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Unilateral governance is morally wrong – it undermines equality by setting up a hierarchical relationship between the parties involved and supplants everyone’s rational autonomy by disregarding occupants’ right to self-determination.

Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI

Unilateral imposition of governance, even if the governance is just, is wrong insofar as it violates the occupants right to self-determination

A shared will thus helps to overcome the wrong of unilateral enforcement. But what exactly is wrong with unilateral enforcement? I believe there are two problems, both usually present, but one more fundamental than the other. The first—in my view less fundamental—problem concerns inequality: unilateral enforcement sets up a hierarchical relationship between the parties involved. Suppose your state- of-nature neighbor goes ahead and uses her powerful weapon to enforce her objectively correct interpretation of private rights. Even though she implements a substantively just scheme, she wields unequal power over us. This might lead the rest of us to see and treat her as our superior. If so, then our social relations might fail to exhibit certain intrinsically valuable features, such as parity of respect and status, that relations among equals ought to have. The basic thought is that unilat- eral enforcement sets up two classes of people: the powerful rulers, on the one hand, and the others, who must obey the decisions that the rulers make.

If equal social relations are of intrinsic value, then your neighbor has some reason to refrain from acting unilaterally: i.e., to refrain from using her superior private power to implement the substantively correct decision. Recent arguments for the authority of democracy have appealed to this inequality worry about unilateralism, and to the role that democratic procedures play in overcoming it.19 On these accounts, since social equality is intrinsically important, we have reason to make decisions democratically and to treat those decisions as authoritative, even if, in doing so, we settle on a distribution of rights, opportunities, and resources that is less substantively just than we might have achieved through the imposition of one particular agent’s view. This pro tanto reason in favor of egalitarian authority might sometimes be outweighed by countervailing concerns (e.g., for the quality of political decisions), but it is an important reason nonetheless.

This offers an account of the wrong of unilateralism (i.e., it threatens social equality) and an accompanying interpretation of how a decision-maker might enforce a scheme of rights omnilaterally: such an agent must be authorized through an egalitarian political procedure in which each person subject to the scheme has equal opportunity for influence.

Though social equality is important, I doubt it is our most fundamental worry about unilateralism. Note too that when our state-of-nature neighbor enforces her interpretation of justice, she does so in a way that ignores and supplants everyone else’s rational autonomy. An important part of treating others as independent persons involves respecting them as autonomous deliberators, who can reason for themselves how to act.20 Yet our imagined neighbor is insensitive to the need to engage her fellows in this way. She does not offer them any reasons that might lead them to share her point of view about what justice requires, nor does she inquire into, or respond to, their reasons for not sharing it. Instead, she imposes her judgments by force, leaving others powerless to do anything but go along. This seems a disrespectful method for organizing a society. It also fails to acknowledge others’ claim to live in a social world that makes sense to them, that in some way reflects their own convictions about how society should be arranged.21 Of course, before coercing her fellows, the neighbor could offer them reasons, hoping to bring them to endorse her rule. Still, this may not suffice to respect their rational autonomy. Consider three scenarios. In the first case, reflecting on her reasons, her fellows come to see her rule as justified, and they form the intention to cooperate in carrying out her directives. Here, there is no disrespect to their autonomy. In the second case, while her fellows see the substance of her decisions as justified, they do not see it as equally justified that she be the one to make and impose these decisions. Why not instead act together to establish a just scheme of rights, rather than being subjected to their neighbor’s self-appointed rule? In the third scenario, her fellows do not come to endorse the substance of her decisions: their moral judgments are too far removed from hers. Whatever justification there may be for the scheme she imposes, it is not one they can appreciate.

Faced with either of these latter two scenarios, suppose that the neighbor goes ahead and coerces her fellows anyhow. If she does, they will suffer three related harms. First, they are unable to act independently, on the basis of their own sense of justice, to establish and comply with a political order they can affirm. Instead, they see their activities coordinated by external threats they do not endorse (or—in the third scenario—even comprehend). Because of this, they are likely to find life under their powerful neighbor’s rule significantly alienating. Subject to the neighbor, I imagine I would feel as though a hostile force exercised near-complete control over my life. Further, participants will not experience their political and social world as a cooperative enterprise, in which they have valuable relationships with other participants, or where they can feel at home.

Because it involves these important harms, I believe unilateral coercion is nor- mally pro tanto wrong. There is an important class of exceptions: the requirement to refrain from unilateral coercion is restricted to cooperators who are willing to recognize and respect others as possessing an equal moral right to independence, and to coordinate in establishing a public authority to specify and enforce this right. Some people—think of murderers or rapists—refuse to recognize others’ independence, even in a minimal way. Suppose I hold you back while you are trying to stab me, thus thwarting your unjust attempt to kill me. It is not reasonable for you to press as an objection to my coercion that you find it alienating. By attempt- ing to murder me, you have denied me any sphere of autonomy independent from your will. When someone refuses to acknowledge very basic elements of personal autonomy and independence, his denial of my moral status releases me, in turn, from any requirement to respect his, by refraining from unilaterally coercing him. Of course, more needs to be said about how to define the basic elements of autonomy that condition the requirement to refrain from unilateral coercion, and I will argue later that this condition requires a willingness to respect a scheme of essential private rights. But in cases where people simply refuse to acknowledge others’ autonomy and independence, there is no moral loss in coercing them in ways that do not reflect their judgments.

So long as people are willing to recognize others’ basic claim to personal auton- omy and independence, however, I believe it is pro tanto wrong to coerce them unilaterally. This is so even when their interpretation of the precise demands of mutual independence is mistaken. When other people attempt, in good faith, to respect the claims that, by their lights, I have—even when their interpretation of my claims is incorrect—I respond to them very differently than I do to people who fail to acknowledge that I have any claim to independence at all. Though they are mistaken, they do not treat me with contempt. For that reason, their capacity for making their own political judgments places demands on me, and I owe them some respect for that capacity. I have pro tanto reason to interact with them using persuasive means, rather than coercively.

I should note that even in cases where unilateral coercion is wrong (i.e., in the case of cooperators who respect others’ independence and who are willing to act together to establish a common public authority) sometimes this wrong can be morally outweighed by other important social values. Perhaps a functioning legal system cannot be achieved unless we subject some dissenters to unilateral coercion.

If there is no other way to secure the essentials of justice, security, and public order, the wrong of unilateral coercion—though important—may be trumped by its strongly beneficial effects. So the constraint on unilateral coercion can be lifted where its recognition would threaten decent governance or entail grave social harms. While self-determination is of very great weight, it is not the only value, and the requirement to respect it is not absolute. I return to this issue below.

In sum, on my view, there is a distinct autonomy worry about unilateral coercion. The principle of individual self-determination holds that, as rational agents, we ought to be able to direct our lives, to a significant degree, according to our own judgments. This idea grounds important basic liberties, like freedom of speech, conscience, association, privacy, and the freedom to form valuable intimate relationships. These private liberties enable us to carry out our own values in areas central to our personal identity and self-conception, granting us a protected sphere of individual freedom. But I believe the autonomy principle also has implications for the making and enforcement of political decisions. A scheme of rules about rights might be imposed in a manner that manifests proper respect for the autonomy of its subjects, or it might not. If a set of rules is forced onto a population of cooperators over their explicit objections, and against their will, then the process of its imposition fails to respect their autonomy adequately. This is so, I believe, even if that scheme of rules sets up an otherwise just distribution of rights, duties, and material advantages. Surely, it would be better to decide and carry out the rules governing our common life through the deliberative agency of those subject to them, rather than via a process that cir- cumvents subjects’ agential capacities.

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