Second, military presence violates individuals’ right to occupancy by infringing on the sovereignty of the state in which they inhabit.
Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI
Viewed in this way, however, the occupancy interest seems quite robust. Removing someone from his territory destroys many of his life plans at once; it harms not just his peripheral plans, but also his most comprehensive endeavors; and his projects tend to be rapidly and thoroughly undermined in ways that are difficult to compensate. Since imposing duties on others to respect occupancy rights involves costs, however, we must also consider their interest in being free from such duties. In most cases, it is difficult to conceive of a weighty interest in being able to remove or expel others, or to interfere with their occupancy in ways that undermine their shared social practices. Nor does compliance with duties to respect others’ occupancy seem especially burdensome: so long as an outsider enjoys flourishing life plans where she lives, depriving her of the liberty to interfere with others’ occupancy does not seem unduly costly to her. It is worth recalling here that I am arguing for a quite limited entitlement to geographical space: namely, the right to reside permanently in an area, and to make use of it for social, cul- tural, and economic practices, immune from removal or expropriation. The limited nature of the right is important, since outsiders may have weightier interests in other aspects of territorial control. For example, they may have an interest in access to other areas of the globe, or they may have an interest in sharing in the value of the earth’s resources. Rights to exclude outsiders from a territory or to control its natural resource wealth face a higher burden of justification, and I will investigate these claims in Parts III and IV of the book.
There is an important class of cases, however, where imposing duties to respect others’ occupancy does seem unduly burdensome. When someone is unable to enjoy flourishing located life plans where he now is, he has a significant interest in acquiring some space in which to pursue these plans, even if that space is now occupied by someone else. Again, this suggests that we should impose a fair-use proviso on occupancy. Imposing distributive constraints does not undermine our assertion of an occupancy right, since rights need not exclude all conflicting reasons. Duties to respect occupancy rights exclude many potential reasons for interfering with occupancy, such as the fact we could increase economic efficiency by removing people; that we could enable other, desirable uses of an area; that we could alleviate social conflicts; and so on. The assertion of an occupancy right means we ought to refrain from acting on these competing considerations, even where, on balance, they seem to outweigh the occupancy interest in the case at hand. So long as the fair-use proviso is respected, then, I believe that the interest in located life plans is significant enough to justify imposing duties on others not to remove us from our territory, and not to interfere with our use of it in ways that undermine our shared social, cultural, economic, and political practices. This is because (i) the increased security afforded to located life plans by recognizing such duties is of great benefit to us, and (ii) our interest in not having such a duty imposed is quite weak by comparison.