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Studying existential risk is key to disaster management – you’re biased to deflate the risk with cherry picked examples BUT the negative effects of fear and insecurity are massively exaggerated – Masco is the worst account of security politics

Zimmerman 15 [Vera. MA in Political Science from George Mason University, BA in Global Affairs from George Mason University; BA in Translation between English, Russian, Ukrainian from Mariupol State University, Research Analyst at the Hudson Institute, “Book Review: The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror. By Joseph Masco (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014)”, 5-23, https://verair.wordpress.com/2015/05/23/the-theater-of-operations-national-security-affect-from-the-cold-war-to-the-war-on-terror-by-joseph-masco-durham-and-london-duke-university-press-2014/] TDI

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States prompted a global debate about nuclear terrorism to justify the invasion of Iraq, provoking much disapproval around the world, yet criticism at home about the country’s unilateral actions—unsuitable for a Western liberal democracy—did not seem to be as vociferous. In his latest book The Theatre of Operations, Professor of Anthropology, Joseph P. Masco, explains this acquiescence by the American society as a result of the well-designed population reprogramming based on fear of a nuclear catastrophe at home. This allowed for the rearrangement of the social contract, society’s docile obedience, and the expansion of national security apparatus to a planetary scale. The book portrays the state and a society as two organisms of one nervous system, both overreacting to fear of the imagined nuclear existential threat. What strikes the reader is the revelation that the United States has already practiced emotional management of its society during the Cold War. The strategic surprise attack on 9/11 triggered the return to a Schmittian state with friend-enemy distinctions, obsessed with anticipation, prevention, and proliferation of “present, contingent, projected, imagined terror” (194). The book contains five chapters written in protest against the amplification of national security threats, emotional manipulation of citizens, enlargement of security apparatus, and too much secrecy—the elements that enabled the counterterror state and created a global theater of operations. Masco shows that fear of an existential threat is a powerful emotion able to make officials overreact in their policies and convince people to sacrifice their civil liberties in the name of defense. The author does not believe that the 9/11 attacks and the receipt of a few anthrax letters were necessarily an existential threat to the U.S. national security but only served as a pretext to justify expanded defense, population management, and projection of power globally. As he puts it: “The amplification of threat has been one of the key attributes of this new system, which relies on an affective atmosphere of imminent danger to unlock new forms of governmental agency.” He makes a strong case that the American liberal democracy turned into a counterterror state which “thrives on a proliferating insecurity, using vulnerability and imaginative creativity, scenarios, fears, nightmares as its raison d’etre” (197). It “promises a world without terror via the constant production and response” of terror (156). Throughout the book, Masco maintains that the created counterterror state based on the secrecy/threat matrix is incompatible with democratic governance. Statements such as these are found all through the book with a notable lack of competing explanations to his argument. While only briefly recognizing the existence of the real threats, Masco’s critical interpretations of the government’s actions seem over confident and biased. In chapter one, “Survival Is Your Business: Engineering Ruins and Affect in Nuclear America,” Masco argues that the fear of existential nuclear devastation is embedded in every day American culture. The lively depiction of existential disasters (equated to the effects from nuclear explosions) found in recent Hollywood blockbusters of the 1990s like Armageddon and Deep Impact is reminiscent of a 1950s civil defense documentary spectacle Cue for Survival on the effects of a post-nuclear explosion in American city. The films demonstrate how the fear of the anticipated, imaginary nuclear devastation not only built a nuclear state as a response but produced a culture of nuclear fear that enabled the present counterterror state. To mobilize the American society after 9/11, the government only had to attach the image of WMD to a terrorist. More recent evidence that highlighted the strong impact of nuclear imagery in American culture was the perception and presentation of hurricane Katrina. In chapter two “Bad Weather: On Planetary Crisis,” Masco shows a strong link between nuclear war and ecological crisis in American culture. Instead of viewing Katrina as a result of climate change, the destruction was understood by America’s leadership, media, and citizens only in terms of nuclear catastrophe and was linguistically equated to an atomic explosion in Hiroshima. In “Sensitive but Unclassified: Secrecy and the Counterterror State”, Masco argues that excessive secrecy, which enabled the counterterror regime, has become nothing more than “a means to power” and is incompatible with democracy. Resorting to claims based on secrecy, the executive power asserts superior knowledge which not only helps manipulate threats but