The onslaught of capitalism has manifested in violence, climate change, lashout and weapons dispersed throughout the globe – the impact is extinction.
Trainer 22 Trainer, T. Ted Trainer is a conjoint Lecturer, part of the Social Sciences program at the University of New South Wales. (2022). CAPITALISM: WHY WE SHOULD SCRAP IT. pg. 101-110. https://thesimplerway.info/CAPITALISMBOOK.pdf **language edited rc ut-ac
Let us step back and consider again the global situation sketched in Chapter 3. It was explained that the increasingly serious range of problems, including environmental destruction, resource depletion, deprivation of the Third World, conflict over access to resources and markets, and the deterioration of social cohesion, are direct consequences of the fact that there is far too much producing and consuming going on. The main argument in this chapter is that this society is not capable of dealing with this situation, and that it will inevitably culminate in the more or less catastrophic breakdown of society on a global scale.
Before detailing that argument some aspects of the trajectory should be considered further.
What will happen?
Following is an attempt to sketch the most likely trajectory ahead.
The multi-factored limits to growth noose will tighten, hopefully slowly but probably too quickly. Many of its elements are already gathering force and compounding to increase difficulties towards a time of great and terminal troubles. As explained, the key determinants of our near-term fate seem to be the future of fracking and of debt. Most likely is a relatively sudden end of the debt fuelled tight-oil venture which then triggers a global debt crisis and a far more serious global economic collapse than the 2008-2009 GFC. There are varied expectations regarding the time scale; Ahmed (2017) explains why it could be a matter of a decade or so before the Middle Eastern failed states become unable to maintain oil exports. Tverberg and several others have a similarly short-term expectation. Randers (2012) however expects the disruption to impact around 2070.
Immiseration.
But the most important determinant of our fate is probably not directly to do with biophysical limits. It is the extent to which the long-suffering and docile masses will go on tolerating how they are being treated. For at least 6,000 years people have been astoundingly passive, putting up with tyrants, kings, and general rule by usually brutal and greedy elites. But over the last two or three decades people in rich countries have become seriously discontented with their situation, recognising that governments do not attend to their needs. One result is the worldwide decline in belief in democracy. Others are the advent of Trump, Brexit, right-wing populism and support for fascism. Guy Standing analyses this well (2012), pointing to the way financialisation is replacing Neoliberalism with domination by the accumulation of assets on which rents can be drawn while casting more and more people into the “precariat”. This is a class struggling with insecurity and personal debt. The hard-won achievements of old labour, secure jobs and good wages etc., are being swept away and replaced by “gig” economies in which the precariat suffers high indebtedness and struggles to find intermittent work, pays high rents (e.g., for mortgages, accommodation, student fees.) Below them is the “lumpenproletariat” of chronically unemployed, aged, infirm, homeless and excluded. The above chapter on the US points to the Walmart-gutted towns, impoverished casual labour, rural poverty and dying country towns, and the social wreckage generating the opioid crisis and other harmful effects. It is not surprising that this produced such support for a Presidential candidate promising to “drain the Washington swamp” seen to be responsible for the situation.
The decline in regard for democracy that is underway is another consequence of immiseration. People are becoming less satisfied with the capacity or willingness of the system to attend to their problems and fix things. The Australian National University’s recent Australian election survey shows distrust of politicians rose from an already high 63% in 2014 to 76% in 2016. Another question found 56% think the federal government is run for a few big interests. (Yeginsu, 2018.)
Tverberg (2021) sees how low disposable household income is now a major determinant of what is happening to the oil industry. The crisis of low prices and rampant bankruptcies in the petroleum industry has not been due to running into scarcity as the “peak oil” thesis once predicted, but to falling demand because large and increasing numbers of people cannot afford to purchase goods at previous rates. This is a most important and somewhat overlooked causal factor in the discussion of global economic woes. Consider the following evidence on it.
There has been negligible increase in household disposable income for 60-80% of Australian households since 2012, while prices have risen and the income of the rich has risen considerably. Similarly in the US real incomes for most workers have barely risen in 40 years and the minimum wage has been at $US15,000 p.a. for years. (Hutchins 2018.) Stasse (2020) refers to literature on “…an unprecedented squeeze on living standards for ordinary households.” Wright (2019) says that in the US “…average hourly pay is below what it was in 1973; 40 percent of adults lack the savings to pay for a $400 emergency expense.”
