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You should invert your normal standards of risk calculus and prioritize the ongoing threats to colonized people over “existential” crises, because any other impact framing only secures white humanity – whenever the 1NC says to vote neg to save the world, ask yourself whose world they’re saving.

Mitchell and Chaudhury ’20 [Audra Mitchell, Balsillie School of International Affairs @ Wilfrid Laurier University, and Aadita Chaudhury, York University. “Worlding beyond ‘the’ ‘end’ of ‘the world’: white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms”, September 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117820948936] pfox TDI

It is often said that the ‘end of the world’ is approaching – but whose world, exactly, is expected to end? Over the last several decades, a popular and increasingly influential literature on ‘human extinction’, ‘global catastrophic risks’, and eco-apocalypse has emerged in the social sciences and popular culture. This rapidly growing body of knowledge is produced by scientists, science journalists, policy-analysts, and scholars of global affairs, all seeking to reach broad audiences and influence international policy-making. Their central aim is to diagnose the gravest global threats and to offer strategies to protect the future of what they regard as ‘humanity’. Yet, despite their claims to universality, we argue that these ‘end of the world’ discourses are more specifically concerned about protecting the future of whiteness. Although our primary aim in this article is to diagnose these potentially destructive narratives, we also engage with the rich and varied sphere of BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color) futurisms. These contributions challenge the perception that there is no alternative to the apocalyptic futures imagined by white scholars. They work to create plural worlds that vastly exceed white visions of ‘the’ end of ‘the world’, embodying much wider, diverse, and transformative concepts of, and beyond, ‘humanity’, ‘nature’, and ‘the planet’. We view this article as a call for IR scholars to recognize and engage these plural imaginaries, which contest and perforate the boundaries of mainstream IR concepts such as ‘humanity’, ‘agency’, ‘governance’, ‘threat’, and ‘harm’. As Amy Niang’s contribution to this special issue shows, those concepts are too often constructed through forms of power that negate, oppress, and super-exploit particular human bodies, societies, and ways of being.

Our analysis takes seriously this special issue’s efforts toward ‘thinking IR into the future’, but with several important caveats. First, we reject the Euro-centric notion that there is ‘a’ or ‘the’ single future – just as we reject the notion of a single world, now or ever. Such assumptions are at the core of the mainstream apocalyptic visions (and their linear temporalities) that are increasing integral to IR imaginaries at the ‘turn’ of the discipline’s ‘first century’. We contend that the foundational and generative role of such imaginaries in global power structures does not receive adequate attention in the field of IR or in the broader social and natural sciences. As a result, their tendency to narrow and homogenize the futures of worlds, plural, goes largely unchecked within the discipline and its discourses. Yet the white futurist discourses we discuss are influential: they aim to bring about major shifts in global public consciousness and policy-making and strategy. They are often accorded validation by the scientific credentials of their authors and their embeddedness in large-scale data and modeling processes. Through these means of public persuasion, such discourses have the potential to shape concepts that are, and will likely continue to be, foundational to IR: how threats are understood; the boundaries of ‘humanity’ and ‘nonhumanity’, and the distributions of harm across and beyond these structures; and the forms of agency and governance demanded by, and deemed acceptable within, a context of global crises. An interdisciplinary IR concerned with interconnected global challenges – the aspiration of this special issue – needs to attend to how dominant narratives and futural imaginaries cut off and sideline the concrete presents and possible futures of plural Others. Second, where this special issue asks ‘how we should hold things together, conceptually, empirically and disciplinarily’ (see introduction, italics ours), we ask what possibilities arise when current structures fall apart – or, indeed, are actively dismantled by the resurgence of worlds they seek to oppress or erase. Far from seeing this scenario solely in terms of catastrophe, as many of the narratives discussed in this article do, we want to open up more conversation in IR about its emancipatory, creative potential for the global connection between and amongst plural worlds.

With these aims in mind, we start by examining a number of salient and influential works in the field addressing global crises, including ‘global catastrophic risks’ and ‘human extinction’, demonstrating how they express anxiety for, and seek to protect whiteness. The second section points to BIPOC futurisms that directly challenge the futures circumscribed by whiteness and offer distinct forms of subjectivity, temporality, and mobilities for responding to ongoing disaster. Throughout, we focus on how futures are imagined, who imagines them and with whose flourishing in mind in competing struggles for survival and thriving in (post-) catastrophic worlds.

