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x. The DA’s narrative of China’s rise is rooted in the logic of Yellow Peril that relies on constructing East Asia as an existential threat to the white Western international order and culminates in genocide.

Barder ’21 [Alexander, International Relations @ Florida International University. 2021. “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and the Asia-Pacific War”, Chapter 6 in Global Race War: International Politics and Racial Hierarchy.] pfox TDI

The salience of anti-Japanese racism in the United States did not emerge willy-nilly out of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor or the need to induce pro-war sentiment in an American public largely content with its aloofness from global geopolitics. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, anti-Asian racism proliferated in American society and politics. Recall from  Alfred Mahan’s concern about the nascent conflicts with Asiatic civilizations and the potential for racial conflict in the twentieth century that would come to constitute global politics. As America became a global power, the notion of the “yellow peril” dominated American ideas about the Pacific as much as those of economic expansion. From the Chinese-Exclusion Act of 1882 to the denial by the United States of Japan’s request for enshrining a covenant on racial equality at Versailles for the League of Nations in 1919, this period in the United States marked a certain fear of and contempt for the Japanese and Chinese in particular. The famous American writer Jack London, in his 1910 short story “The Unparalleled Invasion,” imagines a resurgent China bursting beyond the Pacific as a result of population growth to challenge Western civilization. Only, London writes, as a result of biological warfare leading to outright genocide of the Chinese is Western civilization saved. Indeed, London’s message in the story is not only that racial genocide avant la lettre is warranted but that such techniques should be used only against non-Western populations as a way of maintaining racial hierarchy. In much of the “yellow peril” literature, fictional and otherwise, a persistent theme is the need for a broad alliance of European/Western powers to counteract the threat posed by a rising Asia.

This particular theme of presenting Asian races as inherently threatening in terms of an almost unstoppable mass of people was ubiquitous in late nineteenth-century Western literature and political discourse. Its anxiety reimagines the Mongolian invasions of the thirteenth century as a specter haunting Europe and the West as a whole. Indeed, it was not just in the United States that such racist views proliferated; European intellectuals and politicians voiced outright hostility toward what they saw as an inferior, yet potentially dangerous, set of East Asian “hordes.” The term itself, “yellow peril,” came into widespread circulation with Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany pronouncing it in the 1890s; it evoked this specter of a global threat that challenged the very notion of a European state system. “The East” thus came to signify this almost limitless territorial expanse populated by racially inferior people, which would cultivate particularly German fantasies of empire and colonization, a theme that the Nazis would base their geopolitical imaginary on (). Moreover, this racial notion of the East or Asiatic would continue to structure Western imaginations after the Second World War; it would come to play an important role during the Cold War, with the Soviet Union being seen as an “Asiatic” power and the Chinese as a monolithic communist threat to American interests in the Pacific. George Kennan, in his famous essay “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” argued that the Soviet Union emerged out of the “Russian-Asiatic world,” which implied that its “particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power.” The fear of “Asia” in American discourse never entirely goes away. Throughout the Cold War, China becomes the Asiatic (communist) enemy whose machinations aim to subvert American influence and power in the region. In the 1980s, the nominally pliant Japanese ally takes on more ominous characterizations with the intensity of economic competition. By the turn of the twentieth-first century, China returns as the main culprit in future threats to American global hegemony.

This chapter explores the history of such racialized threats and fears of Asia in the Western imagination. What I wish to show is that the discourse of the “yellow peril” can be understood as a process of world-making in which “Asian” alterity is heightened through ideas of threat and insecurity; it is a discourse of anxiety wherein the global racial imaginary is seen as being in crisis and what potentially replaces it is seen as a world of disorder and violence. To be sure, this idea of yellow peril was certainly not accepted ubiquitously in the West; it was also contested and debated among a wide range of writers, policymakers, and diplomats, many of whom did not necessarily accept its conclusions even if they were accepting of its racial premises. The Anglo-Japanese alliance beginning in 1902 is emblematic of the tensions between negotiating the racial views of purported Japanese inferiority and the necessity of developing a strategic Pacific partnership with a rising power. Many diplomats also recognized the complexity of Asian politics and the incredibly facile claims of an inherent aggregate that is called “Asian”—much like criticisms of discourses of civilizations about the “Islamic” world ().

