No link turns---transition is irrelevant for suppliers solely dependent on oil.
Goldthau & Westphal ‘19 [Andreas and Kirsten. *professor of public policy @ Central European University **assistant professor for international relations and foreign policy @ the University of Gießen. "Why the global energy transition does not mean the end of the petrostate." Global Policy 10, no. 2 (2019): 279-283.]perth
The global energy transformation does not mean the end of the petrostate. The low carbon transition may in fact well facilitate new oligopolies, and a higher market concentration among fewer crude suppliers. As energy‐intensive sectors dislocate from fast‐decarbonizing OECD countries, this presents oil 6 producer countries with new export opportunities in refined oil products and in the fast‐growing petrochemicals sector. ‘Peak demand’ will remain an OECD‐centered phenomenon for the foreseeable future, with growth in oil consumption ‘moving East’ before eventually also flattening out there. For traditional oil exporters this opens inroads into the new demand centers in South East Asia (and Latin America). In the long run, oil will cease to play a role in a low carbon energy system. Until then, it will continue filling the pockets of a significant number of petrostates. An important policy challenge will lie in dealing with the very high cost producers whose social contract obligations deprive them of viable alternatives to ‘panic and pump’, and whose short‐term political outlook may include the possibility of collapse. Fast decarbonizers, i.e. mostly the rich world, will need to prepare for tipping points at which the rising spread between the social and the market price of oil fatally tilts the domestic politics against these countries incumbent regimes. The speed of the decar‐ bonization pathway will play an important role in that regard. The energy geopolitics of a low carbon future might for some time resemble the ones of the fossil past. Fast decarbonizers committed to making the bright clean energy future work will therefore need to prepare for a two‐fold challenge: managing a rapidly changing energy system in order to secure the transformation dividends it will bring, for human security and economic welfare (Goldthau, Keim, and Westphal 2018); and balancing the (geo)political afterpains of the incumbent fuels leaving the system.