Fears of nuclear proliferation depicts countries as uncivilized, irrational, and immature which legitimates colonial power relations.
Mathur ’20 [Dr. Ritu; Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas. Her research and teaching interests are in the field of International Relations with a specialization in Security Studies. July 11, 2020; “The West and the Rest: A Civilizational Mantra”; Civilizational Discourses in Weapons Control, Chapter 2] TDI
This anger circulates as ‘the image of proliferation’ is constructed among ‘(particularly western) states and is invoked as a threat to international order and stability to further “strengthen controls on the spread of technology related to the research for or production” of weapons.’183 The metaphor of proliferation signifies ‘the “other”’ and is ‘grounded in biology.’184 Practices of proliferation entail that the supplier states ‘police the circulation of technology’ and the recipients accept these policing measures at the risk of being identified as ‘immature,’ ‘backward,’ ‘nuclear outlaw’ or ‘rogue state’ that is ‘unwilling to conform to the rules of civilized behaviour.’185 An outlaw, outlier or a rogue is deemed to be ‘hostile or seemingly hostile Third World states with large military forces and nascent Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities’ that exists outside ‘a larger, settled community’ or civilization ‘whose rules the outlaws refuse to follow.’186 It is argued that the West could only be persuaded to accept ‘legal proscriptions’ against these nuclear weapons based on the dreaded possibility that these weapons could be used as ‘powerful force multipliers’ by ‘poor and weak countries.’187
Security Culture and Decorative Savages
The Western powers completely failed to empathize with ‘multiple valences of atomic energy’ that had found resonance in postcolonial societies.188 The US, enamored with its exceptional status within the Western civilization as a responsible superpower, sought to contain the threat of communism and waged wars in Korea and Vietnam ‘to bring the light of civilization to Asia.’189 The new superpower was so preoccupied with building its own nuclear arsenal that it was unthinkable for it to envisage that any of the new sovereign postcolonial states ‘would be in a position to develop an independent atomic energy project — military or civil — for many decades to come.’190 Gusterson observes, ‘[C]olonial overtones’ in the ‘collective common sense’ of the West represented especially by the ‘US defense intellectuals, politicians and pundits — leaders of opinions on nuclear weapons.’191 This collective consciousness failed to take note that atomic energy signified ‘a source of cheap electrical energy to developmentalists, a means of overcoming neo-colonial domination to nationalists, a sign of masculinity and intellectual prowess to scientists, a resource for state power to socialists, and an instrument of foreign policy to realists and militarists.’192
The West persisted in its outlook of considering them as mere suppliers of raw materials such as thorium, monazite, beryllium and manganese. The efforts by these postcolonial countries to use the sale of these materials in exchange for expertise that could directly benefit their atomic energy programs were strongly resisted by the West. The acquisition of ‘modern technology’ and especially nuclear technology by the postcolonial states perturbed the West, which then resorted to claims that these technologies were ‘always marked with the trace of the foreign.’193 They questioned the ‘purely national origins of atomic energy’ in the postcolonial states that had benefitted from the detailed plant designs, drawings and advice that they had received from the West. These dangerous attempts by the West to represent the postcolonial states as ‘decorative savages’ depict how the West denounces the performative modernity of the other.194
The ‘decorative savages’ according to the West are capable of nothing more than a crude attempt at mimicry, a ‘savage aping’ at a superficial level of technological prowess that is ‘in fact in the service of deeper levels of “primitive”, “tribal,” or magical thinking.’195 Any Third World country’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons was condemned as an act of national chauvinism. It was further subject to ridicule and caricature. Said observes,
As momentous, generally important issues face the world — issues involving nuclear destruction… popular caricatures of the Orient are exploited by politicians whose source of ideological supply is not only the half-literate technocrat but the superliterate Orientalist.196
Said suggests that this period was ripe to produce ‘military-nationalsecurity possibilities of an alliance, say, between a specialist in “national character analysis” and an expert in Islamic institutions… for expediency’s sake if for nothing else.’197 Questions were raised, ‘how to reach a less culture-blind study of international relations (?)’ and ‘how to approach and represent otherness (?)’198 It was now claimed that the neglect of culture in international security studies needed to be remedied as ‘strategic culture’ gives meaning to ‘objective’ variables such as technology.199 It was further reinforced that ‘if strategic culture changes, it does so slowly, lagging behind changes in “objective” conditions.’200
