This is sufficient reason to vote negative – US statecraft constitutes permanent war on indigenous subjects
Rodríguez 10 – Professor of the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Riverside. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. degrees in Ethnic Studies from the University of California, Berkeley (2001), and earned two B.A. degrees and a Concentration degree from Cornell University [Dylan, “The Terms of Engagement: Warfare, White Locality, and Abolition,” Critical Sociology 36(1) 151-173, DKP]
Generally, the state materializes and becomes comprehensible to both its anticipated and unexpected publics through such definitive moments of crafting: the state identifies itself as a series of active rhetorical, political, and institutional projects and mobilizations, many of which hinge on the marshalling of capacities for racist state violence (war). The state’s self-narration inundates and hails multiple publics with its discourse of policing and jurisprudence as the righteously punitive and justifiably violent front lines of an overlapping series of comprehensive, militarized, and culturally valorized domestic wars, whether the ‘war on drugs’, ‘war on crime’, ‘war on gangs’, ‘war on illegal immigration’, or ‘war on terror’. By extension, it is the material processes of war, from the writing of public policy to the hyper-weaponization of the police, that commonly represents the practical existence of the state as we come to normally ‘know’ it.
Domestic warfare has thus become both the common language and intensely materialized modality of the US state. While this form of legitimated state violence certainly predates Reagan’s ‘war on drugs’ and his/its inheritors, the scope and depth of domestic warmaking seems to be mounting with a peculiar urgency in our historical moment. To take former NYPD and current LAPD Chief William Bratton on the strength of his own words, the primary work of the police is to engage aggressively in ‘the internal war on terrorism’ (Garvey and Winton 2002), which in these times entails everything from record-breaking expansions of urban police forces (McGreevy 2007), to cross-party consensus in legislating state offensives against criminalized populations of choice (Rau 2007) and the reshuffling of administrative relationships between the militarized and juridical arms of local and federal government to facilitate the state’s various localized ‘wars on gangs’ (McGreevy and Winton 2007). This modality of domestic warmaking also, crucially, entails the discursive innovations of an emergent multiculturalist white supremacy, wherein authoritative embodiments of the ‘new’ post-civil rights racist state smoothly recapitulate the a priori of the nation-building project. Barack Obama’s now notorious 2008 Father’s Day speech at the Apostolic Church of God in Chicago, in which he scolded and cajoled ‘black fathers’ for ‘acting like boys instead of men’ and rendering ‘the foundations of our families … weaker’, also encompassed a back-door (and largely unnoticed) pledge of allegiance to the law-and-order state: ‘Yes, we need more cops on the street. Yes, we need fewer guns in the hands of people who shouldn’t have them.’ (Obama 2008) Crucially, Obama obtained an enthusiastic round of applause from his ostensibly progressive black audience on all rhetorical counts.
It is in this context that we can urgently assume the political burden of critically assessing the work of progressive USA-based community and non-profit organizations, grass roots movements, and issue-based campaigns: that is, if critical scholars, progressive and radical scholar activists, and antiviolence movements are to take the state’s own language of domestic warfare seriously, what are they to make of the political, ideological, institutional, and financial relationships that progressive movements, campaigns, and organizations are creating in (uneasy) alliance with the state’s vast architectures of war? Under what conditions and sets of assumptions are progressive activists, organizers, and scholars able to so militantly oppose the proliferation of American state violence in other parts of the world, while tolerating the everyday and nearby state violence of US policing, criminal law, and low-intensity genocide?
