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Goes nuclear.

Gabuev ’22 [Alexander. *senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Putin’s Doomsday Scenario.” The Atlantic. November 11, 2022. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/11/russia-putin-nuclear-escalation-ukraine-war/672082/.]perth

Neither should anyone set too much store by the ostensible restrictions in Russian nuclear doctrine. Despite them, as many senior Russian officials have pointed out, the doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory against conventional aggression. Furthermore, their vague language could give Putin plenty of room for maneuver—something seen in the serial instances on his watch in which Russian laws, including the constitution itself, have been bent or violated.

From Moscow’s point of view, the illegally annexed territories now belong to Russia. Accordingly, losing them to an invading army would mean one thing: Russia’s nuclear arsenal is no deterrent to any potential aggressor. The way that senior Ukrainian officials have been framing the breakup of Russia as a desired outcome of the war is not helpful—serving only to confirm Putin in his long-held belief that the West’s goal in supporting Ukraine is regime change in Moscow and the destruction of his country.

As for the reaction of Russia’s major partners like China, the Kremlin knows full well that Beijing will not use its economic leverage to deter Russia. Xi Jinping might warn against nuclear war, but he won’t threaten the Kremlin with breaking economic and military relations should Moscow use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Beijing knows it is unlikely to reap any reward from the U.S. for putting pressure on the Kremlin to fix a problem that China sees as American-made. India and Turkey have so far voiced concern about possible nuclear escalation in Ukraine only in vague terms, and have also refrained from suggesting that they might impose any real consequences should Russia indeed use weapons of mass destruction.

The Kremlin believes that the devastation inflicted by the Russian air bombardment of Ukrainian infrastructure will be a rude awakening for President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian people, and make them more clear-eyed about Putin’s determination to fight by all means possible—including nuclear weapons, should that remain the only option for him to not lose this war. Russian leadership also still labors under the misperception that Ukraine’s leaders have no agency, and that Zelensky and his team are beholden to the U.S. If the White House wishes, the thinking goes, Ukrainian military advances can be stopped and Kyiv can be brought to the negotiating table.

Finally, Russian leadership believes that no American president will risk a nuclear war with Russia over a non-NATO member, even Ukraine. The Kremlin believes that Biden understands this when he says that Putin “is not joking.” The Russians believe that any U.S. military response to a Russian nuclear escalation would most likely be conventional, such as U.S. strikes to destroy the Russian Black Sea fleet or other targets within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. But the Kremlin also believes that Washington may be inhibited even in this response, on the assumption that such actions would lead to further Russian escalation. Putin probably judges that U.S. nuclear deterrence in this context means a nuclear response only as a last resort.

Putin also takes inspiration from his experience dealing with the U.S. in 2013, when President Barack Obama declared the use of chemical weapons a red line yet failed to act when the Syrian tyrant Bashar al-Assad crossed it. The White House preferred to reach a deal with the Kremlin rather than use military force. The calculation in Moscow is that something similar will happen this time around.

None of this provides any assurance that Putin will continue to exercise nuclear restraint. The bad news is that the military situation could deteriorate very quickly for the Kremlin, and then Putin, caught off guard by a series of setbacks from the front lines, might act impulsively. Worse, if a nuclear crisis should arise, the chances of successful diplomacy are slim. Putin does not seem to have abandoned his maximalist ambitions of subjugating Ukraine, and is likely to use any cease-fire the Kremlin would agree to as an opportunity to rebuild the Russian military machine and return to combat.

For his part, Zelensky is attuned to the dominant sentiment among Ukrainians, who are ready to fight to the bitter end after seeing the war crimes in Bucha and elsewhere. Ukraine’s war goals call for a return to the 1991 borders, including Crimea. That’s where Moscow’s and Kyiv’s red lines clash, with no chance now of reconciling them.

The good news is that, for now, the Western intelligence community has noted no changes in Russia’s nuclear posture. Putin appears convinced that the tools he is already using in Ukraine will ultimately work.

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