Nonetheless the racial premises of the yellow peril form an integral part of how the globe was rendered intelligible on the basis of racial difference and hierarchy. The first section of the chapter explores this form of world-making of the yellow peril through the work of Arthur de Gobineau. Gobineau was an important French writer (and diplomat) whose book Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races), published between 1853 and 1855, became an important part of the canon of race-thinking. In a posthumous publication in 1885 entitled “Ce qui se passe en Asie” (“What Is Happening in Asia”), Gobineau articulates in clearest terms the threat posed by a resurgent Asia for a Europe wracked by (for him) racial degeneracy due to miscegenation and thus unable to meet the growing challenge emanating from the East. This nexus between a discourse of threat posed by China, and then Japan after 1905 and its defeat of the Russian Empire, and the fear of race-mixing at home became a salient issue in the United States. It animated a politics of racial retrenchment by barring Asian immigrants (the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and culminating in the Immigration Act of 1917) and by placing increasingly onerous restrictions on Japanese and Chinese Americans. Furthermore, it structured a geopolitical imaginary in which the Pacific becomes a crucial area of American, but also Canadian, British, and Australian, geopolitical interests, leading to clashes with Japan. This, in other words, is the construction of a racial order in the Pacific, what Erika Lee terms a “White Pacific.” The second section of the chapter then examines how both the Japanese and the Americans engaged in the racialization of each other: first, in terms of how the Japanese empire itself internalized its own version of racial order in response to the global racial imaginary; second, for the United States, as a way of intensifying the violence against a racial other, which can be traced back to the settler colonial plans of the nineteenth century (). I conclude the chapter by showing how the global racial imaginary functioned within the United States during the early Cold War period by representing the Soviet Union as the Asiatic other.

The “Yellow Peril”: World-Making and the Global Crisis of White Supremacy

The crystallization of the global racial imaginary during the nineteenth century defined a world in terms of racial difference. The global racial imaginary provided a way of ordering the world hierarchically in a way that ensures a faith in the innate superiority of the West relative to other races. It assumed the natural demise of races unfit to survive in a world comprised of predatory empires mercilessly deploying the latest military technologies and displacing the native inhabitants through settler colonialism. As a consequence, the nature of global order was based on a notion of the incommensurability of races in which each was violently competing against the others. This is in contrast with the juridical-political community that comprises Western states on the basis of norms and rules that more or less govern violence between them and are defined by a “standard of civilization.” However, this idea of a wider political or juridical community is deemed to be entirely absent when it comes to racial conflict: such conflicts are assumed to be existential in the biological sense, in which the biological fate of a race or people ultimately determines the viability of the nation-state itself.

What I call the global racial imaginary is described by Jürgen Osterhammel as a “bleak and fatalistic worldview” that dominated at the end of the nineteenth century. Expansion was seen as the key to survival in a brutal international order, which itself was predicated on developing a significant industrial and scientific base. The globe was increasingly closed off, intensifying competition between different powers—and under the Darwinian assumption this would imply the inevitable demise of the weak on the fringes of the global expansion of settler colonial empires. The realization, however, that a whole variety of races, particularly Asiatic races, would continue to inhabit the planet indefinitely provoked consternation and anxiety, particularly in American intellectuals. Writers such as Charles Pearson and Lothrop Stoddard were profoundly pessimistic about Western relations with Asia. What if these races, in the mind of a coterie of racial thinkers of this time, were able to effectively modernize and catch up to the West? Would their advances challenge white supremacy and the global order upon which it rested? Indeed, as Osterhammel characterizes this worldview, “Special caution was needed with regard to the ‘yellow race.’ It was demographically stronger than the others, characterized by an aggressive business sense and, in the Japanese case, a feudal warrior ethic. If the West did not watch out, it would be threatened by a ‘yellow peril.’” Moreover, as Osterhammel adds, there was a widespread recognition that the “global sharpening of the struggle between the races meant that the militarized nation-state could not remain the only, all-embracing entity for the resolution of conflicts.” There would need to be wider cooperation between “Anglo-Saxon” nations to mitigate the threats posed by these different races.

To a degree, the discourse of the yellow peril and its salience in popular imagination were rooted in the perception that the global racial imaginary founded on white supremacy was in crisis. It was rooted in a fear that its racial, hierarchical ordering of the global system was inevitably going to change and that there would come a time when non-European races were going to begin to assert themselves on the global stage. In other words, the “yellow peril thematic,” Stanford Lyman writes, “presents itself as a coded ethnomethodological discourse, under the cover of a guarded defense of the Occident-under-siege.” It is a discourse that amalgamates political differences into racial differences and renders them intelligible for the purposes of disciplinary control for internal populations and as a way of defining geopolitical threats. For, as Lyman continues, the great issue with respect to the yellow peril discourse is that it reveals the extent to which Western

spokespersons, leaders, officials, intellectuals, opinion makers, etc., believe[] that it, i.e., the particular element of the Asian aggregate under discussion, “is not keeping to its [appropriately subordinated] place but threatens to claim the opportunities and privileges from which it has been excluded”; even more fearsome is the belief “felt [that the Asian aggregate or its subset is] . . . a threat to the status, security, and welfare of the dominant ethnic group.”