The shrinking middle class and rising precariat class are part of the phenomenon, and it is evident in the rise of household debt, now very high in Australia. Karp (2020) says in the US households’ debt-to-income ratio was less than 40 percent in 1950 but is now120 percent, and since 1985 the wealth share of the bottom 90 percent of adults declined from 40 percent to 27 percent. Indices of increasing hardship at the bottom are clear. In the UK. MacFarlane (2019) reports, “Rough sleeping in England has increased by 165 per cent, while homeless deaths have more than doubled. The number of people using food banks has increased to 1.6 million … up from just 26,000 in 2009. 14 million people are living in poverty … the UK population is still 1.6 per cent poorer than it was more than a decade ago on average.” Menadue (2020) reports that in Australia, “Homelessness is also increasingly significantly. It rose by 30% in the decade to 2016.”
These observations point to a killing of the goose that was laying golden eggs, a failure to attend to the way the drive to extract as much wealth as possible eventually undercuts the capacity to go on siphoning it out, by leaving most people with too little purchasing power. This situation is a consequence of the success of the capitalist class. Their dominance has meant that they have been able to ride over the resistance that might have got them to make sufficient concessions to defuse the problems they were causing. Streek (2014) puts it in terms of capitalism becoming its own worst enemy. “It has eliminated criticism and oppositional moves, which would have pushed it to adapt…”
The accumulating power has also led to corruption, which in time reduces a system’s capacity to respond to challenges. Streek (2014) points to the way the GFC revealed “…rating agencies being paid by the producers of toxic securities to award them top grades; offshore shadow banking, money laundering and assistance in large-scale tax evasion as the normal business of the biggest banks with the best addresses; the sale to unsuspecting customers of securities constructed so that other customers could bet against them; the leading banks worldwide fraudulently fixing interest rates and the gold price, and so on.” He notes the billions of dollars in fines for these offences which several large banks have had to pay recently, including by some major Australian banks. In more recent years several inquiries and revelations have detailed similar criminal behaviour on the part of mainstream institutions, especially via the Australian Banking royal commission, and exposures of global tax haven and laundering operations.
The advent of cannibalism.
Collins (2021) and others point to the way the economy’s increasing difficulties have led it to enter a “catabolic” or “cannibalistic” phase. As the capacity to do good business producing useful things deteriorates, investors turn to activities that plunder the economy. It is as if a hardware firm has to start selling the corrugated iron on its own roof to stay in business. The illicit drug industry and the Mafia are similar; rather than producing new wealth effort goes into extracting previously produced wealth. Much financial activity is of this nature, such as “short selling”, “asset stripping” and getting hold of assets that enable rents to be extracted. In the GFC a lot of money was lent to home buyers incapable of meeting the payments, because investors could not find less risky outlets. When the borrowers could not pay their interest instalments their houses were repossessed by the banks and sold off.
Similarly in the US some of the money in the worker’s pay packet is put into a pension fund run by the corporation, to be paid back on retirement, but many corporations have taken these funds to invest, and “lost” them. Often they were lent to smart operators in the financial sector to put into speculative ventures, siphoning out fees in the process. Sometimes money is borrowed to buy weak firms, arrange for them to borrow too much and thus drive them into bankruptcy, and then sell them off, and because the pension money has become an asset of the firm it goes to the lenders and is lost to the workers who earned it and set it aside. So, accumulation and profit making are being kept up by activities which enrich big and smart investors (lenders) by getting hold of the wealth of little/naive investors (borrowers), through granting them loans they cannot repay.
Another common mechanism is simply commercialising activities that the state once carried out without charge. This is an aspect of “financialisation” discussed in Chapter 4. A good example is where students must now pay for college and university education, meaning large loans must be taken out and large interest payments then flow to lenders from the earnings of parents and students. Again the process does not involve lending to produce anything, it just enables wealth previously produced to be acquired by lenders. Collins (2021) and others see this process accelerating as the ever-increasing volumes of accumulated capital find it increasingly difficult to find investment opportunities in producing anything of value. Streek (2014) says, “… the struggle for the last remaining profit opportunities is becoming uglier by the day.”
