Our innate right to external freedom requires that we exit the state of nature and establish a state under which competing rights claims can be arbitrated and enforced.
Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI
I begin by briefly recapitulating some main elements of Kant’s theory of legitimate state authority. I will pass over this quickly, since Kant’s political philosophy is by now relatively familiar, simply isolating the main claims that are of interest for my argument.
Natural Duty: We have a natural duty of justice to respect others’ innate right to freedom as independence.
State: We cannot fulfill this natural duty without coordinating in a state that can define and enforce one unitary scheme of substantive rights (especially property and contract rights) that binds us all amid disagree- ment. Our duties to do justice to others are therefore mediated by the state.
Omnilateralism: This public scheme of rights ought not to be imposed uni- laterally. That is, it ought not to be coercively implemented by an agent who demands that everyone else conform to her own judgment of what justice requires, and who privately enforces this demand. Instead, for its imposition to be legitimate, a public scheme of rights must reflect an omnilateral will, that is, a set of judgments about the enforcement of justice that are shared.
Kant begins from the idea that everyone has an innate right to independence. A necessary condition for autonomous, self-directed action is being free from the will of others, who might otherwise interfere with one’s capacity to set and pursue one’s goals. Everyone has a fundamental, coercible natural duty of justice to respect others’ independence (Natural Duty).
Kant further argues that we cannot fulfill our natural duty of justice without entering a civil condition (State). At least some of our general, coercible duties of justice (particularly the duty to respect other people’s property and contractual rights) are mediated by legitimate state institutions. We have a duty to comply with and support a legitimate state’s system of law because this is necessary to treat other people justly.
Why might duties of justice be institutionally mediated in the way Kant suggests? The main problem is that people disagree about which scheme of rules ought to guide their attempts to do justice to one another, and these disagreements require legitimate authority for their resolution:
[B]efore a public lawful condition is established, individual human beings, peoples and states can never be secure against violence from one another, since each has its own right to do what seems right and good to it and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this. (6:312)
Kant argues that these problems of disagreement mean that rights (including the occupancy rights explored in Part I) are not legitimately enforceable outside the state. When two individuals, each acting to implement a set of rights that they believe, in good faith, protects the independence of all, disagree in their interpret- ations of justice, neither is required to submit to the other’s judgments. No one can claim the exclusive standing to interpret and enforce justice for others, in a way that would put those others under an obligation not to interfere with, compete with, or resist his efforts.16 As Kant puts it, “rights are in dispute (ius controversum)” in the state of nature, since in cases of conflict, there is “no judge competent to render a verdict having rightful force” (6:312). As I argued in Chapter 3, we should not take this to mean that there are no valid moral claims (including rights to noninterference with the use of land) in the state of nature. But it does mean that in the absence of a state, each individual is the sole judge of what these moral claims are. Where individuals’ interpretations diverge, no single person has the standing to resolve the conflict by using force to overrule others’ judgments.