x. Narratives of Russian revisionism strategically invest in Russophobia to uphold neocolonialism.
Roberts ’16 [(Kari Roberts, PhD, Political Science at Mount Royal University, Senior Fellow at the Canadian International Council.) “Why a Normal Relationship With Russia Is So Hard: Russophobia in Clinton-era American Foreign Policy Discourse and The Decision to Expand NATO”, May 2016. https://cpsa-acsp.ca/documents/conference/2016/Roberts.pdf] pfox TDI
Andrei Tsygankov accurately identifies anti-Russianism, or Russophobia, in American decision making, defined as “a fear of Russia’s political system on the grounds that it is incompatible with the interests and values of the West in general and the United States in particular. This fear finds expression in various forms of criticism of Russia that are unbalanced and distorted. No matter which independent actions Moscow may pursue, they are sure to be perceived… as reflecting Russia’s expansionist interests, not as a legitimate pursuit of national interests.” 19 Russophobia transcends ideological and partisan lines, as both neo-conservative and liberal minded groups demonize Russia in fairly equal measure. These attitudes are more than simply a cultural animosity toward Russians; rather, they reflect “a very real fear of Russia’s political influence” that finds expression in a distorted critique of Russia and its politics. This animosity results in a persistent need to contain Russia’s influence, even in times of relative peace and cooperation between the two nations. This is evidenced by the impulse to expand NATO just a few short years after the end of the Cold War and before the reversal of early expectations for Russia’s democratic consolidation. This will be discussed later in the paper.
For Tsygankov, Russia is viewed as an expansionist state that refuses to abide by “acceptable rules of international behavior,” owing either to its political culture or its questionable leadership; either way, it must be “contained or fundamentally transformed.” Russophobia is informed by a misinterpretation of Russia’s history, one in which Russia has been forced to respond to the actions of the West, rather than represent some sort of ingrained need to conquer and dominate. Russia is viewed as an autocratic empire that perpetually oppresses nationalities, denies its citizens basic rights, “concentrates economic and military resources in the hands of the state,” and doggedly pursues its inherent and illegitimate expansionist national interests. This last point bears re-stating: Russia is not accorded the courtesy of being seen to possess legitimate national interests, owing to the above assumptions about its nature and motivations. Tsygankov notes that, “even during the 1990s, when Russia looked more like a failing state than one capable of projecting power, some members of the American political class were worried about the future revival of the Eurasian giant as a revisionist power.” He attributes the rampant triumphalism in the US at the end of the Cold War to this fear of Russia, noting it reached its zenith in the mid-1990s. In fact, it was actually the Clinton administration that “entrenched the rhetoric of victorious thinking by drawing the analogy between Russia and the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II.” This triumphalism implied something inherently superior, and therefore inferior, about the US and Russia, respectively.
Tsygankov is quick to label American Russophobia as a political phenomenon rather than a cultural phenomenon, leaving open the possibility for its willful reversal. While it may be the case that Russophobia’s presence in American foreign policy making may not be a fait accompli, its presence in the American discourse may reflect more of a cultural presence of anti-Russianism that is self-reinforcing. In fact, Tsygankov himself notes that public opinion followed elite opinion and policy,28 which testifies to its presence in the popular discourse. Tsygankov claims that the infusion of Russophobia into elite and popular attitudes about Russia is the result of a willful construction of an anti-Russian lobby in order to advance a particular foreign policy agenda. “The Lobby,” is a deliberate cabal of anti-Russian military hawks, or those who presume American geopolitical hegemony can best be achieved by the military defeat of Russia, as well as those who assertively presume the hegemony of so-called liberal values of democracy, rule of law and human rights.29 This Lobby allegedly dates back to the early 20th Century, its views solidified by the Cold War, to which members of Congress and policy makers in the White House have been sympathetic. While Tsygankov acknowledges that some of the Lobby’s success could be attributed to the absence of a pro-Russia lobby in the US, his attention is trained on the Lobby’s political goal of fostering anti-Russian sentiment in the West in support of a “global power struggle” against a potential “resurgent” Russia, rife wih what Zbigniew Brzezinski once labeled “neo-colonial thinkers.”
Tsygankov seeks to explain the construction and persistence of an anti-Russian lobby that is purposefully distorting Russia’s role in the world, its history and its interests to advance an anti-Russia agenda; however, this is not the precise case made herein. Tsygankov’s premise is not fundamentally rejected here, but it is not fully embraced either. There does seem to be a culture of anti-Russianism present in Washington that has influenced foreign policy elites, but it may not necessarily be the result of an intentional drive to keep Russia down. What this paper shares with Tsygankov is the conviction that Russophobia exists, has a significant influence on American foreign policy concerning Russia, and therefore must be better identified and understood. The goal here is not to reveal malevolence toward Russia, but rather to name this Russophobia, discuss its genesis, and connect it with foreign policy outcomes in the hope of illuminating what remains a significant impediment to a more constructive Russia-US relationship.