Fears of a rising “Asia” became prevalent in Western discourse in the late nineteenth century. This followed a period in which perceptions of China, especially, vacillated between awe-inspiring recognition of its wealth and power following Marco Polo’s account during medieval times, and a respect for its “longevity, its stability, its system of government, its philosophy and its toleration of diverse faiths and ideas.” But as Ji points out, that discourse radically began to change in the early nineteenth century as a consequence of modernization and industrialization; China appeared increasingly static in that it “lacked any internal dynamic promoting change.” The initial crux of the critique was based on cultural factors that restrained its development, which, over the course of the nineteenth century, gave way to a racial/biological explanation for Chinese backwardness and inferiority.

But if the racialization of Chinese cultural attributes—essentially a proxy for “Asia”—reifies this tendency to see it in ahistorical terms, incapable of modernizing itself as Europe has done, then what accounts for the emergence and prevalence of a discourse of fear of China/Asia in the latter part of the century? Gobineau’s work here is instructive: fear of China and of a rising “yellow peril” reflects the twofold fear of the degeneracy of European civilization to the level of other races as a result of representative democracy and, as a consequence, the lack of ability to resist the inevitable—for him—horde of Asians invading Europe. Gobineau’s work on China is part of a larger framework for uncovering the patterns of history on the basis of racial mélange and conflict; racial differences, for Gobineau, stem from the primordial difference between three biologically singular races, the white, yellow, and black races. Unsurprisingly, Gobineau stipulates the innate superiority of an unadulterated white race (Aryan), originating in Siberia, and responsible for creating a superior culture. For Gobineau, understanding human history involves understanding the patterns of racial intermixing and the manner in which races (i.e., civilizations) degenerate. The geopolitics of nations or empires only matters over the long run insofar as it reflects such racial trajectories. Thus China’s emergence as a civilization owes itself to the conquering migration of whites (“Aryans”) emanating from India and subjugating the native Malay or “yellow” race. However, the problem was precisely the fact that this supposedly Aryan minority lost itself through miscegenation, and in the reign of Qin Shi Huang (246 BC), the feudal system gave way to a broadly meritocratic imperial system. This broad polemic against not only racial miscegenation but the leveling effects of meritocracy that defined the mandarinate served Gobineau as a means to contrast the East with the liberalization of European politics. Gobineau saw any retreat from the entrenched rights of a nobility—which he derives from Henri de Boulainvilliers, a seventeenth-century French aristocrat—as indicative of the political and racial degeneracy that is enervating European civilization. Gobineau’s racial polemics not only are important for understanding a particular reaction to the internal (i.e., European) crisis but are in fact constitutive of world history and his present. Gobineau’s turn to China at the end of his life was not just a way of contrasting it with Europe; rather, “There were practical applications for international politics to be derived from his reading of history.” In one of his last essays, entitled “Ce qui ce fait en Asie” (“What Is Occurring in Asia”), written in 1880–81 and originally published in Richard Wagner’s journal Bayreuther Blätter, Gobineau situates the West’s predicament in a broader world history of racial miscegenation and its relation to the political fates of empires, kingdoms, and nation-states. When Gobineau turns to the Asia of the nineteenth century, he begins with the early conflicts between European powers and China in the First Opium War; even as the former were victorious, they realized that “the Chinese fight well and could make excellent soldiers.” However, what Gobineau emphasizes is not so much the Chinese or Asiatic military capabilities that threaten Europe; rather, it is the increasing prevalence of Chinese labor that immigrates throughout the world. Gobineau makes reference to the American initiatives restricting Chinese immigration out of concern for falling wages. As Gobineau writes, “Fear of the Chinese has reached such proportions that it has been suggested that they should be driven from California by force, there being no other way to overcome the invasion.” This Chinese migration under the coolie system of labor is happening across the Pacific world and the Indian subcontinent, according to Gobineau, and results in increasing “hatreds” and conflict between races. For instance, Gobineau claims that the Chinese are actively working to exterminate “Moslems” across Central Asia and that it would be in the interest of European powers to align themselves with “Moslems” as a counterweight to Chinese expansionary ambitions. Furthermore, Russian plans to develop Central Asia present risks: “The result of these developments will necessarily be to restore to their former fertility regions which have become artificially sterile, and consequently to reopen the old invasion routes which successfully brought into Europe every race which rushed head long from Central or Western Asia.” To put it in other terms, Gobineau was writing at the height of the “great game” of geopolitical intrigues between the Russian and British Empires. Such continental imperial rivalries, however, did not appear to interest him much because they were ephemeral to the more fundamental question of the global racial dynamics that hold the fate of such empires to begin with. Thus Gobineau writes, I am [not] stimulated by the question of whether the Russian Empire will take over the whole of Asia and India. But my attention is seized by the rapidly growing dangers in Asia, which are certainly going to explode on Europe. I am struck by the amazing speed with which these dangers grow and develop; I think it is quite possible that within ten years the face of the world will be on the point of changing. Add to that the belief in “the rapid decline and spreading torpor in the whole Western world . . . [due] to the advanced state of the intermixture of races” and you have, for Gobineau, the inevitable demise of the West. Gobineau creates a historical and contemporary representation of what the world is in terms of racial difference, intermixture, and conflict. It is a representation that draws a map entirely different from that of the nation-state system or of imperial geopolitics. Flows of races across space matter much more than the realpolitik of imperial geopolitics. Hence, for Gobineau the question of immigration—he describes Chinese immigration in the United