europe. On this issue, he sounded unequivocal: “The whole spatial structure of the earth in European international law was based on the distinctive territorial status of colonial overseas lands” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 221, emphasis added). This bold proposition identifies the colonies and their “distinctive territorial status” as the basis (die Grundlage) of the Eurocentric order, its “basic spatial fact” (raumhafte Grundtatsache) (Schmitt, 2011, pp. 114, 117). It is the colony, for Schmitt, and its special significance in international law, that determined and sustained the Eurocentric order.7 For one thing, against internalist and teleological views, Schmitt's approach questions traditional accounts that have propagated the idea of the political and legal order of sovereign territorial states that emerged in Europe, autochthonously, so to speak, arrived in the colonies fully formed, and became global through time by simply extending its sphere of application on a larger scale with the quantitative inclusion of new non-European entities into an existing stable interstate spatial structure.8 Instead, his heterodox history highlights how modern international law and the advent of the Eurocentric global order “did not derive essentially from internal European land-appropriation and territorial changes, but rather from the European land-appropriation of a non-European new world” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 183). He could not have been more explicit. The very existence of the jus publicum Europaeum depended upon a “free colonial soil outside Europe” as it did on the sea (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 198, emphasis added, see also Schmitt, 1943, pp. 7). The modern interstate system originated outside the geographical confines of Europe with the colonial expansion to the Americas, as the effect of an illegal and violent land taking (Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 241, 1943, p. 1–2, 1950/2003, pp. 48–9, 132, 135, 352, 1955/2003, 1958/2015, pp. 77–78). For this reason, he described “The landappropriation of a new world,” its colonization, as “the global event in the history of European international law,” which, with “[v]ast, seemingly endless free spaces made possible and viable the internal law of an interstate European order” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 83, 183, 140, emphasis added). For it is the conquest of the Americas that “led to a new spatial order of the earth” and, as he repeatedly maintained, “for 400 years it supported a Eurocentric international law: the jus publicum Europaeum” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 87, 140, 49, emphasis added). Thus, for Schmitt, it is 1492 and not 1648 that marks the beginning of the modern world and the global rise of international public law, defined as “a law among states, among European sovereigns. This European core determined the nomos of the rest of the earth” (Schmitt, 1941/1995, pp. 401, 403–4, 408–409, 1950/2003, p. 126–127).9 This “unrepeatable historical event” inaugurated a new epoch, the first complete spatial revolution on a planetary scale, propelling Europe to the geopolitical center of the earth (Schmitt, 1940/1995a, p. 388, 1941/1995, pp. 406, 1942/2015, pp. 55–64, 1950/2003, pp. 39, 49, 2011, p. 118). The colonization of an extra-European world is the real constitutive event of global modernity (Schmitt, 1941/1995, pp. 405, 408–409, 2011 p. 118). How the conquest and colonization of a new continent gave rise to the modern interstate system of international law is explained by Schmitt's singular interpretation of the global lines (first, with the Spanish-Portuguese divisional lines but mostly with the French-English amity lines) that were drawn by European powers from the end of the 15th to the middle of the 17th century in order to regulate their inter-imperial rivalries. These lines were foundational and generative of the first global spatial order as they put into effective play the rule of colonial difference (Jameson, 2005, p. 201; Schmitt, 1943, pp. 2–3, 7, 1950/2003, pp. 86–100, 228, 2011, p. 116; Stirk, 2011, pp. 276– 283). In fact, the “distinctive” territorial status of the colonial overseas lands originates with the division of the earth into two distinct spatial zones, the statist and the colonial, the European and the non-European, the civilized and the uncivilized. For Schmitt, this division indicates the world-historical uniqueness of the modern nomos (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 49, 50–5).10 The new discoveries and the circumnavigation of the globe unified geographically the earth by carving “internal divisions … within the framework of one and the same spatial order” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 92). The global lines encompassed for the first time in human history the whole earth by differentiating between two spheres, Europe and the rest of the world (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 198, 140, 148). The colony is the effect of this partition of the earth and it is foundational, like the free sea, as it partakes in a constitutive act of spatial ordering. For this reason Schmitt considered the special meaning of the colony and its exceptional territorial status both as a symptom and an effect of global linear thinking (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 87). He understood it in relation to the originary split between “the soil of European states, i.e. state areas in the specific sense, and the soil of overseas possessions, i.e. colonial lands” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 184, emphasis added; see also Schmitt, 1940/1995a, pp. 244–245). The New World, the colonized territories, came to designate an extra-European, non-sovereign realm located outside international law but immanent to and productive of the spatial structure of the global nomos (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 93): The sense and core of the Christian-European law of peoples, its fundamental order, lay in the partition of the new earth. Among