Awareness of pain and pleasure occurs via phenomenal introspection – phenomenal introspection is reliable a process of belief formation; those who did not experience pain as bad died off and their genes were removed from the gene pool
Phenomenology=study of consciousness from a first person POV, lived experience
Nelson 20 [(Joe, PhD in philosophy from Duke University) “A Defense of Basic Prudential Hedonism,” Duke University, 2020. ]
In summary, the explanandum says that in at least some cases, feeling things is part of the process by which you become aware of being in a state of pleasure or pain. It does not say that feeling things is always part of this process. Nor does it say that having a feeling is ever a necessary part of this process. Nor does it say that any specific feeling must be involved. It only says that some feeling is part of the process on some occasions.
I believe that this explanandum is an obvious fact. But even so, I will say two more things on its behalf.
In support of the point that we sometimes know that we are in a state of pleasure or pain, I will note that to deny this is to give up on theorizing about hedonic states altogether. If we do not ever know when we are in a state of pleasure or pain, then we have no way of telling whether our theories of pleasure and pain in any way match the phenomena they purport to be about. Hence this dissertation must presuppose that part of the explanandum, and indeed all the criticisms of BPH that I will discuss below must presuppose it as well. Consider also that to justify rejecting this part of the explanandum, we would need a rationally convincing argument implying (for example) that when a cognitively competent adult burns himself with a branding iron, attends to the subsequent feeling, and classifies it as painful, he does not actually know that he is in pain. I suspect that no such argument exists or is forthcoming.
In support of the point that knowledge of our hedonic states is at least sometimes conscious, and gained at least in part through phenomenology, I invite the reader to perform an experiment. Pinch yourself on the arm, increasing the pressure until you are aware of being in a state of mild pain. How did you become aware of when the pain began? I would wager that you did so at least in part through phenomenology. During the experiment, you underwent changes in what it was like to be you at the moment— you felt things—and this was at least part of how you became aware of the onset of a pain. This shows that awareness of pain does sometimes occur at least partly via phenomenology.
Unfortunately, it’s generally easier to gradually induce pain in ourselves than pleasure. But if you can, try to repeat the experiment by giving yourself a gentle scalp massage, starting with pressure light enough as to be nearly imperceptible, and gradually applying more until it feels pleasant. If that does not work, feel free to substitute any suitable pleasure-inducing activity. In any case, I expect you will find that detecting the onset of pleasure involved feeling something. This shows that awareness of pleasure, too, sometimes occurs at least partly via phenomenology.
If we suppose that the phenomenological thesis is true, these facts are easy to explain. We can become aware of our pleasures and pains through phenomenology because pleasures and pains are phenomenological states. Phenomenology provides the most direct path to awareness (conscious knowledge) of the properties that make our pleasures and pains what they are; the situation is analogous to using vision to become aware of visual qualia or hearing to become aware of auditory qualia. It’s simply the right tool for the job.
So, the phenomenological thesis explains the explanandum. But this is not enough. For the phenomenological thesis to provide single best explanation, there must be adequate reason to favor this explanation over the alternatives. I cannot do the whole job of giving such reason here; demonstration of some virtues of the phenomenological thesis—its resilience to standard objections, and its simplicity compared to certain rivals— will have to wait for later parts of the dissertation. But I will build a presumptive case for the phenomenological thesis by attempting to show that every non-phenomenological alternative is seriously flawed. I will also consider different sort of phenomenological view, and argue that it enjoys no distinct advantage over BPH’s phenomenological theiss.