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Transition is non-existent absent dramatic policy action---that makes the plan a unique trigger.

Colgan & Hinthorn ’23 [Jeff D., and Miriam. *Associate Professor of Political Science @ Brown University **PhD student @ MIT. "International Energy Politics in an Age of Climate Change." Annual Review of Political Science 26 (2023).]perth

The first reason is that societies have been slow to politically accept climate change as a reality, and even slower to figure out a response to it (Keohane & Victor 2011, Hayes & Knox-Hayes 2014, Tingley & Tomz 2014, Allan 2018). Even in the face of climate-related disasters, voters are reluctant to update their climate beliefs or economic behavior ( Javeline & Kijewski-Correa 2019). In part, this is because of intentional efforts by businesses and interest groups opposed to proclimate policy (Oreskes & Conway 2011, Brulle & Roberts 2017).

A second reason is that, even in the face of climate change, most voters are not willing to sacrifice energy consumption for environmental goals, and their willingness to pay for climate mitigation measures is relatively low (Kotchen et al. 2013, Ansolabehere & Konisky 2014). Moreover, voters tend to punish political incumbents for rising energy prices (Decker & Wohar 2007, Ross et al. 2017). The anticipated clean energy transition also will likely hurt those who make their livelihoods in ways related to fossil fuels (Downie 2019, Mildenberger 2020, Gaikwad et al. 2022). Therefore, voters are likely to penalize politicians who advocate for the measures needed to bring about the energy transition as quickly as possible. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that humanity will achieve the more ambitious goals for climate sustainability, like limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5°C.

That gloomy conclusion is reinforced by a third reason: The desired clean energy transition, in which fossil fuels are substantially reduced or eliminated, would be historically unprecedented. Previous energy transitions show that when one fuel is overtaken by another as the dominant energy source, its dominance decreases in relative terms but its consumption does not decrease in absolute magnitude (Smil 2010, Newell & Raimi 2018). For instance, when coal became the dominant fuel of the first Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century,it did not eliminate wood and biofuels. In fact, as seen in Figure 1, traditional biofuel is still used today at higher aggregate rates than in 1800. Similarly, when oil replaced coal as the lifeblood of modern economies in the twentieth century, it did not eliminate coal (Colgan 2021). Rather, coal consumption grew massively over time. Market dynamics alone are unlikely to result in an absolute decrease in fossil fuel consumption. Unfortunately, the absolute rate of fossil fuel consumption, not its share of the energy mix, is all that matters for climate change, and it is unclear whether humans will be able to reduce consumption quickly enough to avoid catastrophic effects. One implication of the history of energy transitions is that while economic forces might boost new energy types like solar and wind power, they are highly unlikely on their own to eliminate existing fuels like oil and gas in the absence of major political decisions to significantly steer markets away from the status quo. Those decisions would have to be made despite determined political opposition (Colgan et al. 2021).

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