By way of brief example, the early 21st century renaissance of ‘Immigrant Rights’ activism in the USA has frequently reasserted the mystified novelties of the ‘post-9/11’ Homeland Security racist state. While an intensified critical focus on the criminalization and imprisonment of brown migrants does enable a particularized critique of the US racist state, it has at times nonetheless produced a troublesome political insistence that
1) the objective sociopolitical crisis refracted in US racist criminalization has substantially changed in form, and is significantly anchored to
2) a qualitative shift in the logic of US state racism itself (Nguyen 2005). 4 Thus, the political rubric and analytical category of ‘(anti-) immigrant’ criminalization, detention, policing has become both a critically necessary and theoretically troubling discursiveterrain. On the one hand, theracist criminalization and domestic pursuit of (assumptively) brown migrants and/or racially coded ‘alien/undocumented’ bodies is a classical technology of the US white supremacist state. In this sense, a situated historical examination of how this racist statecraft articulates particularly and peculiarly to our political moment is clearly crucial to understanding, effectively resisting, and radically critiquing the specific edifices of US state violence in their most common institutional terms: Homeland Security, border policing, wars on (immigrant) gangs, and ‘illegal immigrant’ control. On the other hand, the rubric of ‘immigrant rights’ – to the extent that it focuses largely on (non-black and non-indigenous) racial criminalizations of Mexican, Latino/a and Middle Eastern border crossers – runs the risk of reconstituting the fetishized political category and vexed rhetoric of an alleged ‘post-9/11’ (racial) era. As I have elaborated more extensively elsewhere (Rodríguez 2008) this political-discursivestructuresuggests, and sometimesexplicitly asserts, the emergence of multiple ‘new’ forms of racist state violence in the context of a ‘War on Terror’, and often relies on an exceptionalist, ahistorical narration of anti-immigrant civil and state violence in order to distinguish immigrant criminalization/detention from other, more politically normalized forms of institutionalized racist dehumanization. This myopic analytical approach displaces – and pragmatically obstructs – the difficult praxis of conceptualizing immigrant criminalization within the organic logic of the totality of US white supremacist state violence, as addressed in the incisive work of such scholar activists as Davíd Manuel Hernandez (2008), Martha Escobar (2008), and others.
Thus, behind the din of progressive and liberal reformist struggles over public policy, civil liberties, and law, and beneath the infrequent mobilizations of activity to defend against the next onslaught of racist, classist, ageist, and misogynist criminalization, there is an unspoken politics of assumption that takes for granted the mystified permanence of domestic warfare as a constant production of targeted and massive suffering, guided by the logic of normalized and mundane black, brown, and indigenous subjection to the expediencies and essential violence of the American (global) nation-building project. To put it differently: despite the unprecedented forms of imprisonment, social and political repression, and violent policing that compose the mosaic of our historical time, the establishment left (within and perhaps beyond the USA) really does not care to envision, much less politically prioritize, the abolition of US domestic warfare and its structuring white supremacist social logic as its most urgent task of the present and future. The non-profit and NGO left, in particular, seems content to engage in desperate (and usually well-intentioned) attempts to manage the casualties of domestic warfare, foregoing the urgency of an abolitionist praxis that openly, critically, and radically addresses the moral, cultural, and political premises of these wars.
In so many ways, the US progressive/left establishment is filling the void created by what Ruth Wilson Gilmore has called the violent ‘abandonments’ of the state, which forfeits and implodes its own social welfare capacities (which were already insufficient at best) while transforming and (productively) exploding its domestic warmaking functionalities – which Gilmore (2007b: 44–5) says are guided by a ‘frightening willingness to engage in human sacrifice’. Yet, at the same time that the state has been openly galvanizing itself to declare and wage violent struggle against strategically targeted local populations, the establishment left remains relatively unwilling and therefore institutionally unable to address the questions of social survival, grass roots mobilization, radical social justice, and social transformation on the concrete and everyday terms of the very domestic war(s) that the state has so openly and repeatedly declared as the premises of its own coherence. Given that domestic warfare composes both the common narrative language and concrete material production of the state, the question remains as to why the establishment left has not understood this statecraft as the state of emergency that the condition so openly, institutionally encompasses (war!). Perhaps it is because critical intellectuals, scholar activists, and progressive organizers are underestimating the skill and reach of the state as a pedagogical (teaching) apparatus, that they have generally undertheorized how the state so skillfully generates (and often politically accommodates) sanctioned spaces of political contradiction that engulf ‘dissent’ and counter-state, antiracist, and antiviolence organizing