First, military presence is an example of unilateral governance – it violates occupants’ equality and autonomy by denying their right to self-rule.
Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI
Many traditional liberals instead take a functionalist approach to state legitimacy. As outlined in the introduction, the functionalist holds that a state has a right to rule a population and territory insofar as it governs in a reasonably just manner.2 Recall Allen Buchanan’s view, introduced in Chapter 1. Buchanan claims that a state is morally justified in exercising political power over a population and territory if it “(1) does a credible job of protecting at least the most basic human rights of all those over whom it wields power and (2) it provides this protection through processes, policies, and actions that themselves respect human rights.”3 Functionalist accounts of state legitimacy often appeal to a natural duty of justice that requires us “to support and comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us” and “constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves.”4 This duty to participate in a just state is binding on us independently of any special relationships we have, or any voluntary transactions we have engaged in.
Functionalism comes in both maximizing and threshold variants. The maximizing variant holds that a particular state has a right to rule a territory if—compared with its rivals—it can do best at delivering justice. The threshold variant holds that the state has a right to rule a territory if it achieves a decent level of success in that task.5 Meeting the threshold gives it a claim against interference by foreign powers that would do an even better job.
An important worry about functionalism, however, is that it may license benign colonialism, the unilateral imposition of political institutions onto unwilling groups.6 The charge is not that functionalists will endorse colonialism in all cases. Colonialism and annexation frequently involve unjust rights violations and may be ruled out on these grounds. Allowing states to annex territory also promotes war, which has predictably bad consequences for international peace and security.7 Further, functionalists would likely condemn most historical instances of colo- nialism. Colonial rulers dispossessed indigenous populations and sometimes exterminated them; they engaged in forced labor and economic exploitation, and they institutionalized systems of racial and cultural discrimination. Functionalist commitments to human rights explain why these acts were wrong.
Still, the functionalist does not rule out a benign colonial regime if it did a reasonable job at providing good governance. Indeed, functionalism might be invoked to support “civilizing” colonialism: particularly in the later colonial period, European colonizers often relied on arguments grounded in liberal principles to justify their practices.8 Colonial rule was defended on the basis that it would abolish the slave trade in Africa, further the moral and material well-being of native populations, or advance commerce and development. The US occupation of the Philippines, for example, supposedly aimed to improve “the well-being, prosperity, and the happiness of the Philippine people” and to establish “an enlightened system of government.”9
Suppose a benevolent colonial regime were successful in living up to its “civiliz- ing” ideology: it protected its subjects’ rights and delivered enlightened govern- ance to them. In that case, on either variant of functionalism, no claim to self-governance could be pressed against it. Ex hypothesi, this regime meets the minimal justice threshold, and it may do better at securing justice than its rivals (also satisfying the maximizing criterion). Still, many people believe that a popula- tion subjected to benign colonial administration would have a morally significant complaint: while not subject to grave injustice, they are denied self-rule. I will argue that this violation of self-rule is itself a wrong, even when not accompanied by further rights violations.10 A key aim of this chapter is to understand the nature of the pro tanto wrong involved in the denial of political self-determination.
Violations of self-determination can occur in other cases. Consider:
Military Occupation.11 In 1945, the Allies occupied Germany through a just use of force. Suppose that instead of restoring the territory to the German people, the United States had annexed their zone of occupation, turning it into an additional state of the union. After annexation, the United States governed reasonably justly, protecting the Germans’ human rights and granting them rights of democratic participation in the unified polity. Would the Germans have had a claim to political independence?
Humanitarian Intervention. Proponents of humanitarian intervention argue that it is permissible to intervene militarily in another state in cases of genocide, mass expulsions, or gross violations of basic human rights.12 They believe temporary foreign rule can be acceptable in the aftermath of a justified intervention. Yet most people think occupiers are obliged to restore the country to independence once a decent domestic government can be established. Why do they have this responsibility?
The best way to characterize our intuitions about these cases, I believe, is to hold that annexed, colonized, or occupied populations have a claim to govern themselves independently, and to order their political institutions as they choose. Their claim to self-determination is defeasible, and it may sometimes be outweighed by competing concerns, as in a justified humanitarian intervention. But where weighty countervailing considerations are not at stake, it ought to be respected. Functionalism, however, seems unable to account for self-determination. On its maximizing variant, no political group can ever claim a right—against a more just colonizing power—to govern itself independently. And while its threshold variant allows a political group that achieves decent rule to govern themselves, their right to independence holds only pro tem, and may be lost if in the future they become subject to reasonably just foreign rule.
As noted in the introduction, I agree with many aspects of functionalism, particularly the insistence that a legitimate state must do a minimally good job pro- tecting basic rights. Where foreign rule is the only option for securing these rights, it may be temporarily permissible, and I say more about such cases in Chapter 5. Yet even where self-determination is outweighed by other considerations, in my view, it remains important and may ground future claims to political independence. Unlike the functionalist, then, I deny that the minimal provision of justice is sufficient to give a state a claim to rule a territory and its population.13 Instead, we should distinguish between a temporary permission for an effective agent to use force to secure basic rights, and legitimate territorial jurisdiction—a claim-right, held by a state against its competitors, to be the permanent ruler of a territory and its population. Legitimate jurisdiction requires a state that reflects the self- determination of its population.
Two Dimensions of Legitimacy
On my view, then, legitimacy has two dimensions. Functionalism focuses on the “taker dimension”: a (reasonably just) state’s role in providing justice-related benefits to its members.14 As institutional “takers,” individuals have interests in protection of their rights (including rights to democratic representation), a fair scheme of distributive justice, or public goods that only a state can provide. This “taker” dimension of evaluation focuses on familiar aspects of the basic structure, e.g., “the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.”15 It is concerned with the quality of state institutions, independent of anyone’s acceptance or endorsement of them.
But I believe legitimacy also has a second, “maker” dimension: people have an interest in seeing themselves as the authors of their political institutions. It is as important that their institutions reflect their priorities and values (in their role as “makers”) as these institutions be good ones (from their perspective as “takers”). This second dimension of evaluation focuses not on the internal structure of the state itself (its qualities or characteristics), but rather on the relation between that state and those it rules. Collective self-determination is grounded in this “maker” interest in authorship of our institutions.