The state must be governed by an omnilateral will – only an omnilateral will is reflective of the interests of a state’s occupants and can thus be legislative.
Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI
Kant’s reflections on private right in the state of nature lead him to two con- clusions. First, he argues that people living side-by-side have a derivative duty grounded in their more fundamental natural duty of justice to coordinate under public authority (State). If they are to discharge their duty to treat others justly, they need to settle on some common public interpretation of rights, because without clearly shared rules, their independence will become precarious indeed. A world in which there is no commonly accepted scheme of rights but only a set of competing and conflicting private interpretations is a world in which no one’s independence is fully secure. The natural duty of justice therefore grounds a derivative duty to coordinate, through the state, on a scheme of rights that can be enforced in a unitary way amid disagreement.17
Much more could be said about Kant’s argument for the duty to enter the state. But I propose to take this background argument largely for granted here and instead to focus on a less-noticed aspect of his view: Kant holds not only that we ought to coordinate in a state, but also that we ought to coordinate in a particular way: omnilaterally, not unilaterally. The required common scheme of rights ought not to be imposed unilaterally, since “a unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone” (6:356).
To bring out Kant’s position, imagine a private individual whose interpretation of justice is substantively correct (i.e., she holds justified, true beliefs about everyone’s moral rights) and who is endowed with sufficient power to successfully bring other people to coordinate around her view. Perhaps she has access to a new weapon no one else possesses. Though she could successfully impose a per- fectly just scheme by acting unilaterally, Kant claims that she has some reason not to do that. The fact that her judgment is correct is not sufficient to give her the right to force others to comply with her decisions. The question of legitimacy, in other words, is not settled by the truth of her views about justice: it requires an independent justification.
Kant’s basic complaint about unilateralism can be expressed by analogy to international relations. Suppose Country A proposes to undertake a war that, objectively speaking, is perfectly justified: Country A has a just cause, the war has a reasonable prospect of success, it is a last resort (Country A has already tried all other methods to resolve the injustice), and the means it proposes to use to prosecute the war are proportionate to the wrong. Still, many people believe that this war is defective unless it receives multilateral authorization: it is not Country A’s right to make this decision all on its own and without submitting to an appropriate procedure, such as perhaps (though this is controversial) seeking authorization from the United Nations.18 Kant holds that the enforcement of rules about private rights is subject to a multilateral authorization requirement of a broadly similar kind.
To understand this account fully, we need to understand the pro tanto wrong involved in unilateral enforcement. We also need to understand how this wrong might be overcome, that is, how an agent could be in a position to enforce a scheme of rules about rights omnilaterally. Here Kant argues that:
The legislative authority can belong only to the united will of the people. For since all right is to proceed from it, it cannot do anyone wrong by its law. Now when someone makes arrangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself (for volenti non fit inuria). Therefore only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative. (6:314)
What would it mean to form a “concurring and united will of all” under conditions where individuals have differing views about what justice requires? Individuals who are committed to respecting one another’s independence, while at the same time differing about which specific rights and duties this entails, may come to a second-order agreement to associate together in institutions that they collectively accept as a legitimate way to specify and enforce their rights. A state will thus represent the “general united will of the people” insofar as it is authorized by a significant majority of cooperators on a territory who form a joint intention to act together to establish justice through specific institutions. Cooperators are those individuals who are willing to acknowledge the basic natural duty of justice, respecting one another as bearers of a claim to freedom as independence (Natural Duty), and who adhere to the requirement of political coordination under law that flows from this commitment (State). Cooperators who share a will constitute a collectively self-determining people.