White subjectivities

Discourses that predict the imminent ‘end of the world’ are not as universal as they often claim to be. The futures they fear for, seek to protect and work to construct are rooted in a particular set of global social structures and subjectivities: whiteness. Whiteness is not reducible to skin pigmentation, genetics or genealogy. It is a set of cultural, political, economic, normative, and subjective structures derived from Euro-centric societies and propagated through global formations such as colonization and capitalism. These multi-scalar structures work by segregating bodies through the inscription of racial difference, privileging those they recognize or construct as ‘white’ and unequally distributing harms to those that they do not. Whiteness is also a form of property that accrues benefits – including material, physical, and other forms of security – and pervasive forms of power, across space, time, and social structures. Due in part to its trans-formation through long-duration, global patterns of violence and conquest, whiteness takes unique forms wherever and whenever it coalesces, so it should not be treated as universal – despite its own internal claims to this status. Most of the leading contributors to mainstream ‘end of the world’ discourses discussed in this article are rooted in Euro-American cultural contexts, and in particular in settler colonial and/or imperial states such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. As such, the forms of whiteness they embody are linked to particular histories of settlement, frontier cultures, resource-based imperialisms, genocides of Indigenous communities, histories of slavery, and modes of anti-Blackness.

Whiteness is remarkable in its ability to render itself invisible to those who possess and benefit from it. Many, if not most, of the (often liberal humanitarian) authors of ‘end of the world’ discourses seem unaware of its integral influence on their thinking, and would almost certainly be horrified at the thought of their work entrenching racialized injustices. We are not suggesting that these authors espouse explicit, intentional and/or extreme racist ideals, on which much public discussion by white people of racism tends to focus. Nor do we wish to homogenize or present as equivalent all of the viewpoints discussed in this paper, which display a range of expressions of whiteness and levels of awareness thereof. On the contrary, we work to center broad, everyday, structural ways in which underlying logics of whiteness and white supremacy frame and permeate mainstream paradigms and discourses, including those identified as liberal, humanitarian, or progressive. Even amongst white people who consciously and explicitly disavow racism, unconscious, habitual, normalized, structurally-embedded assumptions circulate, and are reproduced in ways that perpetuate race as a global power structure. This includes one of the authors of this paper (Mitchell), who, as a white settler, continues to benefit from and participate – and thus ‘invest’ – in structures of whiteness, and therefore has a continual responsibility to confront them (although total divestment is not possible).

The ‘habits’ of racism are reflected strongly in the way that contemporary ‘end of the world’ narratives frame their protagonists: those attributed with meaningful agency and ethical status in the face of global threats; those whose survival or flourishing is prioritized or treated as a bottom line when tradeoffs are imagined and planned; and, crucially, those deemed capable of and entitled to ‘save the world’ and determine its future. This is expressed in several key features of the genre, including its domination by white thinkers; the forms of subjectivity and agency it embraces; and the ways it contrasts its subjects against BIPOC communities.

First, contributors to fast-growing fields like the study of ‘existential risk’ or ‘global catastrophic risk’ are overwhelmingly white. As we will see, almost all of the authors identified by the literature review on which this paper is based, and certainly the most influential thinkers in the field, are white. For example, the seminal collection Global Existential Risk, which claims to offer a comprehensive snapshot of this field, is edited by two white male Europeans (Nick Bostrom and Milan Circovic) and authored by an almost entirely white (and all-male) group of scholars. Likewise, the most senior positions within influential think tanks promoting the study of ‘existential risk’, such as the Future of Humanity Institute, the Cambridge Center for the Study of Existential Risk and , are dominated by white men, with few exceptions. Another expression of this tendency toward epistemic whiteness is found in the habit, prominent amongst white academics, of citing all or mostly-white scholars, which entrenches a politics of citation that privileges whiteness and acknowledges only some intersectionalities as relevant. As mentioned above, Mitchell’s (2017) work offers an example of this tendency: while it engages critical, feminist, and queer post-apocalyptic visions written by white authors, it does not center BIPOC perspectives or knowledge systems.

