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Experts use ‘military presence’ to refer to boots on the ground.

ICRC 20 [International Committee of the Red Cross; Jun 11, 2020; Report prepared and edited by Tristan Ferraro, Legal adviser, ICRC; “Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory”; https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4094.pdf] brett TDI

Military presence as an element of the ‘effective control’3 test provoked constructive discussions among the experts. A majority of participants concluded very quickly that the presence of foreign armed forces in a disputed area was a prerequisite for the establishment of an occupation. However, one expert took a more nuanced approach, arguing that if military presence was a condition sine qua non for the establishment of an occupation, it would not necessarily be one for maintaining an occupation. The expert stressed that effective control, once it was established, could – to some degree – be exerted remotely. This view was challenged on the basis that the maintenance of an occupation would still necessitate a military presence on the ground, as an expression of continued effective control over the territory in question. Therefore, according to most of the experts, occupation could not be established or maintained solely through power exercised from beyond the boundaries of the occupied territory; it required a certain number of foreign boots on the ground, as it were.

The necessity of having troops on the ground was driven home by the clear rejection of the view that occupation could be enforced solely by either naval or air power. In addition, another point was stressed: control of air space did not by itself meet the requirement of ‘effective control’ for the purposes of IHL. Therefore, only effective control on land would characterize military occupation within the meaning of IHL. It was then specified that the prerequisite of having foreign troops on the ground did not mean that effective control required their presence on each square metre of the occupied territory. Referring to US Field Manual 27-10 (1956), one expert stressed that the size of the foreign forces could not be pre-determined and would vary according to the circumstances, in particular the topographical features of the territory, the density of the population or the degree of resistance encountered on the ground. Thus, in certain circumstances, an occupying power could exercise effective control by positioning its troops in strategic places of the occupied territory, enabling it to dispatch them fairly quickly to make its authority felt in the area concerned.

Some experts also established a direct link between effective control and the presence of foreign forces on a contested area by underlining the relatedness of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, which defines the concept of occupation, and Article 43 of the same instrument, which lays out the main obligations incumbent upon the occupying power (i.e. to restore and ensure public order and safety). These experts asserted that foreign forces present in a specific area could be regarded as occupying forces only if they were able to meet the obligations set forth under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. It was also stressed that the link between effective control and the presence of foreign forces on contested territory stemmed from Article 41 of the Oxford Manual of 1880. Further, these experts noted that the concept of effective control would be meaningless if the occupying power was not in a position to fulfil its responsibilities under occupation law. This would eventually run counter to the principle of effectivity upon which the law of occupation was premised.

Another participant, while expressing support for the connection established between Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Regulations, specified that the fulfilment of the duties incumbent upon the occupying power could only be incremental, as one could not expect an occupier to meet all its obligations as soon as it gained effective control over a territory. Making it necessary – for the purposes of IHL – for foreign troops to respect all their duties under occupation law as the starting point of occupation would therefore be unrealistic and would eventually expand the gap already existing between the invasion phase and the establishment of occupation, leading ultimately to a protection gap. The expert stressed that occupation required only a progressive realization of the occupier’s duties and could exist even if an occupying power was not in position to meet all its obligations under occupation law. He concluded by declaring that this theory was supported by the fact that many of the provisions of occupation law were obligations of means, not of results.

Nevertheless, one participant disagreed with the connection made between the two Articles (42 and 43) of the Hague Regulations for the purposes of determining the existence of an occupation. He cast particular doubt on the fact that the applicability of Article 42 would depend on the enforcement of the duties set forth in Article 43, arguing instead that only the contrary was correct (that Article 42 conditioned the applicability of Article 43). According to this expert, mixing those two central provisions could result in requiring the foreign forces to concretely and effectively exert authority over the foreign territory4 and would therefore endanger the applicability of occupation law. This expert asserted that, in fact, a foreign force could still exert effective control even if it refused to fulfil its responsibilities under occupation law or if it let the local government administer the occupied territory. Unilateral refusal to meet the obligations arising from occupation law, whatever form that took, should therefore have no bearing on the classification of a situation as an occupation.

Another expert was reluctant to accept military presence as a condition sine qua non, regarding it as one element – among others – to factor into the classification exercise. For this expert, the key element of the ‘effective control’ test was interdiction/prevention of independent governmental authority. He asserted that occupation law obligations would take effect as soon as the foreign forces had deliberately eliminated the ability of the local authorities to carry out independently the functions of government. This view was vigorously contested by several experts who stated that the negative perspective of the test (prevention of the exercise of governmental functions) was per se not sufficient to establish an occupation. During that period, they said, occupation law would not be applicable since the interdiction of governmental functions, without replacement by the foreign forces’ authority, would only lead to a vacuum of power and would not constitute occupation for the purposes of IHL. In fact, IHL would require another element, constituting the positive aspect of the ‘effective control’ test, i.e. the ability of the foreign forces to exert authority in lieu of the legitimate government. In this connection, some form of military presence would also be required in order to exert effective control over an area.

The experts also stressed that effective control could not be defined in reference to the general capabilities of the foreign forces as compared to those of their opponent. Rather, the test would refer to the effects of the foreign forces’ presence on the exercise of authority in the contested area, in particular their specific ability to exert authority over the territory concerned in lieu of the legitimate government. In other words, most of the experts agreed that the test for an occupation should not be which of the belligerents had the military capability to impose their will, but rather which of them had the military capability by virtue of their presence in a given area to impose their authority and prevent their opponent from doing so, and eventually to be in effective control of that area.

In conclusion, almost all the experts agreed that military presence was a prerequisite for identifying the beginning of an occupation. Nonetheless, some of them also stressed that it could lose its relevance and apply in a nuanced manner for the end-of-occupation test. In this regard, some participants seemed to suggest that military presence would not be a condition sine qua non for determining the end of occupation.

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