The extremely technocratic and specialized discourse on ‘strategic analysis’ based on ‘extreme forms of certain generalizations’ is now to be complemented with an understanding of ‘security culture.’201 Security culture is to be understood as a ‘sub-set of political, diplomatic and strategic/military culture.’202 This simple yet carefully crafted scholarly maneuver facilitated‘[t]he return of culture and identity in IR theory,’ and scholars debated how to navigate this ‘cultural turn in IR’ with the avowed objective of redressing ‘some of the weaknesses inherent in the dominant realist literature.’203 A consensus definition of security culture in the context of weapons control was now proposed in the following terms:
Culture, as it refers to non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and security-building issues, consists of those enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state’s/society’s interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced by political actors and elites.204
To study practices constitutive of ‘identity’ and ‘culture,’ scholars now promised to provide ‘coherent’ and ‘sensible’ accounts of ‘security culture’ to emphasize how ‘security culture can be expected to exercise a powerful influence on a state’s nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament policies and practices.’205 They sought to explore the differences in ‘language’ and ‘thought’ between different national security cultures to gauge their ‘orientations’ toward violence and gauge prospects for ‘development of the arms control and security-building dialogue’ in an effort to ameliorate ‘us-them’ differences.206
But Johnson admits there is ‘a great deal of confusion over what it is that strategic culture is supposed to explain, how it is supposed to explain, and how much it does explain.’207 Krause concurs to argue that culture is a ‘residual phenomena that do not seem at first glance to have a “rational” explanation.’208 This problem is compounded as a narrow focus on similarities among various actors may follow from a universalistic standpoint but be embedded in Eurocentric ethnocentrism.209 In practices of strategic culture there is great difficulty in ‘exporting or translating the fundamental concepts of the Western nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament experience to regional contexts.’210 By focusing excessively on the differences between cultures one produces a ‘narrow focus on how the Other is fundamentally different from (the perception of) oneself.’211 Thus, Walker cautions against the ‘seductive rhetoric’ of discourses that try to display their cultural ‘sensitivity to other civilizations.’212 Valbjorn insistson a ‘blind/blinded stalemate’ that makes scholars within the field of international relations (IR)
blind to the diversity of forms of international relations as well as blind to IR’s own peculiar cultural standpoint — the alternatives suggested have in different ways often replaced a problematic culture-blind position with approaches that in turn most of all appear as culture-blinded.213
Johnston cautions against practices of strategic analysis that seek to ‘reinforce stereotypes about strategic predispositions of other states’ and urges ‘care’ as ‘American policy attention shifts to, for instance, the Asia-Pacific region, an area where US images of the “other” have been rife with stereotyped generalizations about particular “strategic styles.”’214
Others caution against practices of revived ‘Occidentalism’ or ‘Orientalism in reverse,’ a sly strategy of redeploying ‘representations previously employed to legitimize Western imperialism’ that ‘were later on reversed and used by local groups calling for an end of Western interference by reference to an allegedly unique culture.’215 The seeds of this cultural strategy were sowed during the transition from colonial to postcolonial, independent status, when some Afro-Asian elites ‘internalized’ and ‘mimicked’ racially defined ‘civilizational’ thinking that ‘did not go beyond Western colonial thought.’216 To quote Abraham at length,
the reliance on civilizational categories for understanding global differences was not restricted to Europeans alone. Generations of local political elites in the colonies had grown up internalizing these categories and they remained potent means by which to understand the world.
This slippage should not come as a surprise. Modern Asian elites had long been steeped in the knowledge-systems of Europe; indeed, such expertise was a condition of having political voice and being taken seriously within colonial societies. Hence, that Asian elites would adopt and internalize the tacit and explicit conditions of distinction embedded in authoritative social and political institutions is to be expected. Asian articulations of their own differences worked by inverting the familiar hierarchy, but were not able to transcend it, as Gandhi among others would have hoped. This new articulation of difference did little more than relocate Asian civilization in global hierarchies, seeking to make it pre-eminent rather than subordinate; it did not go further and offer a critical appraisal of the idea of civilization. …Asian elites were not able to think outside the category of race and civilization as a way of thinking beyond colonial categories, we find Asian elites had internalized entirely the racial logics through which the world was seen and its hierarchy naturalized, a practice that would have important implications for foreign policy decision-making.217
This was foreseen by Gandhi and therefore his urgent insistence on the need for ‘the rewriting of “civilization” and its conversion from a source of domination to a means of political empowerment.’218 However, this rewriting of civilization is not an easy task.
