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Non-alignment is worse in a world of fill-in – Russian and Chinese pivots are not gains for Africans, but worsen corruption and exploitation because it leads to ruling class capture of anti-imperialism – South Africa proves!

Shoki ’23 [(William Shoki, deputy editor of Africa Is a Country. He is based in Johannesburg.) “Anti-imperialism for the ruling class”, Africa is a Country, 05/12/2023. https://africasacountry.com/2023/05/anti-imperialism-for-the-ruling-class] pfox TDI

A question arises here: how does non-alignment today become so disjointed from its conception in the mid-20th century? Although non-alignment, at its best, aspired to world-making, it also expressed more conservative ambitions shaped by global circumstances. According to Immanuel Wallerstein, by 1967, non-aligned states already “wanted entry into the world community as equals but did not seek to transform the nature of this world.” Non-alignment encompassed a heady mix of competing ideas of postcolonial modernization and development. As historian Frank Gerits explains in his new book The Ideological Scramble for Africa: “The wide range of ideological options also made diplomacy within the Global South more convoluted.”

Non-aligned internationalism could never crystallize into a fully coherent program because it lacked a mass character. It was coordinated by esteemed statesmen like Nkrumah, Nyerere, Senghor, and Nasser, but as a politics lacked expression in durable working-class institutions and labor movements. However, working-class institutions were underdeveloped in the first place because the sociological conditions for mass society and associational life—industrialization and collective provision through a strong state—never came to pass.

The aporia of non-aligned internationalism is, thus, that states were mainly fighting for more equitable conditions abroad to pursue development at home, but it is that development which could have helped furnish the base to make non-alignment more robust. Still, the vision of non-alignment offered a reservoir of hope and the sense of an emancipatory horizon. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, that has disappeared from view. For the ANC, the commitment to non-alignment may reflect less nostalgia, and more saudade (in Portuguese, a bittersweet yearning) for a simpler time. By the time the ANC was governing South Africa, the USSR had collapsed, and history had ended. Rather than a world animated by a spirit of possibility, as in the first wave of decolonization, the ANC entered a world resigned, leaving it with the unbecoming task of presiding over neoliberal immiseration.

To be sure, the material basis for a non-alignment movement today is borne from the constraints imposed on the developing world by US economic primacy manifested through dollar hegemony. Counterbalancing Western encirclement is a goal few on the left would disagree with. But whether a pivot East along the lines that the ANC is chasing would be advantageous is doubtful.

Non-alignment at the level of state diplomacy that is not subject to bottom-up pressure from popular forces is bound to project only the interests of the domestic bourgeoisie. In South Africa, the ANC’s post-apartheid development model has been premised on propping up the local black elite, an effort to complete the first stage of the national democratic revolution.

The war in Ukraine, then, expresses a conflict between two competing factions of capital in South Africa. One side, loosely classified as advocating for ‘Radical Economic Transformation’ (RET), seeks to transform capital by transforming the economy so that wealth is less concentrated in the hands of white and foreign capital, by transferring ownership of the commanding heights of the economy to politically connected black elites. The RET’s record in power was connected to what is called state capture: the transfer of sovereign decision-making power over public policy to private interests—most infamously, the exiled Indian business clan, the Gupta family.

During his tenure, former president Jacob Zuma, the poster boy for RET, came close to covertly concluding a $76-billion deal with the Russian state energy corporation Rosatom to build a nuclear power plant in South Africa. The ANC has also been the beneficiary of a nearly $1-million donation from a company linked to a sanctioned Russian oligarch in the third quarter of the 2022-23 financial year.

What South Africa and Russia share is a political economy based on patronage, rent-seeking, and accumulation through state-owned enterprises. At the height of social discontent against Zuma, one of the ANC’s most prominent ideologues, Gwede Mantashe (who then served as secretary-general, and is now its national chairperson), characterized significant protests during Zuma’s tenure—including the Marikana miners’ strike, Fees Must Fall, and the Zuma Must Fall marches—as evidence that the party was under threat from a “color revolution” driven by “nefarious NGOs.” (Years later, Mantashe described frontline mining communities’ opposition to Shell seismic surveys as “apartheid and colonialism of a special type”). Mantashe added that, unlike the party of Mandela, the ANC was not “the darling of everybody in the world.”

Non-alignment today cannot be coherent, and it can only articulate the ideology of national elites, as an anti-imperialism for the ruling class. The dream of national sovereignty is ultimately a longing for the completion of a bourgeois revolution in the postcolonial context—one that consolidates the economic dominance of the domestic bourgeoisie, retains their role as political stewards, and ends their dependence on foreign investment. This is what it would actually mean to resolve the “national question.”

Claims to non-alignment are driven by the moralizing power of geopolitical ressentiment; not an objection to an unequal power structure per se, but a bitterness about being at the wrong end of it—a desire not to overcome such inequality, but to jockey for a better seat at the table.

This complicates the meaning of internationalism for the left in South Africa and for the Global South more generally. Firstly, it is unclear what internationalism can mean beyond stated and abstract commitments to universal principles of emancipation. So far, Volodymyr Zelensky’s gravitation to the West has cast the war on the unhelpful, civilizational, East-versus-West terms that obscure cleavages within Ukraine itself. But this itself is unsurprising—we are no longer operating on the ideological terrain of the 20th century, where such vocabulary would have been easily available to the struggle.

Ahead of the 15th BRICS Summit due to take place in Durban, members have been publicly touting plans for the formation of a new joint currency. At present, the New Development Bank is an initiative that seeks to de-dollarize development finance, but this currency, if successful, would help create a new reserve currency by acting as a vehicle for trade settlement between participating countries.

Although BRICS still projects an image of a collective of rising superpowers, it is far from it. China is the dominant partner, with India the only other to exhibit strong economic growth. The rest (Russia, South Africa, and Brazil) are stagnant commodity exporters. Any de-dollarisation strategy pursued by the coalition will only reinforce dependence on China, owing to its substantially larger economy and stronger currency. The widespread enthusiasm for the currency as a potentially game-changing move—which, to be sure, will certainly give wiggle room to the economies of the South—reflects the truncated horizon of the political moment.

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