States, for example, as a form of “invasion”—appears much more crucial in discerning the futures contours of global order and politics. Thus from the late nineteenth century to their apogee in the Second World War, such global racial dynamics increasingly become fused to the manner in which imperial states (particularly Germany, as I discuss in the previous chapter) begin to define the necessities of deploying violence and war-making. However, it is also in the United States where we see the importance of this discourse of the yellow peril in defining a world on the basis of racial threats that cut across geopolitical boundaries. By the Second World War, the racialization of the Japanese enemy would unleash the extraordinary capabilities of the American warfare state. “White Pacific”: The Yellow Peril and the Racial Geopolitics of the Pacific American interests in the Pacific predate the completion of its continental expansion to the West Coast in the middle of the nineteenth century. Pacific trade was of obvious concern in the early republic, with American merchants and whalers seeing the Chinese market as key to their success. However, the shifting geopolitical landscape in China as a result of the Opium Wars in the late 1830s posed fundamental issues for American strategic interests in the region. For, as Michael Green argues, American interests began to shift from a purely commercial calculus to one involving great power politics over mastery of Asia. European territorial machinations in the region would increasingly become of concern for American officials and would subsequently pave the way for the establishment of the Open Door Policy by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899. Green sees the historical arc of American foreign policy in the region through the turn of the twentieth century in terms of the accumulation of power and concerns about the relative power of America’s geopolitical rivals in the region. As he writes, Ultimately, while the architects of America’s Pacific power at the end of the nineteenth century were surely motivated by the economic opportunities they saw and were shaped by the racial attitudes of their day, their primary focus was on power—specifically the distribution of power among their potential adversaries, the power of geography, and the instruments and limits of American power in the Pacific. Green draws an explicit distinction here between an understanding of American power in terms of its material “instruments” and its geopolitical interstate rivalries versus the “racial attitudes” that, nonetheless, would seem to be immaterial to the calculus of such geopolitical imperatives. However, this division between state power and race is problematic; by reducing racial effects to the manifestation of an “attitude,” Green minimizes the constitutive role that race plays in forming a world on the basis of hierarchy, difference, and, ultimately, fear and insecurity. It also elides the geopolitical alliances between settler colonial powers of the Pacific that revolved around maintaining racial barriers to Asian immigration conjoined with fear of rising Japanese power. As Erika Lee notes, “Transnational debates over the new ‘problem’ of Japanese immigration, in particular, including characterization of Japan and Japanese as the ‘Yellow Peril,’ intensified by the early 1990s.” The result, Lee continues, was “actual cooperation and policy coordination, promoting what I call the ‘White Pacific,’ a racial and geographic imaginary in which Orientalism and anti-Asian policies were shared and replicated among white settler societies in the region.” Racial imaginaries were instrumental in constituting the Pacific as a geopolitical region in the late nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century. Such racial imaginaries linked imperial geopolitics over China, the emergence of an independent Japan asserting itself in the region, and especially the beginning of Chinese (and later Japanese) migration to the Americas. To be sure, the crystallization of such racial imaginaries did not necessarily predetermine state policies in Asia; nor did it necessarily predetermine the geopolitical contours of imperial competition by automatically generating racial conflicts. A case in point is the history of the Anglo-Japanese alliance signed in 1905. On the one hand, British strategic interests in forming an alliance with Japan revolved around restraining Russian power in East Asia and China, reducing naval expenditures in the region, and acting as a counterweight to other European powers in the region. But as Cees Heere argues, the British pursuit of the alliance was itself predicated on a reframing of “contemporary estimations of Japan’s ‘civilization’ ” as a result of Japan’s military prowess in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95). Indeed, as Heere shows, the formation of the British alliance with Japan was necessarily filtered through this language of “Japan’s capacity for modernity” and its integration within “international society on terms favorable to London.” In other words, what constituted the alliance was certainty a racialized discourse about the Japanese and their capacity for certain norms of conduct within a racialized global order and not simply reflective of an objective raison d’état derived from the condition of global anarchy. On the other hand, such racialized language actively worked to undermine the prospect of such an alliance by drawing attention the fundamental racial chasm at the heart of the late nineteenth-century global order. The emergence of Japanese power, especially after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, could become a source of inspiration for colonized peoples across the world and fundamentally undermine the Western imperial order. It could rouse East Asian peoples in a way that would radically undermine global white supremacy. As Heere writes, “This fear of an Eastern awakening, shaking the foundations of the white man’s world, gained additional significance in the settler states of the British Pacific, where it merged with standing preoccupations over Asian migration to produce a new incarnation of the ‘yellow peril.’” Put differently, the emergence of Japanese geopolitical power called into question the fundamental constitutive role that race played in cementing a global hierarchical order. Fear of the unraveling of this order with Japanese imperial revisionism of this order would ultimately provoke intense violence over the first half of the twentieth century. The racialized geopolitical evolution of the Pacific was co-constituted with the transnational development of Asian migration. This proved to be a significant contribution to the development of anti-Asian sentiment in the United States. Chinese migration began in earnest in the 1850s with the construction of the transcontinental railway and the California gold rush. The middle of the nineteenth century saw the increasingly