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The importance of respect for political autonomy explains the wrongness of colonialism.

Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI

I also think failure of respect for political autonomy is at the core of our complaints about colonialism. Of course, colonialism was wrong for many reasons, including human rights abuses, economic exploitation, and racism. But unilateral coercion was one of its key wrong-making features. A particularly destructive effect of “civilizing” colonialism was the forcible imposition onto a subject population of a social order that bore no relation to their own judgments about how, and by whom, they should be governed. Those who lived through this experience tell of a sense of powerlessness and a loss of orientation and control.22 This produced lasting alienation among these peoples, a problem distinct from other abuses perpetrated by colonial institutions, and one that persists today in the form of great bitterness and resentment. Even in the best imaginable scenario, where colonial institutions are substantively just, still they deny the autonomy of colonized subjects, disre- garding their claim to shape their common life on the basis of their own judgments. Of course, most historical cases of colonialism also raise concerns about social equality, since colonial rulers typically stood in relations of political superiority to those they ruled. Subject peoples were often denied input into political decisions, which were made by a separate class of rulers. One might therefore object that I have misidentified the wrong in colonialism. Perhaps what makes colonialism pro tanto wrong is not a violation of autonomy, but rather a violation of the sub- ject people’s democratic rights to exercise a fair share of political power. Yet while important, I doubt that political inequality is truly the fundamental concern here.

One way to see this is to ask whether our objection to colonialism would be neutralized if the colonizers treated their subjects as political equals.

Consider the following case:

Democratic Incorporation.23 Suppose that instead of extending support to the 2011 Libyan revolutionary movement, France had overthrown Qaddafi’s regime, occupied the country, and annexed Libya’s territory, much as it annexed Algeria in 1830. Further, suppose that after annexation, France governed Libya reasonably justly and extended its inhabitants democratic participation rights within a wider French republic. Imagine that there were no distinctions between French citizens and “the former Libyans” in terms of their democratic or other rights. Would the former Libyans have had a complaint?

If the imagined incorporation is objectionably unilateral—as I believe it is—then it is hard to see how the democratic equality argument explains this. Because Qaddafi’s regime threatened grave humanitarian abuses, there was arguably a right to intervene in Libya in 2011.24 Since Libya was a nondemocracy prior to the intervention, on the democratic argument, each Libyan had an outstanding individual claim to be enfranchised in the political decisions governing him.25 But France responded to these claims by granting the Libyans democratic rights after the annexation. Indeed, there are real colonial cases that followed this model, cases in which colonizers democratically enfranchised their subjects. In the 1950s, for instance, France granted full citizenship—with suffrage rights—to all adult men and women in its former Algerian colony.26 A second case is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland: from the Act of Union in 1801 until its independence in 1922, Ireland formed an integral part of a wider Britain, electing their own MPs to the British House of Commons.27

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