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We have a perfect duty to coerce states that fail to respect human rights – failure to hold states accountable is tantamount to a failure to respect the dignity of their constituents. States that fail to protect human rights have failed as a state, and thus, do not have claims against coercion.

Bagnoli 04 [(Carla Bagnoli, Carla Bagnoli is a Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, and a Visiting Fellow at All Souls College, University of Oxford. She has written extensively on moral dilemmas, moral authority, and responsibility, and is the editor of Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge UP, 2013) and Morality and the Emotions (Oxford UP, 2011). Her Ethical Constructivism is forthcoming with Cambridge University Press.) "Humanitarian Intervention as a Perfect Duty: A Kantian Argument," ResearchGate, January 2004, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265188932_Humanitarian_Intervention_as_a_Perfect_Duty_A_Kantian_Argument] TDI

In violating another person’s dignity, I fail as a moral as well as a rational being in that I fail to act upon a maxim that can be conceived and willed as a universal law.35 Others are then permitted and required to coerce me, if coercion is needed to obstruct my wrongdoing. Although the underlying reasoning is clearly moral, Kant defends the permission to coerce as a juridical permission, according to which one person may force another to act rightly; that is, we may obstruct wrong actions.36 This conception of coercion is based on the idea that the wrongdoer and the victim are both members of a moral community of mutually accountable equals. The moral norms that regulate the moral community are merely the standards of respect for the equal dignity of all members. All members of the community have equal standing to demand compliance. When those standards are violated, the victims have a claim on the wrongdoer, and they have grounds for complaint if he does not comply.

Membership in a community of mutual respect and accountability helps us to see that human rights are claims to which we are entitled as persons. As Joel Feinberg points out, having rights makes claiming possible; but it is claiming that gives rights their special moral significance. This feature of rights is connected in a way with the customary rhetoric about what it is to be a human being. Having rights enables us . . . to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal to anyone.37

This conception is backed by a longstanding tradition; my aim here is simply to ground it on a Kantian conception of respect for humanity. Membership in humanity is tantamount to membership to a community of equals, “persons” who have equal standing and are mutually accountable. Morality, according to this Kantian view, is mutual accountability based on mutual recognition, not on special moral customs and conventions or common sense.38 By linking morality to mutual accountability, we can argue not only that the failure to protect human rights is a failure to acknowledge and defend the claims to which persons are entitled as members of the moral community, but also that a failure to hold someone accountable for wrongdoing is tantamount to a failure to respect his dignity as a rational being.39 That is, the right to coerce springs from the recognition of the wrongdoer as an equal, as having equal standing in the moral community, and therefore as somebody to be addressed as a wrongdoer, rather than obstructed as a moral incompetent. On this view, then, coercion of the wrongdoer is a form of moral address, a relation that presupposes the recognition of mutual accountability.

What is legally right according to the existing laws may not correspond to what is categorically right. This is the case where the actual laws do not meet the complete conditions for mutual external freedom. In other words, it can be that we live under unjust institutions, governed by laws that do not adequately express or protect our humanity. Recht is a regulative ideal. Therefore, when we ask ourselves how to act, we should ask not only what is required by the existing law but also, more importantly, whether our maxim can be willed as a universal law. When the conception of right is instantiated, instead, there is no further test for our maxims because what is legal according to the existing law is also consistent with the external freedom of others.

This argument makes further sense of the claim that a state that does not grant fundamental human rights to its citizen is a state that fails its most important task; it fails as a state. In Kantian terms, it is a state that does not warrant mutually secure domains of external freedom. Hence, not only is there no obligation to respect the integrity of a state that fails as a state, there is also a legal permission (that is, an obligation) to use coercion against it. To argue that there is a moral obligation to obstruct the obstruction of freedom is already an argument for humanitarian intervention. It follows from it that neutrality is morally inadmissible, that the the offender is complementary to the perfect duty to protect the victim.40

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