transnational circulation of Chinese labor across the Pacific Rim and even in Latin America and the Caribbean. It reflected the beginnings of a global industrial economy, which required continuous low-cost labor. Chinese immigration, particularly in California and the Pacific Northwest, however also came with a significant racial backlash by white laborers who saw the Chinese as undercutting the price of labor. Chinese Americans, moreover, were seen as embodying the social calamities of an increasingly industrialized America and especially were seen as representing a much starker threat to its foundational character as a “white Christian nation” versus other immigrant communities. By the 1880s, enough support had accumulated in Congress to pass the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which not only proscribed further Chinese immigration into the United States, but became the impetus for a policy of racial retrenchment until the end of the Second World War. A crucial point, however, is that the exclusion of Chinese immigration became coterminous, as Erika Lee notes, with “the growth of the federal government at the turn of the twentieth century. This new level of expansion, centralization, and bureaucratization, or ‘state-building,’ came in the form of regulating both foreigners arriving into the United States and foreigners and citizens already residing there.” American state-building was instrumentalized on the basis of racial administration “at home,” and the state’s necessary ability to discern and securitize against the possibilities of domestic racial conflicts. Such an expansive federal state became crucial in the development of the United States as a global power in the late nineteenth century with the Spanish-American War (1898). Restricting the movement of “racially inferior” minorities thus became an important political project not only within the United States, but also throughout other settler colonial states, such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. With the increase of Japanese immigration (not subject to the Chinese Exclusion Act) in the late nineteenth century, fears of Asian displacement of the white population became increasingly prevalent. As Lee shows, during the early twentieth century, domestic concerns with unassimilable “Oriental” populations became more pressing as a consequence of racial riots on the West Coast and in Canada. The Pacific Coast race riots of 1907 took place in San Francisco and Vancouver, Canada, and involved the deliberate targeting of Asian, primarily Japanese, communities. As a consequence, the US and Canadian governments worked with Japan to curb Japanese immigration, what became known as the “Gentleman’s Agreement.” But importantly, Lee writes, the outcome of the riots “was that Canada, the United States, and the British Empire all focused attention squarely on the international aspect of the ‘Asiatic issue,’ thereby uniting ‘white men’s countries’ together against the ‘Yellow Peril.’ ” British and American newspapers were warning about the transnational threat that Asia and Asians posed. More specifically, Japan was targeted for particular calumny given its increasingly obvious political presence on the global stage. When it specifically came to denouncing the strategic alliance between Britain and Japan, John Strachey, the editor of the newspaper The Spectator, wrote in 1904 that Japan would eventually seize China and establish a “yellow power which would in many respects be the strongest in Asia” and would then jeopardize “the safety of every white power . . . which has grave interests or broad territories on the Asiatic continent.” In other words, after the 1905 Russo-Japanese War ending in Japanese victory and the Pacific Coast race riots in 1907, Japan increasingly became discerned as a potential rival or even enemy not just to the particular interests of Western powers in the region. Japan was also seen as an ontological or racial threat to the very essence of a particular order premised on white supremacy. The nexus between the transnational migration of Asians into settler colonial polities and the emergence of Japan as a pole of East Asian power would be increasingly seen as questioning the global racial imaginary and would be assumed to invariably lead to a cataclysmic racial conflict. The early twentieth-century American writer Homer Lea perhaps gave clearest expression to the racial and geostrategic threat that Japan posed to the United States. Lea, a relatively unknown writer, dreamed of a military career, only to see himself stymied because of medical issues that would claim his life at the young age of thirty-five. Nonetheless, his 1909 book The Valor of Ignorance, which was widely read within both the American and the Japanese militaries, forcefully argued that a clash between the United States and Japan was inevitable. Lea’s starting point is rooted in a racialized view of the world crucially based on the necessity of expansion and war. “National existence,” Lea writes, “is governed by this invariable law: that the boundaries of political units are never, other than for a moment in time, stationary—they must either expand or shrink. It is by this law of national expansion and shrinkage that we mark the rise and decline of nations.” As Lea writes, “War is but a composite exemplification of the struggle of man upward: the multiplication of his individual efforts into one, and the aspirations of his diurnal strife turned toward a greater and nobler end, not of himself but of his race.” For Lea, as a result of modern transportation and communication technologies the spatial distance that separated nations was no longer a buffer: “No longer, therefore, can nations consider themselves safe behind their moats of space.” Thus Lea continues, The peoples of the whole world are now elbowed together with all their racial antipathies and convergent ambitions to struggle and war in a theatre of action no greater than that in which European nations only a few years ago sweated and strove for supremacy. On the other hand, while the causes of war have diminished by the elimination and unification of innumerable smaller nations, on the other, the shrinkage of the world by man’s inventions has brought the remaining nations, different not only in race, but in civilization, ideals and purposes, so closely together and with so little hope of amalgamation that we cannot say that the possibilities of war have in the sum total decreased. The pace of the future must be, as in the past, an armed peace. The implication for the United States is clear. The United States is increasingly faced (in 1909) with a rising Japan, after its recent victory against the Russian Empire, that is asserting itself in the Pacific region and challenging American interests. Importantly, for Lea, the Japanese display a racial homogeneity that underlies their political and military strength. By contrast, the United States is increasingly enervated