No backup for infinite intervention—the plan solves those
Beckley 15 (Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf ) TDI
Despite this deep policy interest in entanglement, however, there are few rigorous studies on the subject. Most studies on alliances examine issues only partially related to entanglement, such as the design of alliance agreements,15 the reliability of allies in wartime,16 the causes of alliance formation,17 and the effect of alliances on the likelihood of international conflict.18 The few studies that focus on entanglement engage primarily in theory building, rather than theory testing, and analyze, at most, a handful of cases.19 As a result, scholars’ hunches about the security risks of the United States’ alliances remain largely just that—hunches.
To address this shortcoming, this article tests two competing perspectives on entanglement. The first, which I call “entanglement theory,” holds that alliances drag states into wars by placing their reputations at risk, socializing their leaders into adopting allied interests and norms, and provoking adversaries and emboldening allies.20 The other perspective, which I call “freedom of action theory,” maintains that great powers can avoid entanglement by inserting loopholes into alliance agreements, sidestepping costly commitments, main taining a diversified alliance portfolio that generates offsetting demands from different allies, and using explicit alliance commitments to deter adversaries and dissuade allies from initiating or escalating conflicts.21
I test these competing perspectives by analyzing the extent of U.S. entanglement in all postwar U.S. military conflicts. Specifically, I examine every militarized interstate dispute (MID) in which the United States participated from 1948, the year it signed its first standing alliance, to 2010 and ask a basic question: To what extent was U.S. involvement driven by formal alliance commitments?
Admittedly, this is a limited ambition, as I evaluate only the frequency of past cases of U.S. entanglement, not the current level of U.S. entanglement risk. Moreover, I do not account for other potential costs of maintaining alliances, such as higher levels of military spending or poorer diplomatic relations with non-allied countries. Nevertheless, entanglement is arguably the most important cost of alliances, and providing a systematic account of past cases is an important step in gauging the United States’ current level of entanglement risk.
The results of this analysis strongly support freedom of action theory. Over a sixty-two-year period in which the United States maintained more than sixty alliances, I find only five ostensible episodes of U.S. entanglement—the 1954 and 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises, the Vietnam War, and the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Even these cases are far from clear-cut, because in each there were other important drivers of U.S. involvement; U.S. policymakers carefully limited support for allies; allies restrained the United States from escalating its involvement; the United States deterred adversaries and allies from escalating the conflict; or all of the above.
To be sure, the United States has intervened on the side of allies on numerous occasions. In most cases, however, U.S. actions were driven by an alignment of interests between the United States and its allies, not by alliance obligations. In fact, in many cases, U.S. policymakers were the main advocates of military action and cajoled reluctant allies to join the fight.
In addition, there are many cases in which alliances restrained the United States, or in which the United States restrained its allies or sidestepped costly commitments. I examine only cases of military conflict and therefore cannot evaluate fully the prevalence of such cases of nonconflict. Even within my biased sample, however, there are at least four cases in which alliances prevented U.S. escalation, and another seven cases in which the United States reneged on security commitments, restrained an ally from attacking a third party, or both.
At worst, therefore, alliances have had a mixed effect on U.S. involvement in military conflicts—some alliances at some times have encouraged U.S. military involvement; others have discouraged it; and some have simply been ignored by U.S. policymakers. The only way to build a powerful case for entanglement theory is to commit serious methodological errors. For example, one could spin correlation as causation by characterizing cases in which the United States backed allies for self-interested reasons as cases of entanglement. One also could select on the dependent variable by highlighting evidence of entanglement while ignoring instances in which the United States shirked alliance commitments or in which alliances restrained the United States or prevented conflicts from breaking out in the first place. Such practices are common in the existing literature, but they are flawed and feed an exaggerated fear of entangling alliances in American society.