These examples do not simply raise issues of numerical representation, nor can whiteness necessarily be dismantled simply by altering these ratios. More importantly, all-white or majority white spaces create epistemes in which most contributors share cultural backgrounds, assumptions, and biases that are rarely challenged by alternative worldviews, knowledge systems or registers of experience. In such epistemes the perceived boundaries of ‘human thought’ are often elided with those of Euro-centric knowledge. For example, influential American settler journalist David Wallace-Wells contends that there exists no framework for grasping climate change besides ‘mythology and theology’. In so doing, he ignores centuries of ongoing, systematic observation and explicit articulations of concern by BIPOC knowledge keepers about climactic change. The bracketing of BIPOC knowledges not only severely limits the rigor of discourses on global crises, but also, as bi-racial organizer and thinker adrienne maree brown argues, it produces distorted outcomes. For instance, it smuggles normative judgments that ‘turn Brown bombers into terrorists and white bombers into mentally ill victims’ into apparently ‘objective’ claims. Similarly, the influential work of Black American criminologist Ruth Wilson Gilmore demonstrates how white imaginaries of the threat posed by BIPOC bodies has produced the massive global penal complex and the radically unequal distribution of life chances. In short, imaginaries create worlds, so it matters greatly whose are privileged, and whose are excluded.

Further, emerging narratives of the ‘end of the world’ explicitly center figures of whiteness as their protagonists – as the survivors of apocalypse, the subjects capable of saving the world from it, and as those most threatened. In these discourses, ‘survivors’ are framed as saviors able to protect and/or regenerate and even improve Western forms of governance and social order by leveraging resilience, scientific prowess, and technological genius. For example, the cover of American settler scientists Tony Barnosky and Elizabeth Hadley’s book Tipping Points for Planet Earth features a stylized male ‘human’ whom they identify as former California governor Jerry Brown (a powerful white settler politician) holding the earth back from rolling over a cliff. Similarly, presenting a thought experiment about the planet’s future, Homer-Dixon asks his readers to imagine ‘an average male – call him John’ (in fact, the most popular male name globally at the time of writing was Mohammed). This is followed by images of a Caucasian male dressed in safari or hiking gear – both emblematic of symbols colonial conquest – tasked with choosing from two forks on a path, as imagined by white American poet Robert Frost. This image of rugged masculine whiteness, embodied in physical strength, colonial prowess, and the ability to dominate difficult landscapes is mirrored in his framing of his former co-workers on oil rigs in the Canadian prairies as models of resilience. Similarly, American settler science writer Annalee Newitz proposes the Canadian province of Saskatchewan as a ‘model for human survival’, based on her perceptions of the resilience, persistence and collaborative frontier attitudes of its people. Saskatchewan is a notoriously racist part of Canada, in which violence against Indigenous people continues to be integral to its white-dominated culture – yet this polity and its culture are held up by Newitz as a model of ‘human’ resilience. By imagining subjects in whom whiteness is elided with resilience and survival, these discourses not only normalize and obscure the modes of violence and oppression through which perceived ‘resilience’ – or, in blunt terms, preferential access to survival – is achieved. They also work to displace the threat of total destruction ‘onto others who are seen as lacking the resourcefulness of the survivor’.

In addition, many ‘end of the world’ narratives interpellate subjects of white privilege by assuming that readers are not (currently) affected by the harms distributed unequally by global structures of environmental racism. For instance, Barnosky and Hadley (italics ours) state, ‘if you are anything like we are, you probably think of pollution as somebody else’s problem. . . you probably don’t live near a tannery, mine dump or any other source of pollution’. For many people of color, living near a source of pollution may be nearly inescapable as a result of structural-material discrimination, including zoning practices and the accessibility of housing. Viewing ecological harms as ‘someone else’s problem’ is a privilege afforded to those who have never been forced contemplate the destruction of their communities or worlds. At the same time, these authors – along with many others working in the genre – invoke narratives akin to ‘all lives matter’ or ‘colour-blindness’ that erase unequal distributions of harm and threat. For instance, during their international travels for scientific research and leisure, Barnosky and Hadley (italics ours) describe a dawning awareness that ‘the problems we were writing about. . .were everybody’s problems. . .no one was escaping the impacts. . . including us’. They go on to frame as equivalent flooding in Pakistan that displaced 20 million people and killed 2000 with the inconveniences caused by the temporary flooding of the New York subway system in 2012. In addition, they cite evidence of endocrine disruption in American girls caused by pollution, stating that the youngest of the cohort are African American and Latina but that ‘the most dramatic increase is in Caucasian girls’ (italics ours). In this framing, even though BIPOC children remain most adversely affected, white children are pushed to the foreground and framed as more urgently threatened in relative terms. These comparisons background the disproportionate burden of ecological harm born by BIPOC, and reflect a stark calculus of the relative value of white and BIPOC lives. The ‘all lives matter’ logic employed here constructs ‘a universal human frailty’ in which responsibility for ecological threats is attributed to ‘humans’ in general, and the assignment of specific culpability is avoided. While Newitz avers that ‘assigning blame [for ecological harm] is less important than figuring out how to. . .survive’, we argue that accurately attributing responsibility is crucial to opening up futures in which it is possible to dismantle the structural oppressions that unequally distribute harms and chances for collective survival.