due to its racial heterogeneity as a result of repeated (Asian) migration—particularly to Hawaii, which will become the launch pad of a Japanese attack. Thus the United States is ill-prepared to meet the challenge of a rising power in what will be a cataclysmic struggle against Japan’s relentless imperial ambitions. Lea saw in the emergent conflict the profound importance of racial and cultural antagonism as the crucial immutable factor in the relationship. Thus he writes, “Neither now nor at any time in the distant future will these nations coalesce to the extent that the sociological or religious phases of their national life will have a deterrent effect on war, or will alter in any way, other than accentuate their racial ambitions, their perverse activities, their hates and their cries.” The implacability of racial difference is inescapable and confirms for Lea the unyielding Japanese attempt at conquest and supremacy. As Lea writes, “To this ambition of Japan there shall be no end—and rightly there should not be—until her islands have been razed as bare rocks upon which fisherman spread their nets, or until the Japanese become the samurai of the human race and the remainder of man shall toil and trade for them and their greatness.” In other words, the stakes in the nascent conflict between Japan and the United States are such that only the genocidal elimination of the Japanese—“until her islands have been razed”—will ensure American independence and supremacy over the Pacific; short of that, Americans will find themselves under the Japanese “samurai” yoke. It is important to recognize that while Lea’s writings were certainly marginal in terms of their influence on the American political class (among whom he enjoyed a revival, obviously, after Pearl Harbor), he did leave a lasting legacy on the American military. Lea was also widely read in Japan and not only fixed in the minds of many Japanese military and political officials the foreseeable conflict with the United States over supremacy over the Pacific, but confirmed the fundamental nature of an international order based on racial hierarchy and antagonism. As Sidney Xu Lu argues in The Making of Japanese Settler Colonialism, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Japanese officials were aware of the exclusion of Chinese immigration into the United States “as an ominous warning to get ready for the destined battle between white and yellow races.” The Japanese themselves internalized a conceptualization of race derived from Darwin’s and Spencer’s idea about survival of the fittest. They devised numerous justifications for their own racial difference and hierarchy relative to other Asia races. As Japan expanded its colonial reach in Korea and Manchuria, it combined scientific racism with Confusion and Shinto ideas to justify its colonial rule. Importantly, as the Japanese empire modernized and increasingly became an important geopolitical actor in the region, Japanese ideas about expansion were premised on the idea of “biological struggle for limited space and resources among the races.” Nonetheless, while the Japanese did internalize some Western ideas connecting geopolitical expansionism with biology and race, Japan aspired to become a great power recognized by the West. This would certainly have legitimized Japan’s own regional hegemonic aspirations, much like the Western powers. To be sure, the Japanese saw racial discrimination as an immutable feature of the international order, notwithstanding their crucial victory in 1905. By the time of the Versailles negotiations, the Japanese foreign minister, Uchida Kōsai, famously proposed the racial equality clause, which would recognize the “equal and just treatment [of League members] in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.” However, this was vehemently opposed by the Australian delegation and later by Woodrow Wilson himself. Indeed, American and Australian opposition to the Japanese initiative for racial equality was initially rooted in fear that it would permit massive Japanese immigration by subverting American sovereignty over such questions. At the same time, opposition to it reflected what Naoka Shimazu argues was Wilson’s attempt to juggle a complex set of geopolitical factors involving Japanese interests in China, while trying to coax Japan into maintaining its membership in the League. Nonetheless, the defeat of the racial equality clause cemented growing suspicion among Japanese elites that international institutions mainly reflected Western interests and would not recognize Japan as a great power. By the 1930s, a Japanese newspaper reported, “From the first to the last the League did not flinch from its anti-Japanese stance. . . . This is the predictable outcome of the current control of the League by the white race.” Thus, as Young argues, the manner in which Japanese actions in Asia were denounced by Western powers in the League evoked “gloomy scenarios of economic blackmail and worse.” Throughout the 1930s, Young shows, Japanese literature and press ramped up the theme of the inevitable conflict with the United States—the main proxy for the white race—while emphasizing the importance of self-sufficiency and autarky. Between the late 1930s and the 1940s, the Japanese internalized racial ideas about world politics and about their own colonizing mission. As John Dower explains, a Japanese governmental report published in 1943 demonstrates that the creation of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere—Japan’s attempt to create its own version of Lebensraum in the Far East—was by no means a way of challenging global white supremacy, but rather a way of affirming Japanese racial domination in and of itself. Furthermore, Dower writes, the document entitled An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus, argued that “island nations must expand to ensure their security and survival. . . . Indeed, [as Dower characterizes the Japanese official perspective] it was predictable that any race or people whose vital powers were not energized by such external challenges would eventually decline.” The Japanese mission then was the establishment of a regional racial hierarchy that would ultimately protect its own race against the economic and violent predations of other (white) races. By the late 1930s, the geopolitical situation between the Western powers and Japan reached a critical crisis. Japanese imperial officials felt the necessity of continued southern expansion to the oil fields of Indonesia and of access to the raw materials of Indochina—taking advantage of the opportunity in 1940 to occupy the latter while France lay prostrate to Japan’s German ally. The occupation of China (ex-Manchuria) plus the continued expansion of Japanese control southward proved to be the trigger for greater American confrontation with Japan in bilateral negotiations. But for John Toland, in his classic work The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, there