In his writing on Russophobia, Anatol Lieven suggests that anti-Russianism is derived in part from the myth of America’s own exceptionalism. This mythology sees the US standing taller than other nations, able to make objective observations about other states’ motives, and thereby construct appropriate policy in response. Lieven warns of the dangers of such assumptions, because they render US policy makers “incapable of understanding the opposition of other nations” to its own policies. Lieven takes on NATO expansion directly, noting that, among the many reasons Russia opposes it, is the US’ failure to appreciate what it means for Russia. US policy makers have been genuinely puzzled by Russia’s failure to perceive its enlargement as benign, which is due in part to the American rhetoric that exists alongside the policy decision itself. It is not only the physical expansion of NATO that is problematic, but the corresponding failure to bother understanding Russia’s interests. This unwillingness to understand Russia, combined with the embrace of longstanding and outworn stereotypes about Russia, assumptions about the pattern of history in Russia, as well as a Cold War “hangover” of sorts, which cannot shake the image of Russia-as-threat, all contribute to define Russophobia and the discourse within which American foreign policy is made.
Lieven speculates that the intellectual basis for this Russophobia may stem from 19th Century British propaganda regarding Russian expansionism and its inherent wickedness. Lieven notes that this demonization of other peoples, sometimes taking on a racist tone, has long been present within Western, and American, foreign policy making. Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that what was once assumed about a nation and its peoples shall forever be true about them, even in the absence of supporting evidence. This sort of historical determinism denies a nuanced appreciation for cultural evolution and very much denies the potential for American leaders to view post-Soviet Russia’s disappointing struggles with democracy for what they are. Instead, they have been viewed against the backdrop of Russia’s Tsarist and Communist experiences and are therefore “wicked.” This is evidenced by Henry Kissinger’s 2000 remark that Russian imperialism has continued for centuries, characterized by subjugation of its neighbours and “overawing those not under its direct control” and in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assigning of blame for Stalinist-era policies to present day Russians. For Lieven, to view past conduct as less a product of history and more a product of culture or “national DNA” of sorts, comes perilously close to racism. There is a certain essentialism in the American discourse on Russia that equates these acts with “Russianness.” Perhaps, as Tsygankov suggests, demonizing Russia continued to help justify US strategy toward the USSR in the Cold War. For Lieven, this legitimized the military buildup, the containment, the worldview and actions that stemmed from the need to balance Soviet power. Yet, as Lieven importantly notes, even those who demonize Russia for its past seem to have little problem embracing Communist China, so perhaps it is not communism in Russia’s past the Western leaders fear, but rather something cultural, something innately “Russian.”
Lieven concurs about the self-reinforcing nature of Russophobia, noting the US’ “need for enemies” as an instrumental component of its own narrative of exceptionalism. Perhaps the result of viewing Russia as the enemy for so long is the reason it has become one. Russophobia has enabled the judging of Russia “by utterly different standards than those applied to other countries.” Tsygankov and Lieven are correct to suggest a linkage between Russophobia and America’s own mythologies about its place in the world. America’s destiny is to be a cultural hegemon atop the global hierarchy of nations. The perception of American superiority seems to require an “other” to assume a position of inferiority. Russia has long represented a new cultural frontier and a divergent history, one that was assumed to be far less “exceptional” than the American experience. Challenges to the presumption of American hegemony have often been met with not simply disagreement, but a de-legitimizing of the very existence of the ‘other.’ Russia is not immune from ideas of exceptionalism and the two nations have perpetuated a soft rivalry that possesses “nationalist phobias” that can be mutually reinforcing.
Gertan Dijkink acknowledges that this “gross distinction between East and West as opposite cultures” is part of the US discourse on Russia. For Dijkink, this does not have to be addressed directly, or be part of a public discussion, because it has become “naturalized,” or considered to be common sense. He notes that experience and discourse create an imaginative geography of the outside world, which contributes to the construction of visions of the world.” Dijkink notes that, after all, “American foreign policy aims to perpetuate, serve and affirm the American way of life,” thus helping to explain why Russia’s alternative to “the American way,” presents a challenge. Georg Lofflman confirms the impact of mythology on discourse and the influence on foreign policy outcomes.45 Myths shape identity, become themselves part of identity, and influence action. It is reasonable to suggest that American exceptionalism influences Russophobia. If the US is unique, its values superior, and therefore its preeminence in the international system assumed, and if Russia fundamentally challenges these values – America’s very identity – in some way, then fear of what Russia represents may be a consequence. Putin himself famously warned Americans in 2013 of the dangers of seeing themselves as exceptional.