Preoccupation with the subjects of whiteness in ‘end of the world’ discourses is also reflected in the framing of BIPOC communities as threats to the survival of ‘humanity’. These fears are perhaps most simply and starkly expressed in anxieties over population decline within predominantly white countries, paired with palpable fear of rising birth rates amongst BIPOC communities. Chillingly, such fears are often connected to the mere biological survival of BIPOC, and the reproductive capacities of Black and Brown bodies – especially those coded as ‘female’, and therefore ‘fertile’ within colonial gender binaries. For instance, in his treatise on ‘over’-population, American settler science writer Alan Weisman addresses the ‘problem’ raised by the likely significant increase of survival rates (especially amongst children) as a result of widely-available cures for illnesses such as malaria or HIV. Since, he avers, it would be ‘unconscionable’ to withhold these vaccines, Weisman suggests that malaria and HIV research funding should also promote family planning – that is, control of BIPOC fertility – since ‘there’s no vaccine against extinction’. Here, BIPOC survival and reproductivity is literally – even if not strictly intentionally – framed as an incurable disease that could culminate in ‘extinction’. Although some of these discussions examine total growth in human populations globally, much of this research focuses on relative population sizes, usually of BIPOC-majority places to those inscribed as white. For instance, British doctor John Guillebaud predicts a ‘birth dearth’ in Europe while likening ‘unremitting population growth’ in other parts of the world to ‘the doctrine of the cancer cell’. Although these regions are described in various ways throughout the genre – for instance, as ‘poor’ or ‘developing’, the areas slated for growth are almost always BIPOC-majority. For example, Hungarian demographer Paul Demeny (italics ours) argues that Europe’s population is steadily shrinking ‘while nearby populations explode’. Drawing on Demeny’s work, Homer-Dixon warns of a future 3:1 demographic ratio between North Africa/West Asia and Europe, along with 70% growth in Bangladesh, 140% growth in Kenya, and a doubling of the populations of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Directly after sharing these statistics, he appends a list of international news reports referring to, for example, clashes between Indigenous communities in Kenya, riots in Shanghai, and murder rates in Mexico. In so doing, he directly juxtaposes BIPOC population growth with stereotypes of violence and ‘incivility’.

BIPOC are often represented in these narratives as embodiments of ecological collapse and threat, embedding the assumption that ‘black people don’t care about the environment’, and that the global ‘poor’ will always prioritize short-term economic needs above ecological concerns. This belief is reflected in travelogue-style descriptions of ecological devastation, including Barnosky and Hadley’s musings, while on holiday in Utah, that the ancient Puebloan society collapsed because they had run out of water – a situation which they project onto future Sudan, Somalia, and Gaza. In addition, they diagnose the fall of what they call the ‘extinct’ Mayan community to overpopulation and over-exploitation of resources – despite the survivance of over 6 million Mayan people in their Ancestral lands and other places at the time of writing. These descriptions chime with the common refrain on the part of settler states that BIPOC are unable to care properly for their land, even in the absence of conflicting data. This constructed ignorance allows those states to frame BIPOC territories as ‘wasteland’ awaiting annexation or improvement, or as dumping grounds for the externalities of capitalism. What’s more, the use of BIPOC communities as cautionary tales for planetary destruction strongly suggests that the redistribution of global power, land ownership, and other forms of agency toward BIPOC structures would result in ecological disaster.

