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Defending against human rights abuses is a perfect duty as it is grounded in duties of respect for humanity, not duties of charity – upholding this perfect duty requires military intervention.

Bagnoli 04 [(Carla Bagnoli, Carla Bagnoli is a Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, and a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College, University of Oxford. She has written extensively on moral dilemmas, moral authority, and responsibility, and is the editor of Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge UP, 2013) and Morality and the Emotions (Oxford UP, 2011). Her Ethical Constructivism is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press.) "Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument," ResearchGate, January 2004, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265188932_Humanitarian_Intervention_as_a_Perfect_Duty_A_Kantian_Argument] TDI

In the case of humanitarian intervention, the issue of identifying the appropriate agency certainly arises. But this is a political issue that concerns proper authority. Whether perfect or imperfect, a duty applies to all rational agents. Specifically, then, in case of serious violation of human rights, everybody, that is, the entire international community, is bound by the obligation to protect the victims of human rights abuse. How should we collectively handle this moral responsibility? This is not a question of allocation deriving from the broadness of the duty to protect. Rather, this is a political problem of how to institutionalize a response that should be voiced by the international community as a whole.

I agree with Kok Chor Tan’s argument in this volume that if the duty to protect is imperfect in the absence of collective institutions, the proper conclusion is that states must cooperate to improve those institutions, not that they are free individually to ignore the duty.20 There clearly is a problem as to how to institutionalize the moral responsibility to intervene, but it is not exactly a problem of allocation: the problem is a political one and concerns how to institutionalize the responsibility. Furthermore, this political problem does not depend on the fact that humanitarian intervention is at best an imperfect duty. In fact, the problem remains even when we take the duty to intervene as a perfect duty generated by respect for humanity.

Although treating humanitarian intervention as an imperfect duty does not have the consequences I have just discussed, it is nonetheless a mistake. The underlying claim is that the duty to intervene is imperfect, insofar as it is a duty of charity or beneficence, because we cannot be compelled to act on motives of charity. Charity is a duty of virtue that cannot be coerced. This argument seems to me mistaken. Beneficence is the moral ground for assisting societies burdened by unfavorable political or economical conditions. It is related to the principle of respect because the duty of beneficence includes promoting the conditions for respecting human rights and for self-respect.21 But resisting the violation of basic human rights is not simply a duty of charity, or something that one may or may not choose to perform. It is a perfect duty whose performance is morally obligatory. It is a duty that proceeds from respect for humanity. Human rights, such as right to life, liberty, personal safety, social security, and membership or recognition22 are necessary for expressing who we are and exercising our rational agency. It is worthwhile to consider what the recognition of humanity involves in order to appreciate the stringency of the duty to protect. Humanity is the criterion for membership in the moral community, for moral personality.23 It is what gives us dignity, that is, what make us sources of value or “self-originating sources of valid claims,” as Rawls puts it.24 Dignity (dignitas interna) is a category of value that is specific to persons, makes persons inviolable, puts them “above all price,” and entitles its bearers to equal standing in a community of equals.25 Such a community is regulated by moral norms to which all members, as free and rational agents, are accountable. These moral norms express and give substance to the equal dignity of persons, and dictate how they must address and treat one another, what they may properly exact from one another, and what they owe to one another. Since these moral norms are constitutive of the moral community, complying with such norms cannot be merely a matter of virtue or good character. We are bound by such norms insofar as we are members of the moral community. Respect for those norms is tantamount to respect for our humanity and is therefore something that not only may but must be demanded by all our equals and is owed to all.26 It is the condition on which the possibility of appropriate relationships and interactions is grounded. We owe one another respect not because we stand in a special position toward one another (as neighbors, friends, or traders), but because we are persons, that is, self-originating sources of claims.27

Duties of respect are therefore a particularly important category of duties we have toward others and are distinct from duties of beneficence. Duties of beneficence such as charity put others under some corresponding obligation (to express gratitude, for example), but duties of respect do not generate any reciprocal obligation. They are simply owed to others, and can be legitimately demanded by them: “Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow beings and is in turn bound to respect every other.”28

Defending human rights is a duty of respect because human rights are claims persons have as persons. Human rights are, in this reading, principles that warrant that we are able to represent ourselves as self-originating sources of claims and to act upon the conception of ourselves that we have formed. But it should be noted that promoting human rights and defending basic human rights are different activities and fall under distinct categories of duty. This difference also affects the nature of the means for pursuing them. To assist a country in promoting the social and political conditions for the fulfillment of human rights cannot be successfully carried out by warfare: it is a much more complex endeavor, which requires many different activities and structures. Instead, stopping a particular violation of basic human rights can sometimes be achieved only by inflicting sanctions, specifically, by military action.29

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