Johnston notes the persistent dilemma faced by scholars regarding ‘how is strategic culture transmitted through time’ and ‘from what time periods should these sources be taken?’219 The problem of timelag is further explicated by understanding how particular ‘ideas long ago left within the “mother discipline” still reside within the receiving disciplines.’220 It is difficult to address these temporal questions as ‘the alleged homogeneity of a society’s strategic culture across time is problematic.’221 The problem of timelag persists and raises questions regarding continuity and interruption of strategic cultural practices. Furthermore, there is pervasive ambiguity as ‘much of the strategic culture literature does not really specify what exactly should be analyzed when looking for culturally-based ranked set of grand strategic preferences.’222 Nevertheless, studies have been pursued to investigate‘Western security culture’ and efforts made at critiquing the ‘universalizing’ cultural myths perpetuated by Western security practices that concealed ‘a diversity of culturally derived identities, aspiration and styles.’223
There are studies that bring attention to ‘unique security culture’ of particular non-Western countries and claim how often they are ‘at odds with the principles and norms underpinning Western approaches to nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament.’224 This problem is compounded by an awareness that recourse to discourses on strategic culture is constitutive of master-slave maneuvers in ‘instruction or imitation’ to ‘obscure or mask strategic choices’ and can be deployed in an effort to ‘pre-empt challenges to the status-quo.’225 It is argued that ‘the principle of cultural diversity does not necessarily ensure better understanding of the specific Other’ and such practices of strategic culture ‘appear to be about “positioning” rather than “uncovering.”’226 This carries the ‘risk of giving rise to a less internationalized than renationalized discipline,’ reinforcing the state-centric dynamic of difference and produce productive myths idealizing the past.227 This reinforces the message that the ‘most profound legacy’ with which Western leaders and promoters of nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda have to address is that of colonialism, discrimination, dependence and subordination.228
It is suggested that it would therefore be more feasible to engage in multilateral and regional practices of confidence building measures and weapons control to ‘mute’ cultural specificities and inter-civilizational rhetoric that cripple forums such as the Conference on Disarmament.229But any effort at addressing ‘ethnocentric standpoint’ is further crippled as ‘most analysts of arms control and disarmament issues are people who are steeped in the European history of arms control and security-building, and who wish to make the best use of this expertise in other regional or multilateral security building projects.’230 These studies on strategic culture often try to articulate ‘ideal types’ of strategic ‘dyads’ constituted in terms of democratic security community and those outside it.231 They seek to demonstrate to varying degrees how ‘a wide variety of disparate societies may share a similar realpolitik strategic culture.’232 Some studies try to showcase at length a hybridization of particular non-Western cultural security scripts with the ‘universalized and globally institutionalized’ security script articulated through the ‘mechanism of imperialism’ by the West.233
These diverse tactics to ameliorate ‘hegemonic monologues’ with ‘hybrid dialogues’ can ‘mute’ but do not necessarily address the dangers associated with practices of strategic culture as indicated above.234 There is an emphatic insistence ‘that cultural realpolitik is a hardy norm in international relations’ and ‘that in addition to focusing on “needs, interests and objectives”, attention should be paid to “norms, accounts and social definitions.”’235 This atmosphere of cultivated scholarly ambivalence about the significance of culture in security studies is compounded with Huntington’s infamous prediction about a ‘clash of civilization’ based on an essentialized understanding of cultural differences. It is these differences in culture of different civilizations that are considered to be the premise of failure to control horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation. An urgent intervention to mitigate this prophetic apocalypse is made by Krause,who suggests that ‘cultural factors can be used to explain the origins of and (different reactions to) chemical and nuclear weapons taboos.’236
Taboos and Norms of Civilization
There is a growing awareness of the difficulties experienced in universalizing particular norms such as ‘equality’ in nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations.237 In the existing security studies literature on diffusion of norms there are references to a growing ‘arms control community’ of experts that can provide ‘clarification and education’ in a ‘technical’ and ‘apolitical’ manner to policymakers representing the superpowers.238 But at the same time there is an understanding that ‘complex ideas that may have strong cultural or social roots mattered, and could be shared or learned — a lesson that should not be lost on those locked in seemingly intractable confrontations in other regional contexts.’239 Thus, there is a sense of advocacy of superpower model exchanges during the Cold War that can now be deployed in attempts at socialization, in other regional contexts such as South Asia.
While there is much advocacy of nuclear weapons taboo, it is interesting to note how social constructivist scholars such as Price and Tannenwald observe and acknowledge the interplay of different ‘standards of civilization’ in the use and non-use of chemical and nuclear weapons, respectively. Tannenwald observes but does not question the significance of ‘taken-for-granted norms such as “civilization”’ in her study of the nuclear weapons taboo.She is more interested in how the emergence of a nuclear taboo has an effect on US policy and how ‘new interpretations of hegemony could give rise to a discourse that seeks to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons by the United States to enforce norms against so-called barbarians.’240 The circulation of racist arguments preceded the institutionalization of the nuclear weapons taboo in treaty texts such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). But Tannenwald does not explore the possibilities of ‘racial’ contestation of the nuclear taboo and its institutionalization in the NPT as an ‘unequal treaty’ among sovereign states at length.
