Military withdrawal is not an example of a false promise – failing to fulfill one’s commitment is distinct from making a promise one intends to break.
Byrd and Hruschka 05 [(B. Sharon and Joachim, a Professor of U.S. Law at the School of Law, Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena, Germany and Joachim Hruschka is a Professor of Law at Friedrich-Alexander University in Erlangen, Germany) "Kant on 'Why Must I Keep My Promise?'" Chicago-Kent Law Review, December 2005, https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3521&context=cklawreview] TDI
Why is it that I must keep my promise? Immanuel Kant,1 in his "Doctrine of Right,"'2 tells us that everyone easily understands "I must." The duty to keep promises is a categorical imperative. 3 Kant says that any fur- ther proof of this imperative is simply impossible-indeed as impossible as it would be for a geometer to prove that I need three lines to construct a triangle. 4 One may quickly fall into the trap of believing Kant's claim because of his arguments in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,5 where Kant uses false promising as his most convincing example for the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law."'6 The example posits an individual in need of money who knows he will never be able to repay a loan. 7 Still, to get the needed funds, he also knows that he must firmly promise to repay it. Can he make the promise? Kant states that the maxim of his action is, "When I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen." 8 Such a maxim cannot be universalized without contradiction; thus, it cannot become a universal law. The individual acting on this maxim relies on the institution of promising, without which his promise would be ineffective, while simultaneously contradicting the nature of the institution of promising. Although this example seems to convincingly support Kant's Categorical Imperative, does it provide support for the legal duty to perform a contractual obligation? Two distinct questions are raised here. The first is whether the duty in connection with the false promising example Kant discusses in Groundwork is a legal or an ethical duty. The second is whether the duty, be it legal or ethical, is a duty not to make false promises, referring to the duty relevant at the time the promise is made, or a duty to perform as promised earlier, which first becomes relevant when performance is due.
At first blush, the duty Kant discusses in Groundwork is the duty not to lie, which is an ethical duty but not necessarily a legal duty. For Kant, legal duties are duties one owes to others; ethical duties are duties one owes to oneself.9 The duties one owes to others are legal duties if their nonfulfillment constitutes a violation of someone else's freedom of choice, thus violating Kant's universal principle of law: "Act externally so that the free use of your choice can co-exist with everyone else's freedom under a universal law."' 0 Because the non-fulfillment of duties constitutes a violation of someone else's freedom of choice, one can be coerced to fulfill these duties."l In the Groundwork example, the individual considers lying to gain an advantage. Kant notes in several places that lying violates an ethical duty one owes to oneself, 12 but lying violates a legal duty only if the lie infringes upon someone else's rights. 13 In the "Doctrine of Right,"
Kant even states that lying is generally not prohibited by natural law because of every person's innate right to freedom. 14 A person has a right to say or promise anything regardless of whether the statement is true and honestly meant or false and dishonestly meant, so long as the lie does not infringe upon others' belongings. 15 Fairly speaking, falsely promising to repay one's loan infringes upon what belongs to someone else because the promisee parts with her money in the mistaken belief that the promisor intends to repay the loan. The promisee is harmed when she parts with her belonging after the promisor duped her into believing something that was not true. That could be the basis. for charging the promisor with fraud, which is indeed a violation of a legal duty.
The second question raised, namely whether the duty is a legal duty to perform a contractual obligation, must be answered in the negative. Consider a variation of the previous example. Again, assume the promisor makes the false promise to receive the loan, but later, before the loan is due, the promisor inherits a large sum of money from a long lost relative.
When the loan is due, the promisor repays it promptly. Has the promisor violated any contractual legal duty owed to the promisee? Seemingly not.16
If the promisee discovers the promisor's initial inability to repay the loan before the loan is due, the promisee could perhaps charge the promisor with fraud, which is a tort and not a crime according to Kant. 17 However, as long as the promisor maintains that he intends to repay the loan when due, he cannot be charged with breach of contract even if his financial situation indicates that he will be unable to perform on time. 18
In the alternative, consider the example of an individual who thinks he will be able to repay a loan at a later date. He promises to repay the loan and receives the money. He then loses a significant amount of money in the stock market. At the time the loan is due, he can no longer repay it. He has not made a false promise, and thus has not breached the duty Kant considers in the Groundwork example. However, he has breached a contractual obligation owed to the promisee, even though he would gladly repay theloan if he had the money to do so. Kant's example in Groundwork seemingly fails to provide support for the claim that one should fulfill one's promises. The problem lies in the time gap between the time of the promise and the due date for performance.
Whether the promise is false depends on the promisor's beliefs as to his ability to make future payment, beliefs that may or may not be true. Kant's example in Groundwork relates not to the breach of a contractual obligation, but rather to the relationship between the promisor's beliefs and claims about the future. Kant himself points to the problem of the time lapse in connection with what he calls "acquisition of security through taking an oath in court." 19 Kant distinguishes between the promissory and the assertory oath. 20 He takes the example of the civil servant who is called upon at the beginning of his term in office to take an oath promising to properly fulfill his official duties. 21 Kant contends that it would make more sense to require the civil servant to take an oath at the end of each year, asserting that he did, in fact, properly fulfill his duties. 22 With the assertory oath, the civil servant is in a position to know how he actually performed during the year. With the promissory oath, he can always excuse himself at the end of the year by claiming that he could not have foreseen the difficulties he encountered during the year that hindered him from keeping his promise.23