avoids legal persecution. Masco interprets the reclassification of the declassified documents that occurred after 9/11 as “the government’s refusal to admit its responsibility for the creation of boundless, endless nuclear and counterterror state.” In chapter four, “Biosecurity Noir: WMDs in a World without Borders,” Masco singles out concrete evidence of the amplification of the invisible biothreat triggered by the receipt of a few anthrax letters in 2001 to support his argument about the made-up ambiguous link to WMD. The author highlights that by proliferating visions [depictions] of catastrophic danger, biosecurity created a militarized response of global preemption in the name of domestic defense. Masco argues his case well and sharply, providing compelling evidence, but his interpretations of evidence at times seems exaggerated and biased. Though Masco does not deny the existence of the real threats, his recognition of them is too brief, while consideration of an alternative view is rather weak. He acknowledges that terrorist violence is not fictitious but insists that for the most part the United States inflated threats and politically exploited potential danger to declare and maintain the state of emergency. Such focus on the amplification of threats seems to suggest that for the most part the threats are not that real. Masco suggests that the link between terrorists and WMD is mainly inflated. Yet there is a real global concern about 2,000 tons of highly-radioactive nuclear materials being stored in poorly secured civilian locations around the world. The book never mentions the threat of a dirty bomb, which today is viewed as a more likely occurrence than an atomic bomb explosion. The IAEA cites a hundred reported thefts of nuclear materials on average each year. There is a good chance terrorists can get their hands on enough nuclear materials to produce a dirty bomb. The United States meets these challenges with increased international cooperation. Masco’s main argument that “the US is no longer constrained by territorial limits” is exaggerated. The only two cases cited when the United States appeared unconstrained were the invasion of Iraq. Though the invasion of Iraq was opposed by some U.S. allies (France, Germany, and New Zealand), it was still a combined force coalition from the U.S., the UK, Australia, and Poland. The United States does not have an unrestricted reach as Masco wants to depict. It is constrained by sovereignty and territorial integrity of other stable states. The unstable nuclear regimes in North Korea and Iran present that existential nuclear threat to the U.S. described by Masco, but the United States is in no rush to invade these countries. According to the anticipatory and preemptive logic Masco prescribes to the United States, it could have already invaded those states to prevent the disaster. Another limitation of his argument is that he paints the nuclear and counterterror states as consistent through all the presidencies, thus, drawing all administrations under a common denominator. Under Obama, the counterterror state became a liberal democracy again. The ‘unrestrained’ theater of operation has shrunk by ending the presence in Iraq and withdrawing from Afghanistan, even though our presence there could have been extended based on the preemption logic. Obama recognized the faults of the Bush administration in acting unilaterally, scaled back stability operations, and emphasized sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. The emergence of the real ISIL threat undermines the book’s core argument of threat amplification, the U.S. preemption logic of response, and unconstrained global reach. The U.S.-led global effort against ISIL amounts to more than 50 nations, which shows the unified nature of the fight. Masco asserts that U.S. superpower depends on the ability of the state to monopolize a discourse of danger, but he doesn’t discuss how the United States succeeded in doing that. Masco could have developed his argument by tracing how the United States was able to use its soft power to mobilize like-minded states to agree with U.S. hegemony on WOT. It will be interesting to trace the U.S. internalization of fear and terror. He could have examined how allies responded to U.S. domestic mobilization of its population and whether other states imitated U.S. emotional management projects to mobilize their own populations. This would boost his argument that the U.S. was able to project its power on the global scale. In Theatre of Operations, Masco makes a compelling argument about the creation of the unrestrained theater of operations via domestication of fear and terror carried over from the Cold War days. His anthropological study reveals the extent to which a democracy is willing to use fear to assure the core principle of the social contract, defined by Hobbes as the exchange of public obedience for collective security. A democracy that chooses to be preoccupied with security risks to forgo core democratic values resulting in the lack of transparency, restriction of free flow of information, and negligence of non-military threats—no less threatening than nuclear terrorism. Making criticism of U.S. actions the main focus of the book, however, Masco’s interpretations are not properly balanced and sometimes appear biased. Still, reading Masco’s insight of the purpose of U.S. actions in the post-9/11 context offers opportunities to think critically about the effects of 9/11 emotional reprogramming of society and state of emergencies in U.S. history.

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