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Reject either-or revisionism. Only status-based explanations can account for inconsistencies in state behavior.

Simon ’17 [John Lugo; PhD in Political Sciences from Lingnan University. August 16, 2017; “Status, revisionism, and great power strategy: US-China positional competition and the struggle for leadership in Asia-Pacific”; Lingnan University Digital Commons; https://commons.ln.edu.hk/pol_etd/19/] TDI

Starting with China, previous studies claim that China is either a status quo power13 or a revisionist power,14 and proponents of the different standpoints have their daggers drawn about whose account is the most accurate one.15 Yet we need to escape the trap of the either/or logic and open up to the possibility that China simultaneously can be a status quo power and a revisionist power. This becomes obvious when we consult primary official Chinese sources as well as secondary academic exegesis of Chinese foreign policy. As Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress Fu Ying makes clear, China has indeed “chosen to integrate itself into the international order,” yet at the same time, it seeks to “improve…its representation.”16 Similarly, Yong Deng, in his groundbreaking study on China’s struggle for status, accentuates that “the CCP leaders have sought to engineer China’s great power emergence within the world order,” but in doing so “they have geared their diplomacy toward changing the international hierarchy to facilitate China’s great-power ascent.” 17 Here we notice a tension between integrating and accepting the rules of the game and changing the status order, as evidenced by China’s admission to the WTO and its acceptance of global trade rules, while simultaneously struggling to gain a greater position within the WTO hierarchy. 18

If we turn to the United States, we can observe a comparable puzzle. For sure, logically the United States cannot be a revisionist power in relation to the positional status dimension of the international order. If it desires to maintain its preeminent position, this unequivocally means preservation of the status-quo. Yet whereas Barack Obama stresses the desire to maintain global leadership, he at the same time emphasizes the need to write new regional rules to ensure leadership in the Asia-Pacific.19 In their respective studies on the Bush administration’s “transformational diplomacy,” Robert Jervis and Ian Hurd highlight that the United States, in that it wants to preserve its dominant position in the international order, simultaneously “seeks to change the rules of that order.”20 In this way, the United States is taking active part in a “process of changing and remaking the social foundations of the international system.”21 I hash out this problem at length in the conceptual section of the literature view.

Status quo and revisionism are best conceptualized in relation to a struggle between “alternative international orders,” 22 which makes the definition of international order fundamental to the scientific enterprise of investigating preservation and change in the international system. What is at stake, however, does not fit a unidimensional conceptual framework. On the one hand, we are grappling with a social-relational, positional dimension of the international order that concerns status; on the other hand, we are dealing with a social-systemic dimension of the international order that concerns institutions. Yet apart from a conceptual framework that takes into account both the positional and the institutional dimensions of the international order, we must also demonstrate how they relate to the two core domains of the international order — the economic domain and the security domain. My conceptual framework addresses this problem and makes a significant contribution to the definitional parameters of international order, necessary to improve our understanding of status quo-seeking and revisionism and the ongoing struggle between alternative regional orders in the Asia-Pacific.

The second scientific component of the dissertation concerns theoretical innovation. Even though the underpinnings of my theoretical framework to a large extent build on structural realist insights, there are certain theoretical problems that call for theoretical remodeling in order to enable the analysis of status quo-seeking and revisionism to pierce both ways — towards explaining the policies of preservation and change of both the rising great power and the declining superpower.

Various structural realist theories essentially view the dominant state as “always satisfied” and the rising power as dissatisfied and revisionist by definition.23 The theories can therefore not fathom that the US is a deeply conservative power in that it wants to maintain its preeminence atop the global hierarchy, yet at the same time, in both its neoconservative and liberal internationalist guises, a deeply revisionist power that wants to rewrite the rules of the game.24 The theories can neither conceive of China as simultaneously being dissatisfied with the international status order dominated by the United States while being satisfied, in part, with the institutional foundation of the international order, which serves its interests, incurs great benefits, and largely underpins its rise. Yet despite their shortcomings, the major structural realist theories all elucidate that the dominant power will take preventive measures to block the ascendance of the rising state.25 As Mearsheimer states: “the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia.”26 These preventive measures to maintain dominant status are revisionist.

In essence, we need to shift the theoretical focus from security to status. The explanatory focus of structural realist theories relates status quo-seeking and revisionism to issues of security and conquest, or rather insecurity and territorial aggrandizement, with the analytical focus on either status quo or revisionism depending on what structural logic one adheres to; whether defensive realism or offensive realism, whether theorized as part of security-maximizing or powermaximizing behavior. 27 Various IR scholars have convincingly demonstrated that states want status, and have accentuated the importance of status, rather than security, in explaining revisionism and dissatisfaction with the status quo.28 However, their theoretical focus repeats the flaws of the various structural realist theories by only focusing on rising states and the link between status enhancement and revisionism, leaving the link between status maintenance and revisionism unexplored. This is problematic since “none of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with the status quo,” as Samuel Huntington succinctly points out. 29 Hence, status concerns relates to both rising and declining powers.

Offensive realism explains revisionism in terms of power, hegemonic stability theory incorporates the hierarchy of prestige and the rules of the system in addition to power, and power-transition theory adds that power parity must be combined with dissatisfaction. In contrast to offensive realism, change in the balance of power is not the only explanatory factor, we also have to include change in the balance of prestige; in contrast to hegemonic stability theory, prestige is not a mere reflection military power, nor are the rules of the system always tilted in favor of the hegemonic state; and in contrast to power-transition theory, dissatisfaction is not an autonomous domestic-level variable, but is structurally induced. Since status, which I define as social position, is composed of both power and prestige, we have to take into account change in both the balance of power and the balance of prestige in explaining revisionism, which then cause dissatisfaction in the form of status anxiety in the dominant state, not the rising state. This leads to the hegemonic power to revise the international order in order to maintain its dominant status. In doing this, it attempts to block the ascendance of the rising challenger, which frustrates the status aspirations of the rising state who responds by carving out an alternative international order that can satisfy its status ambitions. Hence, my theoretical innovation makes a contribution by providing an explanation for when and why revisionism relates to both the status maintenance strategies of the relatively declining superpower and the status enhancement strategies of the rising great power. My theoretical contribution then also addresses the temporal problem of structural realist theories — namely, that the rising great power acts to revise, whereas the declining dominant power reacts to preserve — by turning it on its head. The rising power is not the first-moving revisionist; instead, the relatively declining dominant power moves first and revises to maintain, whereas the declining dominant power reacts and revises to enhance.

One of the great contributions of liberal theories is that they bring to the fore the increasingly expansive institutional mechanisms that “bind” and “lock in” states to certain international orders.30 However, the logic of path-dependency of the liberal historical institutionalist perspective has a status-quo bias that disregards active choice at critical junctures; neither does institutional path-dependency have to favor the dominant state, nor is the rules-based international order as open as liberals assume. The central problem liberals fail to take into account is that the logical corollary of a “lock in”-mechanism is a “lock out”-mechanism. Security provision by whom, and for whom? A regional trade regime including whom? Whereas realists need to put emphasis on the importance of rules for positional appropriation within systems of monopolistic competition,31 liberals fail to theorize the positional, social-relational insider-outsider logic that perpetuates all form of politics; namely, that institutions work in tandem with exclusionary social closure.32

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