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Oil is inevitable---it’s only a matter of meeting global demands.

Kelanic ’20 [Rosemary. *Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Black gold and blackmail: Oil and great power politics. Cornell University Press, 2020.]perth

The NPS predicts that even if all of the above policy promises are kept, global oil demand will increase by roughly 10 million barrels per day (mb/d) from about 95 mb/d in 2017 to 106 mb/d in 2040, with nearly the entire demand increase coming from developing countries such as India and China. That is the optimistic scenario. Limiting the increase in demand to such a small rise over the next twenty years would represent a staggering policy achievement; to hit those num- bers, the number of electric cars in use would have to increase more than ninetyfold, from about 3.3 million vehicles today (or roughly 0.3 percent of a global fleet of 1,100 million cars) to 300 million by 2040 (roughly 15 percent of a projected fleet of 2,000 million cars). Absent the promised policy interventions, oil demand would instead increase by 26 mb/d to reach 121 mb/d over the same period.3 How likely are countries to meet the aspirational targets articulated in the Paris Agreement and elsewhere? There is ample reason for pessimism, not least because Donald Trump has committed to pulling the United States, currently the world’s largest oil consumer, out of the treaty altogether. Dealing with climate change is a nightmare from the point of view of international cooperation. Compliance with emissions-reducing international agreements is costly, states have strong incentives to free ride off the climate policies of others, and no enforcement mechanism exists to punish states that cheat. It is a safe bet that the probability that states will fully adhere to stated promises—especially now that the United States has shrugged them off—is zero. Future oil consumption, therefore, will almost certainly surpass projections made by the NPS. Because the NPS understates future demand, the analysis in this chapter, which is based on that scenario, represents the lower bound of the strategic problems facing petroleum-deficit states. We can be relatively confident that future petroleum deficits will be at least as bad as the estimates made below

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