was nothing inevitable in the confrontation. As he writes, “A war that need not have been fought was about to be fought because of mutual misunderstanding, language difficulties, and mistranslations as well as Japanese opportunism, gekokujo [the Japanese idea of overthrowing the stronger power], irrationality, honor, pride, and fear—and American racial prejudice, distrust, ignorance of the Orient, rigidity, self-righteousness, honor, national pride and fear.” But while there was certainly nothing deterministic in terms of the inevitability of such a cataclysmic conflict in the Pacific, the importance of racial antagonism and the perceived indisputable fact that the world is composed of incommensurable races simply cannot be overlooked: the crisis of a global racial imaginary in Asia with the emergence of Japanese power gave credence to and propelled the fear of the dismantlement of such an order based on white Western supremacy. In essence, the very idea of the yellow peril is an expression of apprehension at the wavering of the racial hierarchies that had underpinned the global order since its emergence in the nineteenth-century Western imaginaries. After the Deluge: The Ontology of the Yellow Peril Reconfigured The image of the yellow peril and the fear of a world transformed did not die in the fiery inferno of a defeated Japan. The terms simply changed to reflect the evolving geopolitical picture of the nascent Cold War. On the one hand, as I will explore in greater detail in the next chapter, the representation of Asian or Asiatic fear was tied to the nexus between processes of decolonization and fears in the West of communist proliferation. Communist China then takes the place of imperial Japan as the preeminent Asian threat to a Western world order embodied by United States and the creation of a wide-ranging international and capitalist institutional infrastructure. At the heart of American geopolitical concerns is then Chinese communist machinations in league with the Soviet Union: the defeat and dismantlement of French rule in Indochina crystalizes an “Asiatic” Cold War front pulling the United States into a calamitous intervention resulting in its humiliation in 1975. On the other hand, the Soviet Union comes to be portrayed as an Asiatic power, implying that it has attributes fundamentally different from those belonging to Western civilization. In other words, the nascent conflict with the Soviet Union, for a wide coterie of American writers in the late 1940s and 1950s, did not just reflect political or strategic differences; rather it emerged out of fundamental civilizational/racial cleavages that were perceived to be unbridgeable. The Soviet Union, for James Burnham, echoing Huntington decades before, was part of an entirely different civilization, which, alongside its communist system of government, created an irreconcilable threat to the very essence of the United States. Kennan, in the 1950s, imagined the Soviet United as the “single greatest enemy of western civilization . . . since [the] Turks were at the walls of Vienna” and also described it a “semi-oriental country.” Perhaps most extreme among the participants in this discourse was Admiral Leslie C. Stevens, who was the naval attaché to Moscow between 1947 and 1950. His book Russian Assignment how, “Russia is so far removed from our normal experience that life there is like what it must be on an alien planet. . . . The standards by which judgments are validated in Europe and America simply do not obtain in Russia.” For some in the United States, then, the Cold War was, at its core, a metaphysical struggle between two irreconcilable political-economic systems that was translated into an Orientalized racial/civilizational struggle. The irony, however, is that if we fast-forward to 2019, the director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, Kiron Skinner, articulated a strategy against China in civilizational terms. At a security forum in Washington, DC, Skinner was quoted as saying, “This is a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology and the United States hadn’t had that before.” Moreover, as she goes on, “The Soviet Union and that competition, in a way it was a fight within the Western family. . . . It’s the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian.” The discursive integration of the Soviet Union is largely now predicated on the fact that it no longer exists and threatens the United States, whereas China now becomes the racialized threat, the “yellow” racial peril anew. It should come as no surprise, then, that the modern self-understanding of the West over the past two centuries relies on a conceptualization of a menacing East and that during moments of acute geopolitical crises the “othering” of the East becomes ever more politically salient. In particular, the yellow peril as world-making practice is something that is profoundly embedded in the idea of the West itself, continuously molded to activate forms of self-awareness and autoimmunity. This becomes even more crucial at the beginning of the Cold War and influences a wide range of important thinkers in a wide range of disciplines. Martin Heidegger infamously referred to Russia (alongside America) as the metaphysical other to German-rooted (i.e., European) Being. , published in 1953 but originally from a 1935 lecture, properly reflects a time of existential and political peril during the Cold War. But more evidently, as Emmanuel Faye shows, the very notion of the “Asiatic” for Heidegger in the 1930s is crucial in determining the enemy in the Schmittian sense. For example, in a lecture in Rome in 1936, Heidegger speaks of the “preservation of the European peoples against the Asiatic.” Such sentiments, which for Faye pervade Heidegger’s seminars of the 1930s, blend into a general nexus between the Asiatic as the radical other and the explosion of anti-Semitism (see Chapter Five). Hannah Arendt’s famous The Origins of Totalitarianism, published in 1951, was not just a genealogy of Nazi totalitarianism in terms of anti-Semitism and imperialism; it was widely read at the time as a way of insulating the West from the totalitarian experiments of total domination that really connected Nazim and Stalinism. What is remarkable in Arendt, however, is that this notion of total domination appears to gain much more fertile ground in what she calls “the lands of traditional Oriental despotism.” As she writes, The chances for totalitarian rule are frighteningly good in the lands of traditional Oriental despotism, in India and China, where there is almost inexhaustible material to feed the power-accumulating and man-destroying machinery of total domination, and where, moreover, the mass man’s typical feeling of superfluousness—an entirely new phenomenon in Europe, the concomitant of mass unemployment and the population growth of the last 150 years—has been prevalent for centuries in the contempt for the value of human life.

