Moreover, upholding our right to occupancy requires that we respect state sovereignty. We all have an interest in stable territorial occupancy, a necessary condition of located life plans – located life plans are essential to personal wellbeing and the ability to author our lives autonomously.
Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI
Wellbeing (key to personal flourishing) and autonomy = intrinsically valuable
C.f. peripheral projects and commitments: they do not structure many choices and do not contribute to our sense of our lives as our own
How might we ground such a preinstitutional right of occupancy? I begin from the observation that occupancy of a particular place is of central importance for an individual’s life plans and projects.14 What is most arresting about the Navajo removal is that territorial dispossession severely disrupted the Navajos’ ability to enjoy the lives they had built in Arizona. As many theorists argue, our personal well-being depends substantially on our success in pursuing the morally reasonable projects and relationships that we adopt.15 The endeavors a person is committed to play an important role in determining what counts as a flourishing life for that person. My theory of occupancy builds on this idea, highlighting the connection between a place and people’s comprehensive goals and pursuits. The basic thought is that stable territorial occupancy is a necessary background condition for well- being and personal autonomy.
On an interest-based theory of rights, “ ‘X has a right’ if and only if an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.”16 In order to show that our interest in pursuing life plans grounds occupancy rights, we must therefore show two things: first, that people have an interest in occupancy of a particular place, derived from their interests in carrying out their comprehensive life projects, and in controlling and revising their commitments to these projects; second, that this interest is of sufficient weight to hold others under a duty to respect their occupancy.
How are a person’s life projects connected to his occupancy of a place? Most complex goals and relationships require us to form expectations about our con- tinued use of, and secure access to, a place of residence. Geography and climate may affect the economic and subsistence practices we take up, making it difficult for us to reconstitute these practices in some very different place. Suppose you run a dairy farm, an economic practice that structures much of your life. You could not continue to pursue this practice if you were moved, say, to Siberia or the American Southwest. Our religious, cultural, or recreational activities also often have territorial components: think of how sled-dog racing belongs in the Arctic, and surfing in coastal areas, or of how religions incorporate places or natural formations into their rituals of observance. The Pueblo Indians’ rituals center around Blue Lake in New Mexico, and the Black Hills have religious significance for the Sioux. Finally, people form personal bonds and enter work, religious, educational, and friendship relations in part because they expect to remain spatially arranged in certain ways: we structure our daily activities and associate together under the assumption that current patterns of residence will not be massively disrupted. We can call these situated goals, relationships, and projects our located life plans.
The interest in carrying out located life plans does not depend on those plans’ having been autonomously chosen. Each individual has a broad well-being interest in carrying out the (morally reasonable) projects that person happens to have, whether or not these projects were acquired through a process of critical evaluation and choice. Consider a Navajo herdsman who was simply socialized into the pastoral traditions of his people. As long as his pursuits are not harmful to others, and as long as the Navajo endorses them, he has an interest in continuing these practices. Thus, even those who reject autonomy as a fundamental value have an interest in occupancy of their territory. The ability of a person to act on the values that make life meaningful for him is morally significant, even where he has not arrived at his values through critical reflection and choice.
Beyond its connection to well-being, however, stable territorial occupancy is also important for personal autonomy. “Autonomy,” as I defined it in Chapter 1, is the capacity to reflect upon and to endorse or revise one’s own life commitments for what one authentically judges to be good reasons, and to carry out these com- mitments in action. Many people—particularly in modern, pluralist societies—hold that individuals should freely select their goals from among a range of options, based on their own critical evaluations. An autonomous person creates his own conception of a worthwhile life through successive decisions to embrace goals and relationships. Personal autonomy in this sense has important preconditions, including access to an adequate range of options and the reflective mental abilities necessary to critically evaluate and assess these options. But another crucial precondition of personal autonomy is the secure ability to shape and direct one’s life according to the values and commitments one actually holds. By protecting our ability to carry out the life projects to which we are currently committed, stable territorial occupancy also contributes to our ability to author our lives autonomously.
Not all located life plans are equally significant in grounding a claim to territorial occupancy. Our life projects are hierarchically organized: our immediate goals are means to achieve longer-term aims, which are in turn subordinate to our highest-order commitments.17 These are our comprehensive projects: they organize many choices; they give meaning to our lives and provide a standard for its success; they often reflect an agent’s deepest moral and evaluative convictions; and they integrate a person’s plans over time in a way that constitutes her distinctive narrative identity. Comprehensive projects sometimes present themselves as imposing nonnegotiable obligations, and they often bear a close connection to intimate personal relationships. These plans are fundamental to our sense of our lives as our own. Careers or economic pursuits; family, friendships, and other personal relationships; and religious and cultural activities are all good examples of comprehensive projects where autonomy has special weight. But other life plans are peripheral: they do not structure many choices and do not contribute to our sense of our lives as our own. What color to paint my house or which supermarket to shop in are examples of peripheral plans. Our autonomy and flourishing are not threatened by interference with peripheral plans since they are normally of little weight. But loss of territorial occupancy is very likely to undermine these values when it destroys people’s comprehensive plans.