themselves the European peoples were, without much planned reflection, united in treating the non-European soil of the earth as colonial soil, i.e., as an object for their conquest and exploitation. This side of historical development is so important that one can equally well, and perhaps more rightly, call the Age of Discoveries the Age of European land appropriation. (Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 64, emphasis added) The territorial status of the colony is special and distinctive, therefore, to the extent that, while it rests outside international law, not subject to and thus not guided by Europe's interstate rules of war, it remains internal to the global spatial order (Levinson, 2005, pp. 206–209; Schmitt, 1948/2005, p. 794).11 Schmitt describes a case of an inclusive exclusion. This explains, for instance, how wars could be waged between European powers in the colonies despite peace being concluded in Europe; or, likewise, how treaties and agreements among states that were valid for Europe did not apply to the colonies; or, how the dualism in English law between English soil, where common law ruled, and other areas where the king's power was unrestricted, reached global proportions. Included into modern world politics by means of their exclusion, the colonies occupy an exceptional position in the structure of the Eurocentric order. Schmitt regarded this exception as foundational because it produced a normal, relatively pacified, secure, and stable space against an anomic zone, a lawless colonial space free for appropriation that became the indispensable site of limitless violence and wars of expansion and annihilation (Agamben, 1998, p. 36; Rasch, 2003, pp. 124–126; Schmitt, 1940/1995b, pp. 241–242). “The old Eurocentric system of international law,” Schmitt asserted, “rested upon the differentiation of international law of a European space of states of fully valid state order and implemented peace from a non-European space of free European expansion,” that is, between “the soil of the metropolis” and “colonial soil” (Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 245, 1950/2003, pp. 218, 148, 2011 p. 114): The special territorial status of colonies thus was as clear as was the division of the earth between state territory and colonial territory. This division was characteristic of the structure of international law in this epoch and was inherent in its spatial structure. (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 199). The construction of a European normal space (the core) upon and in opposition to an anomic colonial zone (the periphery) was foundational for the Eurocentric order of the earth in the same way that the concept of the colony was special for the development of modern international law (Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 242, 1942/2015, p. 60). Schmitt claimed that in these extra-European spaces the imperial powers displaced their violent conflicts outside their continent, outsourcing them to the new world (Müller, 2003, pp. 88–91). They imagined the non-European world “without a master, uncivilized or half-civilized, an area of colonization, an object for the seizure of holdings through European powers” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 228; see also Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 60); “a sphere outside the law and open to the use of force” since “everything that occurred ‘beyond the line’ remained outside the legal, moral, and political values recognized on this side of the line” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 94, 93). It was there that sovereigns could freely wage absolute wars against each other and against the indigenous populations, that is, colonial wars, sparing the European territory from the destruction they brought about (Schmitt, 1962/2007, p. 11). The spatial ordering and legal orientation that resulted from the distinction of the two zones unburdened the state-making process as the colonial powers went on to formalize and bracket their wars on one side of the line, shielding Europe from destructive conflicts, which could be now removed and exorcised, on the other side, “beyond the lines” (Schmitt, 1943, pp. 2–3, 7, 1950/2003, p. 94, 2011, p. 117; see Rasch, 2005, pp. 257–278).12 The politicojuridical system of sovereign states, which rested upon the externalization of violence, was valid only in Europe. This spatial order of a regulated and balanced coexistence among territorial sovereigns, their equilibrium, their mutual recognition as equal and independent subjects of international law, the “humanization,” “bracketing,” “rationalization,” and “formalization” of European wars, “ended here,” Schmitt emphatically proclaimed, on this side of the lines, in Europe and on its soil (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 93). It did not extend to the other side, the overseas colonies. Thus, “Both civil wars and colonial wars remained outside this bracketing,” outside the limits and restraints of international interstate law, in the colonial territories, removed from Europe and civilization” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 309). The colonies, therefore, have another, additional exceptional meaning and the special territorial status they possess in the Eurocentric international order as overseas zones derives from their designation as stateless and lawless, extra-legal and normless, that is, as conflict zones. Their existence was necessary for the pacification of modern Europe (Galli & Fay, 2010, p. 6). Europeans could conduct their total wars freely, outside the law, in those overseas colonial “zones designated for agonal test of strength,” “where force could be used freely and ruthlessly” and “only the law of the stronger applied” (Schmitt, 1943, pp. 4–8, Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 140–171, 148, 309). The designation of a conflict zone outside Europe contributed also to the bracketing of European wars, which is its meaning and its justification in international law. (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 97–98, emphasis added; see also