Unidirectional time

One of the hallmarks of emerging ‘end of the world’ discourses is profound anxiety about disruptions to – or reversals of – the linear concept of time that underpins European post-Enlightenment sciences. At stake, these discourses claim, is the ‘progress’ of humans and other life forms toward greater complexity and perfection. Frequently, lifestyles, forms of governance, conditions and structures associated with whiteness are presented as the current pinnacle of this movement under threat by global crises. For example, in The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View from the Future, in which they assess the global effects of climate change, American settler scholars Naomi Oreskes and Eric Conway issue ‘a call to protect the American way of life before it’s too late’ (italics ours). Similarly, in the context of global population dynamics, Weisman worries about the collapse of modern Western urban infrastructure and the loss of a ‘European standard of living’. Similarly, Barnosky and Hadley reminisce about recreational family trips to ‘Africa’ to see ‘the last remnants of big game’. These texts express profound anxiety over the loss of what Quandamooka scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson calls white possessions, including empire, territory, and the biological and cultural capital of whiteness. They also enact a form of pre-emptive possessive mourning which frames particular animals and geographical features as the birthright of Western children.

In addition, many authors working in this genre worry about the interruption of the perceived stadial progression of ‘humanity’, a narrative that celebrates the emergence of whiteness through the elimination of ‘inferior’ races or cultures. For example, Canadian settler scholar Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (italics ours) warns that the extinction of ‘humanity’, which she associates with ‘rational life’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘civilization’ (terms all deeply linked to Euro-centric and colonial subjectivities) would be ethically wrong ‘if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing’. In this vein, Bostrom idealizes a future in which the continued evolution of ‘(post)humanity’ culminates in a form of ‘technological maturity’ that adheres to mainstream norms of white maleness: deeply disembodied, unattached to place, and dominant over, or independent from, ‘nature’.

Closely-linked to worries about the loss of potential ‘human progression’ is the fear of de-volution or back-sliding. In some cases, fears of demographic decline in ‘white-majority’ regions (see above) extend to worries about the biological ‘extinction’ of white people. For instance, a recent report asserts that there has been 59.3% decline in total sperm count in men from North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, but no comparable or significant decline in South America, Asia, and Africa, despite a paucity of studies in the latter regions (Ghosh 2017). While warning of a biological decline of whiteness, the articulation of these fears and the funding of research to address them undergirds a resurgence of whiteness formed in the perceived face of its destruction.

Indeed, many contributors to ‘end of the world’ discourses offer strategies for the reconstruction and ‘improvement’ of existing power structures after a global catastrophe. For example, American settler economist Robin Hanson calculates that if 100 humans survived a global catastrophic disaster that killed all others, they could eventually move back through the ‘stages’ of ‘human’ development, returning to the ‘hunter-gatherer stage’ within 20,000 years and then ‘progressing’ from there to a condition equivalent to contemporary society (defined in Euro-centric terms). Other authors focus on social, political, and economic forms of regeneration through simplification, which Homer-Dixon calls ‘catagenesis’. ‘Western civilization is not a lost cause’, he insists,

‘using reason and science to guide decisions, paired with extraordinary leadership and exceptional goodwill, human society can progress to higher and higher levels of well-being and development. . . But that requires resisting the very natural urge. . .to become less cooperative, less generous and less open to reason’ (italics ours).

In this vision, Western civilization – which, is elided here with ‘human society’ – can salvage the future using some of its trademark claims: the possession of reason, science, and cooperativeness. However, this requires assimilating all human communities into a Western liberal-cosmopolitan mode of civility and suppressing forms of resistance that threaten to knock this goal off course. If ‘humanity’ is able to achieve this goal and develop a ‘prospective mind’ capable of seeing opportunity in destruction, Homer-Dixon argues it will be able to ‘turn breakdown to our advantage’ (italics ours). Recalling that the ‘us’ in this discourse actively interpellates whiteness, this discourse frames global catastrophe as an opportunity to consolidate white structures of domination, assimilate resistors, and ultimately increase their power. Other authors who foresee post-apocalyptic movement toward a dazzling future (for whiteness) are clear about its costs. In his seminal book on human extinction, Canadian settler philosopher John Leslie states that ‘misery and death for billions [caused by an ecological crisis] would be immensely tragic, but might be followed by slow recovery and then a glittering future for a human race which had learned its lesson’. Similarly, Bostrom argues even the fractional reduction of threats to the possibility of posthuman, techno-infused subjectivities, by any means, would be worth ‘at least a hundred times the value of a million [contemporary] human lives’. Although rarely explicitly stated, it is not difficult to discern whose lives these authors believe might be sacrificed for the ‘greater good’ of ‘learning lessons’ and rescuing ‘humanity’ as they see it. This can be gleaned from these authors’ assessments of the ‘winners and losers’ of previous global upheavals. For example, in assessing the tumult of the twentieth century, Homer-Dixon states that Western capitalist societies were amongst the ‘most adaptive’ – and therefore closest to his ideal of the ‘prospective mind’ – while

‘at the other end of the spectrum, we find societies, including many in sub-Saharan Africa and some in Asia and Latin America, that have much lower ability to manage or adapt. . . a few, like Haiti and Somalia, have completely succumbed.’

