Social practices cannot be translocated to a different spatial location
Stilz 19 [(Anna, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. She also has a strong interest in modern political thought (especially natural law theory, Rousseau, and Kant). Stilz is Editor-in-Chief of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a co-editor for Social and Political Philosophy at the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy, and Vice-President of the American Society for Social and Legal Philosophy. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2005, and a B.A. from the University of Virginia in 1999.) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration," Oxford Political Theory, 8/29/2019, https://academic.oup.com/book/35135] TDI
First, one might object that our social practices could theoretically be translocated to a different spatial location without disruption. Perhaps the university where I work could be taken down and reconstructed, brick by brick, somewhere else. Perhaps the inhabitants of the area could be carefully resettled in a way that precisely reproduces the patterns of residence people now inhabit. Would there then be any harm in relocation?
I believe it is sometimes possible to move people without damage to their located life plans. Occupancy requires security in one’s central life commitments, with a sufficient geographic scope to ensure access to an adequate range of oppor- tunities for revising these commitments. Occupancy is violated only if a person is moved in a way that disrupts these central life projects. But not all forms of forced movement do this. If the state takes my home in order to build a new road, requir- ing me to move a few streets away, this does not necessarily violate my occupancy rights, so long as it did not prevent me from working in my job, attending my church, or associating with friends and family.21 Similarly, we might imagine that a self-contained group (such as an Amish settlement) could be instantly relocated, to a different, but geographically similar place, where their social infrastructure had already been replicated, and their lives could immediately resume. In such a case, I believe the group members retain a general claim not to be forced or coerced without sufficient justification. If there are no competing social values at stake, we ought not to move them against their will. But the case against territorial removal will be significantly weaker here. The example highlights that our interests in specific geographical locations are largely indirect. What makes a place my “home” is not that location’s GPS coordinates, but my plans involving the place, and my attachments to the people and practices there. Competing social values may more easily suffice to justify relocating people in “pure” cases, where no harm to their located life plans is involved.
Still, I find such “pure” cases difficult to imagine on any very large scale. The process of removal usually involves significant disruption, even if the removed group is eventually able to reconstruct their lives and practices somewhere else. Ethnographic accounts speak of “upheaval” and “uprooting”: people tell of losing their family and friends on the journey, of being detached from their workplace and associations, and of reconstructing these things only with much effort, and after a difficult process of adjustment. Further, short of relocating humanity to a new planet, there is nowhere to put people that will not involve transforming their life plans, by the simple fact that a different social world already exists there, since most places on earth are currently inhabited. The translocation objection shows that the connection between territorial occupancy and personal autonomy is not a logical one, but rather it depends on certain empirical facts. Still, I believe that in a world like ours, the interest in located life plans grounds an interest in secure occupancy of a specific place.