Richard Sakwa notes the difficult time US leaders have had accepting Russia as an equal. Russia did not see itself as a defeated power after the Cold War and conducted itself as such, a view in opposition to the prevailing Washington narrative. Sakwa notes that Russia as a democratic state was no less revisionist than Russia as a communist state and that this was threatening to the existing world order that presumed the hegemony of western liberal ideas.48 Even though Russian foreign policy was actually fairly unthreatening, and could even be characterized as collaborative for many years, it was not universally viewed this way because of the geopolitical threat it was perceived to represent.49 Sakwa also claims that some of the anti-Russianism has a strong basis in history, as Russia has never really been considered to be a part of Europe. Its very presence has motivated European integration; post WWII European identity was constructed on the basis of Russian exclusion, a reality that was confirmed by decades of the Cold War. That the fear of Russia and the exclusionary attitude toward Russia persist, driven largely by the United States and the derivative suspicion of Russia from the Cold War period, is problematic but not surprising.
Russophobia in Western discourse has been written about, by Russians themselves - poets and writers - for nearly two centuries. Some have suggested that Russian fears of American Russophobia fuel a siege mentality present within Moscow since the end of the Cold War. Russophobia has had an impact; it has influenced the manner in which Russia approaches its own relations with the West. Valentina Feklyunina confirms that the assumption of American Russophobia by Russians themselves has shaped Russia’s self perception, and more importantly it has shaped Russia’s expectations for how foreign nations will engage with them. Russian leaders anticipate anti-Russianism in their dealings with the West, which shapes and perpetuate an “us vs. them” discourse among Russian decision makers that may be reinforcing the narrative of fear in Washington.
Russophobia ought not be confused with criticism of Russia. Heikki Luostarinen cautions that Finland, for example, no longer exhibits Russophobia, but that it remains free to offer social and political criticism. Russophobia is more than a disagreement or even competing values; in fact, during the Cold War, Russophobia took on what Luostarinen identifies as racist tones reflected in movies about the evils of the Soviet empire. The USSR was often cast not simply as the enemy, but as an evil villain, which justified its complete evisceration and for which no action taken toward this goal could be considered illegitimate. This demonization of the enemy may have parallels with the post 9/11 discourse about terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). During the Cold War, hostilities with the Soviet Union gave way to “fear, moral disgust and ignorance,” which were coupled with a lack of knowledge about the Soviet Union. Luostarinen explains that this enemy imaging involves the belief, by a cultural or political group and even a nation state itself, that one’s very security and fundamental values are purposefully and meaningfully threatened by the other. This enemy becomes essential to identity construction and may even serve some collective psychological need to perceive a threat for which a harsh response is justified. Externalizing a common threat can be essential to legitimizing a collective identity and historical experience. This “us vs. them” narrative can feed a powerful nationalism, which can provide a context for behaviors that might otherwise be difficult to legitimize. This enemy construction can become ingrained as mythology among members of a society. The “enemy image may strengthen integration within a given group and moderate internal conflicts; it may help to bring the rank and file behind the group leaders; it may be used (scapegoat) to explain any injustices within the group.”
Luostarinen is careful to note that the construction of an enemy image does not mean that the so-called enemy itself is not guilty of actions that contribute to its demonization. The construction of an enemy image of Russia stems largely from the very real fact that, for centuries, Russia has stood for much of what Western values opposed: “autocracy, national repression, and conservatism” and later “radicalism and social revolution.” Fear of Russian aggression has been in place since the 16th Century, blossoming alongside the growth of Russian power. But this fear was coupled with the racist view of Russians as an inferior, inherently violent race that could not be trusted, thereby necessitating the conclusion that peaceful coexistence could not be countenanced; mistrust of the Russian leadership transformed into a cultural loathing of Russians themselves. John Gleason describes as deep seated fear or dislike of Russia, which is the result of misunderstanding of Russian history and culture, rooted in “competitive imperial ambitions.” Gleason notes that it may be a natural inclination to fear that which we know the least, which could help to explain the presence of Russophobia in earlier periods when connection with cultures across the globe was a rare occurrence. It does far less to explain the persistence of Russophobia in a time in which, notwithstanding the warnings of Samuel Huntington and others for whom cultural difference is a basis for conflict, contemporary access to a diversity of cultures can prompt cultural awareness, acceptance, and even fusion. This does not appear to be the case with American views of Russia, which remain imbued with an air of repugnance in which even minor differences take on elevated significance.