We may note the stark dehumanization of Asians, as “inexhaustible material,” but also how Arendt imagines that totalitarianism appears to be something deeply embedded in the “Orient,” whereas it is a “new phenomenon” in Europe. If the Cold War is the distinction between totalitarian and non-totalitarian worlds, then Asia becomes imagined at the ever-present threat to the West’s ontological security, if not its physical security. But perhaps the clearest expression of this gulf or distance between East and West was infamously expressed by Emmanuel Levinas, known as the philosopher of alterity par excellence. Levinas infamously wrote in an essay entitled “The Russo-Chinese Debate and the Dialectic,” written and published in 1960,

The exclusive community with the Asiatic world, itself a stranger to European history to which Russia, in spite of all its strategic and tactical denials, has belonged for almost a thousand years, would this not be disturbing even to a society without classes? . . . In abandoning the West, does Russia not fear to drown itself in an Asiatic civilization. . . ?

Levinas goes on to explicitly draw attention to the very peril that such a radical alterity as the “Asiatic civilization” poses to the West:

The Yellow Peril! It is not racial, it is spiritual. It does not involve inferior values; it involves a radical strangeness, a stranger to the weight of its past, from where there does not filter any familiar voice or inflection, a lunar or Martian past.

Much like Arendt, Levinas implicitly dehumanizes Asians through a “racial strangeness” that appears extraterrestrial. He seems to revel in such a radical alterity as a way of delineating the profound threat that Asia and the “Asiatic” poses to Western universality—“to drown itself in an Asiatic civilization.”

What emerges here is a sense of a world marked by irreconcilable differences, racial, spiritual, civilizational, a way of internalizing fear and insecurity at a profound and fundamental level. It merges itself with the ontological constitution of enmity in the early part of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union as a racialized “Asiatic” power that represents a form of absolute alterity. As Perry Anderson explains, “Communism was an enemy far more radical than fascism had ever been: not an aberrant member of the family of polities respecting private ownership of the means of production, but an alien force dedicated to destroying it.”

The history of the yellow peril is a history of how the global racial imaginary constructs a relation between Western and Eastern worlds that is always perceived to be in crisis, and within which the undoing of the former is always, in a sense, potentially happening as a result of the latter. It is a recognition that a world ultimately built on white Western supremacy cannot last indefinitely.

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