There is marginalization of studying possibilities of enforcement of nuclear norms to maintain the ‘standards of civilization’ against the ‘barbarians’ and their effects. There is a need for more reflexivity to question whether by expounding norms against weapons of mass destruction this scholarship is in fact subscribing and reinforcing a particular set of civilizational practices. Their interest in the problem of weapons can be ascribed as ‘thematic,’ confined to ‘epistemological as well as ethical system which provides a framework of elements and rules for establishing relations between elements’ but does not go further in investigating the ‘problematic’ of possibilities for transformation.241 There is an element of disinterest in investigating how the emphasis on internalization of norms by the subalterns is another deliberate attempt to eliminate any consciousness of the subaltern ‘developing an insight into reduction’ and question the conditions of servility to the West.242 This is in keeping with the practices of maintaining ideological supremacy of the West vis-à-vis others in the field of arms control and disarmament. There is a failure to explicitly acknowledge that ‘racism is the parade ground where the civilized rehearse this love-hate relation’ against the savages that ‘spill out, escape the grid of the normative, and therefore conceptuality itself.’243
On the contrary, postcolonial scholars such as Abraham and Gusterson argue that the NPT’s grounding of 1964 as the dividing time-line between proliferators and non-proliferators suggests the possibility that ‘there is something altogether different about post-1964 proliferators: somehow they are seen to embody a distinct threat to the prevailing order.’244 They are conceived as a threat because of their ‘unwillingness to play by the “rules of the game.”’245 These allegations are made with scarcely any engagement or scrutiny about the ‘nuclear pasts of most states other than the pre-1964 proliferators.’246 There is, however, a degree of caution to the possibility that the ‘rhetoric of progress’ can be deployed to ‘subvert the cultures of societies’ that have experienced ‘external colonialism’ and that can encourage the growing forces of nationalism within these societies to argue for acquisition of weapons themselves, claiming the existence of an ‘external threat to legitimize and perpetuate’ their own presence.247Gusterson notes,
Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric — designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers — the treaty had become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms.248
In a further attempt to explicate this observation, Gusterson suggests the deployment of ‘subtle orientalist ideologies’ by the West in an effort to essentialize the Otherness of the Third World vis-à-vis the West.249 This is facilitated by the efforts of the West to represent itself as a collective ideological front that
(1) makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in the Third World seem natural and reasonable while problematizing attempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody’s; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries’ nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underdeveloped world in order to inhibit a massive North-South confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers.250
The struggle for legitimacy to acquire nuclear weapons is fought further on the grounds that
(1) Third World countries are too poor to afford nuclear weapons; (2) deterrence will be unstable in the Third World; (3) Third World regimes lack the technical maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons; and (4) Third World regimes lack the political maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons.251
In this struggle for legitimacy ‘the claim to rational decision-making is frequently used by great powers to justify the possession of nuclear weapons. Conversely, the purported lack of rationality, on the part of other states, particularly revolutionary regimes like Cuba or Iran, is routinely invoked to explain why they cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons.’252 These countries are time and again hectored by the West and complain of ‘being tired of being lectured to by American officials on the priority of Iran’s economic progress over the development of its military potential.’253
The existing literature on arms control and disarmament is replete with rhetorical polarizations that depict the West as the trustworthy and responsible actor that needs to police the rebellious and recalcitrant Third World that is not up to the task, whose science and technology is not even capable of addressing their basic population and food problems and is constantly seeking attention. All these ‘recurrent images and metaphors…pertain in some way to disorder.’ 254 The West persists with ‘a broadly paternalistic approach’ of ‘Papa knows best’ and resists the idea of ‘political maturation’ of postcolonial states.255 But these representations heighten subaltern ‘sensitivities about any restrictions that might perpetuate or increase the technological gap’ that already exists between the West and the Rest.256 These representations awaken fear of ‘atomic colonialism’ and ‘space age colonialism.’257 There is an unwillingness among the developing countries to merely ‘become a nuclear market comparable to the old-semi-colonial markets, in the sense that those countries would supply raw materials to advanced States, from which they would acquire finished industrial products.’258 The postcolonial states are cognizant of nuclear weapons as the currency of power and ‘differential standards of national security — a sort of nuclear apartheid.’259