Collins (2021) says. “… catabolic capitalists will stoke the profit engine by taking over troubled businesses, selling them off for parts, firing the workforce, and pilfering their pensions.” As difficulties increase for governments and their revenues decrease they will come under greater pressure to give business the conditions it wants in order to stimulate economic activity.
“Regulatory agencies that once provided some protection from polluters, dangerous products, unsafe workplaces, labour exploitation, identity theft, and financial fraud will be dismantled … Public safety will be stripped down, privatized, and sold to those who can still afford it. Court budgets will shrivel, privatized prisons will exploit convict labour, and police will seldom respond to everyday crimes. Instead, private security firms and gated communities will guard the wealthy … catabolic capitalists will pick over the carcasses of bankrupt governments. Crumbling public transportation and decaying highways will be transformed into private thoroughfares, maintained by convict labour or indentured workers. After pressuring bankrupt governments to sell off public utilities, water storage, and waste management systems, corporations will deliver these essential services only to the businesses and communities who can afford them. And, as public schools and libraries go broke, exclusive private academies will employ a fraction of the jobless teachers and professors to educate a shrinking class of affluent students.”
End game.
A number of analysts see the foregoing phenomena as aspects of a terminal decline, partly driven by increasing resource and ecological difficulties, partly by worsening inequality and “immiseration”, and partly by deteriorating “legitimacy”. Rising discontent in Europe and the US is evident in support for populist and fascist movements. Blame is usually put on the wrong targets, especially immigrants. That the squalor is due to capitalism is not recognised, thanks largely to the weakness of Left parties and the fine work done over generations by those keeping capitalist ideology in good shape.
In my lectures on Marx I point to a list of things which I and others think he got wrong. But there are some extremely important things I think he got right. One is that capitalism is shot through with serious contradictions such as the fact that the interests of workers clash with those of the class that owns capital. Another extremely important point he made is that as the system matures immiseration will eventually increase. This is what we are seeing now (Marx’s timing was way out.) As the rich and super-rich cream off increasing proportions of wealth the masses are increasingly having to struggle to get by, and are therefore less able to keep up the purchasing that is the life-blood of the system. And they are more and more discontented. Most importantly, he saw that these tendencies would result in the system’s self-destruction.
The question is, when will people finally cease putting up with what the system does to them? When will they realise that the system is not designed to work for them? When will they see that it cannot but worsen their situation as time goes by? When will they realise what is causing their plight?
The tightening limits will intensify the immiseration as governments are forced to cut spending on welfare etc. and to drive worker’s conditions down and give more favours to the rich in order to get the economy going. Governments struggling to control dissent and to help capital are very likely to adopt fascist options, but unlike in the 1930s, now the materials necessary to maintain armies, large bureaucracies and secret police and stage mass rallies will not be available, so descent towards a warlord dominated feudalism becomes plausible. In some Third World regions and even US cities this seems to be happening, for instance in the form of drug gangs.
Many analysts have tried to draw attention to where these limits are taking us. Mason (2003) for instance sees the many problematic trends culminating in “The 2030 Spike”, the title of his book. As noted above, among those who discuss the multi-dimensional global breakdown likely to be brought on before long by limits and scarcity are Korowicz (2012), Morgan (2013), Kunstler (2005), Greer (2005), Bardi (2011), Duncan (2013), Gilding (2011), Randers (2012) and Streeck (2014). Some foresee more or less totally catastrophic collapse, the end of Western civilisation, with a die-off of billions.
The next collapse might not be the final one; some foresee “... a long and bumpy road down”. Randers (2012) expects the time of troubles to be around 2070. However, Ahmed (2017), Tverberg (2021), Mason (2003) and other “collapsologists” give reasons to expect it to be before 2030. The hope must be for a protracted Goldilocks depression, one that is not so severe as to destroy the chances of salvage, but savage enough to jolt people into recognizing that they must shift to the local, cooperative and frugal self-sufficiency detailed in Chapter 10.
