Nuclear extinction is a unique vector of violence – it erases every individual and singular vector of personhood, but rejecting the conditions of the debate reinforces the bad parts/
Fishel 15 [Stefanie, Department of Political Science, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Stern Hall, Geneva, NY, “Remembering nukes: collective memories and countering state history”, Critical Military Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2] TDI
Countering state narratives What lessons can be drawn from these narratives of the same event? One clear message is that memorialization controlled by the interests of the nation-state fails to bring to the fore our nuclear vulnerability. In part, this is due to the ability of omnicidal weapons to cast doubt on both the state and broader Western conceptions of social order. As mentioned earlier in the article, nuclear weapons broadly question a liberal’s progressive theory of human potential – this is also clear in Japan’s official story of progress and peace – as well as the realist’s belief in a cyclical nature of time. Specifically, thermonuclear war makes recreating the state (the Leviathan) after war impossible in Hobbesian theory and Lockean theory. As Craig writes, “if war occurs no one may be left to point out how bad the war was, and then call for the construction of a state that could have prevented it” (Craig 2003, xvii). Beyond the challenge to the state, for Morgenthau, nuclear weapons made even death and time irrelevant categories. Nuclear death is a difference in kind rather than degree: the scale of nuclear destruction takes away the individuality of death, rendering it meaningless. It destroys immortality and “meaning of life by throwing life back upon itself” (Morgenthau 1961). There is, then, a radical difference in meaning between a man risking death by an act of will and 50 million people simultaneously reduced – by somebody switching a key thousands of miles away – to radioactive ashes, indistinguishable from the ashes of their houses, books, and animals (Morgenthau 1961). Morgenthau stresses that thinking and acting as if nuclear death were no different than other deaths and as if “it has no bearing upon the meaning of life and death” reduces our “noble” words to “absurd clichés”. Humans must come to understand that one cannot defend “freedom and civilization” with nuclear weapons, as these weapons negate the very possibility of society’s survival (Morgenthau 1961). Schell echoed these sentiments in 1998, writing that stopping nuclear proliferation is a pressing moral issue only made more important by the end of the Cold War. Danger lies in additional countries beyond the US and the former USSR “thinking the unthinkable” by creating or expanding nuclear weapons programmes (Schell 2001). In both cases, the state counters the legitimacy crisis, or unthinkability, posed by nuclear weapons by leading the debate away from nuclear weapons to hide this fundamental questioning of the basis of order itself. The state relies on an unrelenting formation of what it means to be a citizen of a nation-state, not as a human vulnerable to nuclear destruction. Unfortunately for this vision of the future, the nation-state is ethically deficient. The nation-state, based on sharp boundaries between “us and them”, creates violence in its very existence (Fishel 2013). It is naturally divisive, and focuses on a destructive account of hypostasized forms of ethnic identity that keep different political communities from forming. It divides the world into mutually exclusive opposing forces armed with thermonuclear weapons that are many times more destructive than Fat Man and Little Boy. If the nation, due to its interest in hiding its impotence in the face of nuclear weapons and covering up past aggressions, fails in creating stable and ethical communities, will Hiroshima and Nagasaki be claimed as a global memory? Can they be used to aid in shaping us into a community of memory based on thick relations of caring – using the nuclear attacks “as warning signposts in moral history” (Margalit 2002, 71)? It is the contention of this article that contextual, collective remembrance can imagine a future where we are not hapless victims, but rather a global collective aware of its vulnerabilities. This collectivity needs to be less concerned about consolidating identity – personal or national – and focus on the “eruptive force of remembering otherwise” (Simon 2005) and what this can mean for ethical relations and the future. As shown, to focus on simple, dualistic debates that serve nationalist agendas loses the power of multivocality in collective memory and also supports future war fighting which adds more categories of “acceptable” collateral damage. Atomic victimization and wartime aggression both forget “the causes and conditions of total war” unless coupled with robust public debate (Giamo 2003, 705).