Rasch, 2003, p. 124) This unprecedented geopolitical distinction between Europe and its colonies differentiated the war-in-form from colonial wars, the just enemy (justus hostis) from the just cause (justa causa), removed civil warfare from domestic politics, and produced the spatial conditions for a secure and protected geopolitical framework conducive to the development and rise of the European interstate order (Schmitt, 1962/2007, p. 9). “Classical European international law,” Schmitt asserted, “pushed both of these dangerous forms of war and enmity [i.e. civil and colonial wars] to the margins” (Schmitt, 1962/2007, p. 11. Europe was spared total war because “the upholders of this international law had available sufficient free space in the colonies in order to rob their mutual confrontations in Europe of a genuine existential severity” (Schmitt, 2011 pp. 117, 116, emphasis added). In the absence of such colonial spaces and their anomalous territorial status it would have been impossible for Europe to bracket war (1940/1995b, p. 244, Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 145– 147).13 The significance of the amity lines in 16th and 17th century international law was that great areas of freedom were designated as conflict zones in the struggle over the distribution of a new world. As a practical justification, one could argue that the designation of a conflict zone at once freed the area on this side of the line—a sphere of peace and order ruled by European public law—from the immediate threat of those events “beyond the line,” which would not have been the case had there been no such zone. (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 97) In short, the distinction of state and the colony, law and anomie, inside and outside, the civilized and the uncivilized, which made possible a continental law of European sovereigns with a global reach, explains the special territorial status of the colony (Schmitt, 2011 p. 114). Here. Then. lies the centrality of this concept for Schmitt: The decisive meaning of the overseas colony for international law lies in the fact that the concrete reality of the conceptswar and peace of hitherto existing international law could only be understood on the basis of this image of space. One must always be reminded of the fact that international law is a law of war and peace, jus belli ac paci. (Schmitt, 2011 p. 115) This conceptual primacy of the colony in Schmitt's theory is reflected nowhere better than in his original interpretation of the doctrine of the natural state in modern political thought, which strongly evokes his earlier famous distinction between the norm and the exception (Schmitt, 1988/1922). The relationship between the two is now framed explicitly in concrete spatial terms as Schmitt came to identify the intellectual origins of the modern doctrine of the state of nature in the historical experience of European land appropriation and colonization (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 95–97).14 Shifting attention from the familiar view that saw in the concept of the natural state a metaphor for the religious civil wars in Europe, Schmitt introduced a geopolitical reading that instead located it in the extra-European colonial spaces of the Americas. The depiction of a normless state of war of all against all, devoid of sovereignty and government, deprived of state and law, he argued, was influenced by how Europeans imagined human existence beyond the lines, outside politics and civilization (Rasch, 2003, pp. 126, 129; Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 242, 1950/2003, p. 96). It is in this manner that Schmitt redefined the traditional contrast between the natural and political state as a distinction between colonial spaces of exception, that is, extra-European lawless zones of war, violence, and expansion, and an interstate international order that self-regulates its internal discord and contains war.15 In a similar vein he designated the juridical domestic state of exception as a spatial correlate analogous to the extra-European colonies (Blanco and de Valle, 2014, pp. 3, 6–7; Schmitt, 1943, pp. 4–5, 1950/2003, pp. 98, 207).16 Thus, hidden underneath the normative foundations of the political philosophy of the modern state, at the very roots of its justification, Schmitt hinted at the sublimated presence of a colonial geography whose existence was acknowledged insofar as it had to be negated and disavowed. These colonial zones of exception constituted the spatial foundation of the Eurocentric global norm and sustained the political and cultural idea of Europe as such (Schmitt, 1932, pp. 185–186). Modern Europe, in other words, emerges only with the global lines, through its encounter with and distinction from the overseas territories (Levinson, 2005, p. 206). It is the difference that colonialism introduces, as an exception to the law, which effectively grounds the concrete unity of a global spatial order, the “Family of Nations,” and supplies it with a common European culture and shared legal and moral values, always against the background of the colonies (Rasch, 2005, pp. 255–259; Schmitt, 1940/1995b, pp. 242, 245, 1942/2015, pp. 61–64, 1950/2003, pp. 86, 141, 168). Schmitt identifies here the necessary presence of a colonial difference against which the statocentric political and legal identity of modern Europe was constructed, took roots, and was enthroned at the center of the earth (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 233–234). In the end, Schmitt's understanding of the colony is determined by how the spatial structure of political modernity works by excluding its own foundation. As a “basic spatial fact” of the modern nomos, the colony is constitutive of the European order of the earth. This atypical history of the rise of the Eurocentric nomos underscores how the norm (i.e., the state, the European center, international law) yet again rests on and depends upon an exception (i.e., the colony, the extra-European periphery) (Rasch, 2003, pp. 128–130; Schmitt, 1942/2015, pp. 61–62).

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.