The situation will at best be confused and chaotic, with governments and “leaders” continuing to not understand the fundamental causes and quick to blame the wrong things. The present tendencies to right-wing populism and fascism are likely to gain momentum, supported by many in privileged classes who will call for repressive measures to restore order and protect their security and property. Many in angry lower classes will want strong leaders willing to break rules. (A recent survey found this to already be true of a majority of UK people; Walker, 2019.) Capitalism will again morph into its fascist form whereby an authoritarian central government rules in cooperation with a selected few big capitalist firms. It is highly unlikely that there will be sober, clear headed rational thinking about causes and solutions. Poor and struggling governments will be even less capable of analysing or dealing with the situation effectively than they are now.
The international possibilities are similarly disturbing. Dominant powers will surely become more aggressive in their efforts to control sources of scarce resources and markets.
Third world governments wallowing in debt are likely to allow corporations to cause greater environmental destruction and to generate revenue, and to resort to increasingly repressive measures to control dissent over deteriorating living conditions. (Ahmed, 2017).
The problems cannot be solved.
The conventional assumption is that the problems can and will be solved by the institutions and processes of present society, such as by parliaments implementing effective policies in line with international agreements and resolutions, and ordinary people accepting legislated adjustments to their circumstances. But from the perspective of The Simpler Way, this expectation is now clearly mistaken. Given the foregoing account of the nature and magnitude of the problems, the institutions and political process of this society are not capable of recognising the situation and rationally facing up to it and making the enormous and difficult changes required to solve it. Consider the following reasons.
The enormity of the changes required.
Even the Degrowth literature generally fails to adequately represent the magnitude and difficulty of the reductions required. (Again, for the numerical case see Trainer, 2021a). Chapter 3 explained that rich-world volumes of production and thus consumption of resources must be cut by up to 90%, meaning that most of the present quantities of industry, transport, travel, construction, shopping, exporting, investing etc. have to be phased out. How could this possibly be done? This is the “degrowth conundrum”. It cannot be a matter of just closing a coal mine and transferring the workers to other jobs, because the amounts of production, work and jobs have to be cut dramatically. It would have to involve the creation and massive implementation of totally new social structures and procedures, whereby most people could live well without producing anywhere near so much as before. This could not be done unless it involved historically totally unprecedented, massive and rapid cultural change, to widespread public understanding and acceptance of the extremely radically new systems and values. And governments cannot impose or make the new ways work. Chapter 10 will make it clear that this could only be done by conscientious citizens who are eager to build and operate the new local systems.
There isn’t time
Even if the understanding and the will existed, it is difficult to imagine that the enormous required could be carried out in a few decades. They involve reversing what have been some of the fundamental ideas and values that have driven Western civilization over the last two hundred years, and scrapping and replacing vast systems and structures. Yet it is probable that the following three main global threats each give us no more than ten years.
Carbon.
According to various estimates the “carbon emissions budget” associated with a 67% chance of limiting temperature rise to under 1.5 degrees will have been exhausted within about twelve years. (Levin, 2018, Steffen, 2020.) Many insist that this one-in-three chance of failure is far too high to be acceptable. A more responsible target would significantly reduce the budget, and therefore the time left to move off fossil fuels. Note also that these estimates do not take into account the positive feedbacks, such as warming causing loss of snow causing absorption of more solar heat. Currently there are around 490 new coal-fired power stations being built around the world, with 790 planned. (Global Energy Monitor, 2020.)
By 2050 energy demand is likely to be around 890 EJ/y, 56% higher than at present. (Minqui, 2019.) Input from renewable sources would have to increase by 27 EJ every year but the current rate of increase is only 0.72 EJ/y. (Our World in Data, 2019.) This equates to building 1.5 million 2 MW wind turbines every year, costing over 6% of world GDP not including the cost of energy storage, grid strengthening and distribution. And plant built now will probably only last twenty years, less than half as long as coal-fired plant. There will be at least formidable difficulties in developing satisfactory renewable energy solutions for emissions from the 80% of demand made up by the heavy land transport, agriculture, military, shipping and aircraft sectors. (Trainer, 2017.) These numbers would seem to completely rule out any possibility that acceptable emissions targets can be met in the time available.