While this statement refers historical patterns, it is presented as part of an analysis that explicitly analyzes historical trends as indicators of future scenarios. As such, it inscribes ongoing racial inequalities and stereotypes far into the future.

Despite these strategies for re-vitalization and post-apocalyptic resurgence, some white futurists express concerns about the ‘de-volution’ of ‘humanity’ from its perceived pinnacle in Euro-centric societies. For example, American settler economist Hanson describes the emergence of ‘humanity’ in terms of four ‘progressions’: from animals with enlarged brains to ‘hunter-gatherers’, then to agricultural societies and finally technology-driven industrial models. From his perspective, the ‘return’ to a ‘hunter-gatherer’ society would constitute the reversal of ‘human progress’. This scheme echoes a twentieth century scientific paradigm that holds that ‘humanity’, ‘human nature’, and liberal values emerged from the transcendence of hunter-gatherer brains and social structures. In this vein, Homer-Dixon (italics ours) states that without the emergence of modern petro-capitalism, ‘we would still be hunter-gatherers, surviving on grubs, roots and local game’, and that moving ‘back’ to this state would involve the crushing of ‘engineering marvels, political institutions and our culture and great art. . .into dust’ (italics ours). He and others, including Oreskes and Conway (2014) predict that this ‘reversal’ would also destroy democracy and liberal cosmopolitanism, producing highly-authoritarian forms of governance. In the face of this feared ‘de-volution’, some authors worry that ‘it is not even clear how much longer our descendants would remain distinctively “human”’. These accounts explicitly denigrate ‘hunter-gatherers’ – including many contemporary Indigenous societies – as ‘pre-human’, authoritarian and a degraded form of (pre-)humanity, while effacing the technological, political, and other forms of modernity and futurism embraced by BIPOC communities (see below).

Following this logic, proposed efforts to safeguard ‘human’ achievements or ‘progress’ often focus on controlling, directly instrumentalizing or even eliminating BIPOC bodies. According to Bostrom and his colleagues, reducing existential risk would require invasive, assimilative forms of government, including the creation of a ‘singleton’ – a form of governance that encompasses the entire planet and beyond, and in which every aspect of existence is merged into a collective intelligence. Less ambitious strategies for securing an ‘improved’ future for whiteness involve intensive control, surveillance, and policing. According to Newitz (italics ours) ‘if we want our species to be around for another million years, . . . we must take control of the earth’ through geo-engineering, bio-engineering, or the colonization of other planets. In many cases, these strategies involve the intensification of control over BIPOC bodies, relationships, and ways of life. Homer-Dixon (italics ours), outlines an ‘aggressively proactive’ strategy that includes, amongst other measures, family planning in countries that ‘still have high fertility rates’; conservation of ‘resources’, transitions to cleaner energy globally, post-conflict reconstruction, efforts to boost resilience of governments in ‘poor’ countries to reduce the ‘spillover’ of immigrants and disease; and targeted efforts to destroy ‘extremist groups’. Barnosky and Hadley also focus on education, particularly of girls, in BIPOC-majority places – including the use of explicitly colonial educational traditions, as in Mauritius – as a means of suppressing birth rates. They argue that it may be necessary to devote 50% of earth’s land to feed a growing ‘human’ population, including ‘switching from traditional crops to high-yield crops’ and ‘consolidating small farms into large, mainly monocultural operations, including the use of genetically modified organisms’. In so doing, they influential American settler conservationist E.O. Wilson’s (2016) proposal to annex 50% of earth’s surface as ‘inviolable nature reserves’ governed by the norms of Western conservation.

These plans for ‘saving humanity’ and the planet involve the re-enactment and innovation of key techniques used by European colonizers to annex land, displace communities and undermine the sovereignty of BIPOC peoples across the planet. Similarly, Weisman considers possible strategies of social control designed to reverse-engineer ‘liveable’ conditions. To this end, he defines

‘the optimum population as the number of humans who can enjoy a standard of living that the majority of us would find acceptable. . .roughly equivalent to a European level, pre-[2008 financial] crisis’.

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