Our humanity, which consists in our autonomous rationality, endows us with the capacity to decide what is valuable. It is this feature that belies our dignity and renders us each an inviolable, unconditional source of value. That we are each unconditional sources of value bounds us to respect each other’s humanity. This requires that we only act on those maxims that can be willed as universal law.
Bagnoli 04 [(Carla Bagnoli, Carla Bagnoli is a Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, and a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College, University of Oxford. She has written extensively on moral dilemmas, moral authority, and responsibility, and is the editor of Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge UP, 2013) and Morality and the Emotions (Oxford UP, 2011). Her Ethical Constructivism is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press.) "Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument," ResearchGate, January 2004, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265188932_Humanitarian_Intervention_as_a_Perfect_Duty_A_Kantian_Argument] TDI
What is humanity, then? According to Kant, humanity is what characterizes us as persons; it consists in the capacity to decide what is valuable and what is not. This decision is not a mere whim, but the very capacity for rationally setting ends of one’s own.4 A person is a special locus of value in that it is also the origin of value. Kant calls “dignity” the peculiar kind of value that persons embody insofar as they are themselves sources of value. Originating value is a law-like activity: it requires that we are capable of setting ends by conceiving maxims that can be willed as universal laws. This also requires that we are capable of self-legislation and therefore of prescribing obligations for ourselves. This activity of self-legislation is tantamount to the autonomous exercise of rationality. Hence, humanity is tantamount to autonomous rationality, and it is the feature that makes persons inviolable.5 We cannot view persons as indistinguishable units of value insofar as persons embody a peculiar kind of value, dignity. The recognition that somebody is a person makes a claim on us: it demands that we respect such a person as an autonomous source of value.
Armed intervention is “humanitarian” when it is undertaken for the sake of protecting the dignity of persons, that is, the value of their humanity. Human rights are necessary to express and exercise our humanity; they are fundamental to being a person. When we appeal to the idea of human dignity, we make a moral case for intervention, that is, one that applies universally and unconditionally.