LAWs development encourages disarmament and de-escalation of nuclear weapons.
Umbrello et al 19 [Umbrello, Steven, et al. “The Future of War: Could Lethal Autonomous Weapons Make Conflict More Ethical?” AI & SOCIETY, Springer London, 6 Feb. 2019, link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-019-00879-x] TDI
More generally speaking, the growing use of UAVs in conflict situations is consistent with a broader trend toward high-precision weaponry and away from larger, more destructive weapons like those in the world’s nuclear arsenals (Wilson 2013). There are some reasons for welcoming this shift. For example, the use of high-precision weapons like LAWs to achieve a state’s military objectives could reduce the probability and proportion of indiscriminate harm, thus violating the LoW and “rules of engagement” (RoE) less than might otherwise have been possible. Even more, the “ease-of-use” of LAWs that are fully autonomous could enhance the “balance of terror” that prevents conflict from breaking out by providing a credible means for retaliation: “If you strike me first, I will unleash a swarm of LAWs that devastate your infrastructure, poison your streams, set fire to your farms, destroy your armies, and assassinate your leaders.” The precision and effectiveness of LAWs could also accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament, seeing as the conception of LAWS regards them as agents capable of conventional weapons use rather non-conventional weapons platforms. First, consider that research on the potential climatic consequences of a nuclear war resulted in the replacement of MAD (“mutually-assured destruction”) with SAD (“self-assured destruction”). The reason is that an exchange of nuclear weapons—even a regional one [citation]—could initiate a “nuclear winter” that causes global agricultural failures, widespread starvation, the spread of infectious disease, and other catastrophic sequelae that cannot be contained within national borders (Mills et al. 2014; Xia et al. 2015). Consequently, a nuclear war would all but guarantee the self-annihilation of states involved. As Seth Baum (2015) notes, though, LAWs could provide a kind of “winter-safe deterrence” by providing states with a credible threat of retaliation without the global catastrophic risks of nuclear confict. Thus, LAWs could render the world’s nuclear arsenals irrelevant and, in doing so, lower the overall risk of human annihilation.