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Our fundamental interest in located life plans grounds a right to occupancy.

Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI

Showing that people have an important interest in the area fundamental to their located life plans is the first step in an argument that they have a preinstitutional right to occupy this place. But while residents of an area certainly have an interest in it, we have not yet shown that their interest is of sufficient weight to hold others under a duty. Claim-rights declare that it is reasonable to expect other individuals or institutions to bear responsibilities for protecting, respecting, or promoting the locational interest in specific ways.25 To argue for a moral right of occupancy, we must compare the strength of the interests protected under the proposed right against the strength of possible countervailing considerations. Once a right has been justified, it grounds duties with pre-emptive force: these duties exclude our direct consideration of the underlying merits case by case.26 The assertion of a right sums up our assessment, from a general perspective, of several more funda- mental, intersecting, and potentially competing, value considerations. Since the interest in located life plans is just one such consideration, we must assess whether it is defeated by conflicting reasons.

Viewed in this way, however, the occupancy interest seems quite robust. Removing someone from his territory destroys many of his life plans at once; it harms not just his peripheral plans, but also his most comprehensive endeavors; and his projects tend to be rapidly and thoroughly undermined in ways that are difficult to compensate. Since imposing duties on others to respect occupancy rights involves costs, however, we must also consider their interest in being free from such duties. In most cases, it is difficult to conceive of a weighty interest in being able to remove or expel others, or to interfere with their occupancy in ways that undermine their shared social practices. Nor does compliance with duties to respect others’ occupancy seem especially burdensome: so long as an outsider enjoys flourishing life plans where she lives, depriving her of the liberty to interfere with others’ occupancy does not seem unduly costly to her. It is worth recalling here that I am arguing for a quite limited entitlement to geographical space: namely, the right to reside permanently in an area, and to make use of it for social, cul- tural, and economic practices, immune from removal or expropriation. The limited nature of the right is important, since outsiders may have weightier interests in other aspects of territorial control. For example, they may have an interest in access to other areas of the globe, or they may have an interest in sharing in the value of the earth’s resources. Rights to exclude outsiders from a territory or to control its natural resource wealth face a higher burden of justification, and I will investigate these claims in Parts III and IV of the book.

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