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Our interest in occupancy is not an argument for state sovereignty – place-based ties could equally ground an argument for a world state.

Schutter 21 [(Helder De, professor of social and political philosophy at KU Leuven. He works on the moral justifications of language rights, federalism, and nonterritorial political autonomy) "Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration, a Review by Helder De Schutter," Ethics and International Affairs, Spring 2021, https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/journal/territorial-sovereignty-a-philosophical-exploration#author] TDI

While compelling in many respects, the book’s core argument suffers in my view from two shortcomings. First, it remains unclear why occupancy, the first interest above, is an argument for states. The right to occupancy is grounded in place-based ties that structure the life of individuals. But the sum totals of the places to which people are attached do not necessarily map on to the territories of states. For many people, states may be too cramped for their life plans: if my family members live overseas or if my religion involves visiting holy places abroad, then my life plans are better served by a world state, or they in any case demand rather idiosyncratic state boundaries.

Stilz herself allows for granting occupancy rights without statehood: “Suppose,” she argues, “that in the future, Alaska were to secede from the United States. It would be wrong for Alaska to close its borders to people from other US states who have family ties or associational or occupational commitments in the area: it ought to allow these people to continue to come and go freely, reside there, and so on” (p. 57). But this is puzzling. If granting access to an independent Alaska to U.S. citizens who have Alaska-based life plans suffices to protect their occupancy rights, occupancy does not ground states.

Rather than a justification for the states system, occupancy is in my view merely a protection-worthy interest. This interest is arguably so important that its protection should be a legitimacy condition for existing states. Indeed, Stilz often presents the matter in this way, claiming that states only have the right to rule if they protect occupancy (and basic justice and self-determination). But she also makes the stronger, and in my view unwarranted, claim that beyond an interest to protect, occupancy is a reason to have states.

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