Petroleum.
It is likely that a major and permanent collapse in oil availability will occur, possibly within a decade. (Ahmed, 2017.) It is generally recognized that the supply of conventional petroleum peaked around 2005 and has declined significantly since then. World supply has continued to increase due to the remarkable rise in output from the advent of “fracking” in the US “tight-oil” regions. However, there are strong reasons for expecting this source to peak and decline soon. (Hughes 2016, Cunningham 2019, Whipple 2019, Cobb, 2019.) T0 2020 the major producers have not made a profit in any year of operation while accumulating a debt of over one quarter of a trillion dollars. It seems that an oil price high enough for producers to break even is too high for the economy to avoid recession. Unless there are major technical breakthroughs reducing costs, which are not thought to be likely, at some point in the near future lenders will probably cease providing capital to the fracking sector. A major factor increasing costs is the decline in the energy return on the energy that has to be invested to produce energy.
There is a strong case that it will either not be possible for renewable energy sources to replace fossil fuels or that it will be too expensive. (Trainer, 2017.) As noted above, only 20% of demand is in the form of electricity, which is the easiest task. It will be much more costly to run heavy trucks, farm tractors, mining equipment, ships and aircraft on renewables.
Ahmed (2017) presents a persuasive case that most Middle East oil-producing nations are encountering such serious ecological, food, water, population growth and climate problems that their capacity to export oil could be largely eliminated within ten years. Meanwhile the amount of energy it takes to produce a barrel of oil is increasing significantly (Brockway, et al., 2019). Despite these alarming observations the precariousness and urgency of the petroleum situation is attracting little attention.
Debt.
After remaining more or less stable for decades, global debt has quadrupled since 1999. (Hienberg, 2018.) It is now equivalent to around three times global GDP, is far higher than before the GFC, and is regarded by various economists as inevitably bound to crash soon. (Brown, 2018, Lu, 2020.)
In addition to these three major factors many other biophysical difficulties are reducing the capacity of economies to deal with the accelerating problems tightening the limits noose, including water scarcity, fisheries decline, deteriorating mineral grades, accelerating costs of ecological disruption such as climate change, agricultural soil damage and loss, chemical poisoning of ecosystems, species loss, ocean acidification and sea rise. A [collection] holocaust of extinctions appears to have begun, now possibly including insects and thus jeopardising pollination of food crops. These and other factors will cut into the diminishing resources available to apply to solving system difficulties.
Existing political institutions are not capable of making changes of the magnitude required.
Our institutions are reasonably good at making small changes. Elections are usually won by small margins and therefore governments cannot afford to irritate significant numbers of voters or they will be thrown out. But they cannot adopt policies that go against the vital interests of significant sectors.
This situation is partly a consequence of the self-interested, competitive, individualistic ethos built into present cultural and political systems. Burdens are not shared fairly or appropriately but are typically left to groups least able to avoid them. Because dealing with the global predicament effectively would be seen to involve painful adjustments on a massive scale people would be acutely sensitive to perceived inequities in the changes they were called upon to make. Fierce resistance, disputes and appeals would surely proliferate over the new options presented, the changes in locations, and especially the dramatically reduced levels of income, purchasing and consumption. Authoritarian governments can force big changes through but current democracies are much less able to.
The problems interact, compound and positively feedback.
Often solving one problem increases difficulties in other areas, especially by increasing energy demand. More importantly, problems often have multiplicative interactive effects. For instance, Ahmed’s analysis of Middle Eastern oil producers shows how climate change, drought, rising temperatures, soil loss and rapid population growth are combining to generate intractable challenges for governments. As their capacity to cope declines they resort to repression in an effort to contain discontent and maintain order, which feeds back to generate more discontent, further disrupting productive systems and capacity to cope.
Thus the difficulties now being experienced due to climate change are likely to be swamped soon by a tidal wave of many compounding positive feedback effects. Several analysts including those listed above have detailed how the combined effects are likely to trigger sudden and catastrophic breakdown in the global economy.