JGP is MMT in disguise. Federal jobs endlessly erodes worker’s rights, masks class conflict, and reproduces a neoliberal ethos of austerity.
Palley 19 Palley, Thomas I. (2019). Palley received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Oxford University in 1976. He earned a master's degree in international relations and a PhD in economics from Yale University. Palley founded the Economics for Democratic & Open Societies project. He states its purpose is to "stimulate public discussion about what kinds of economic arrangements and conditions are needed to promote democracy and open society."[1] Palley's previous positions include director of the Open Society Institute’s Globalization Reform Project, and Assistant Director of Public Policy for the AFL-CIO.[1] : What's wrong with modern money theory (MMT): A critical primer, FMM Working Paper, No. 44, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK), Forum for Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies (FFM), Düsseldorf. https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/213401. pp. 22-32. **footnotes omitted ut-ac
3. Employer of last resort (ELR) or job guarantee program (JGP)22
The second leg of MMT’s triad of arguments in Figure 1 is the proposal for a JGP, whereby the central government would offer work to any who applied (i.e. act as employer of last resort). In principle, the JGP is completely separable from MMT and can be considered as a stand-alone program on the basis of its own merits. However, for MMT, the JGP is central because it is the way via which policy is supposed to harnesses the power to create money so as to deliver productive non-inflationary full employment.
The employer of last resort JGP can be thought of as an attempt to create an automatic stabilizer in the spirit of Lerner’s (1943, 1951) functional finance approach to macroeconomic policy. Lerner’s approach has government engage in expansionary “discretionary” fiscal policy until the economy reaches full employment, at which time policymakers are supposed to step on the fiscal policy brakes. The JGP aims to create an automatic stabilizer version of functional finance. That is because, theoretically, there should be no spending on JGP jobs at full employment since all workers are supposedly employed in the private sector. Consequently, spending would automatically taper off.
In theory, the proposal has significant macroeconomic benefits including generating a particular type of full employment, providing another automatic counter-cyclical stabilization mechanism, preserving the skills of unemployed workers by keeping them in jobs, and providing society with the benefits of the output produced by JGP workers.
However, it also has significant downsides that MMT neglects. One downside is the cost of a JGP, which could displace other needed programs (though MMT denies that by assumption because it asserts government is financially unconstrained). A second downside is the potential to displace private sector production if workers prefer JGP jobs. A third downside is JGP jobs can be used to undercut public sector unions and enforce workfare in place of welfare. In effect, a JGP could be used by a neoliberal government as a double-edged sword to undercut public sector employment from above, and undercut worker rights from below. A fourth downside is some JGP jobs might be characterized as “make work”, and that could be used as political fodder by the neoliberal right in its war on government.
The JGP proposal also augments inflation concerns that are already inherent in MMT’s money-financed approach to fiscal policy. The main problem is a JGP sets a real wage floor for the entire economy, thereby implicitly introducing inflation indexation. As the economy approaches full employment, inflation will tend to rise in accordance with Phillips curve logic. That will trigger a higher nominal JGP wage, and raising the nominal wage floor will tend to spread inflation throughout the economy. If private sector firms fail to match the JGP nominal wage increase, workers will start to drift toward JGP jobs, causing a contraction of private sector output that could even potentially cause stagflation. The JGP is intended to be a non-inflationary automatic stabilizer. Yet closer inspection shows its implicit indexing may also render it an automatic destabilizer.23
Furthermore, to the extent that a JGP delivers quasi-full employment, it will also tend to exacerbate income distribution conflict inflation which emerges at full employment (Kalecki, 1943). That is because it would remove or diminish the threat of labor pricing itself out of work, thereby potentially increasing wage demands. The problem of full employment conflict inflation is generic, but a JGP would exacerbate it. Indeed, a JGP could trigger such inflation even earlier by emboldening wage demands earlier in the business cycle. There is no easy solution to that problem, which explains Lerner’s (1977, 1978) interest in Wage Increase Permits (WIPs). However, MMT proponents are wrong to claim that a JGP is not afflicted by the problem of conflict inflation, and they are doubly wrong to be dismissive of Lerner’s later concerns that prompted his WIPs proposal.
These multiple adverse considerations suggest it may be better to use and strengthen existing policy modalities to secure stable full employment. Those modalities include structural measures to improve income distribution (e.g. restoring worker bargaining power and reinvigorating progressive taxation) so as to rebuild the aggregate demand generation process, combined with strengthened and improved counter-cyclical stabilization policy (e.g. planned counter-cyclical infrastructure spending, counter-cyclical interest rate policy, and counter-cyclical asset and credit market policy based on asset based reserve requirements (Palley, 2010a)).
4. The history of money24
The third leg of MMT’s triad of arguments in Figure 1 refers to the history of money. That leg is essentially rhetorical and it is not as important as the arguments about either the macroeconomics of money financed budget deficits or the JGP. It is there to enlist monetary history in support of MMT’s macroeconomic argument, which is why monetary history figures so prominently in MMT’s narrative (Wray, 1998). The claim is the history of money is “chartal”, by which is meant money is a token created and spent by government, that then circulates as money.
Unfortunately, monetary history does not support MMT’s claim, and it is especially confounded by the fact that for most of the past two thousand years money has involved gold and silver bullion. Metallic money is the exact opposite of chartal money since government cannot create gold and silver money out of thin air. In a metallic system, government must first tax or borrow to acquire money to spend, which is completely contrary to MMT’s fundamental macroeconomic logic.
The US only became fully chartal on August 13, 1971 when President Nixon suspended official convertibility (i.e. the right of foreign governments to convert dollars into gold). That suspension undoubtedly gave US policymakers an important additional degree of policy freedom. However, the other constraints on budget policy imposed by existing debts, existing large federal expenditures, financial markets, and the Phillips curve all carried over the day after suspension.
It is a faulty thought experiment to think a new monetary history began on August 13, 1971, whereby the US government was suddenly financially unconstrained and did not need taxes or bonds to finance its spending. Indeed, the financial experience after the suspension of official convertibility confirms the existence of those constraints. Thus, the 1970s weakening of the dollar and higher inflation can be partly attributed to financial markets’ response to the end of dollar convertibility, which shows financial markets do respond to public finance developments.
5. Competing macroeconomic conceptions of capitalism
The above arguments focus on the analytic weaknesses of the three legs of the MMT triad. However, behind the scene lies a further deeper critique concerning MMT’s macroeconomic conception of capitalism. That critique is illustrated in Figure 3 which describes competing non-mainstream (heterodox) conceptions of capitalism. Those conceptions are divided into Keynesian and Marxist.
Keynesians believe capitalism’s tendency to exploitation and instability can be contained and managed by appropriately designed economic institutions and policies (Palley, 2010b). In contrast, Marxists (Foster and McChesney, 2010) believe capitalism is subject to systemic contradictions that can only be resolved by changing the system.
Figure 3. Competing macroeconomic conceptions of capitalism. [Figure 3 omitted]
Within the Keynesian group, Figure 3 distinguishes between MMT and structural Keynesianism. MMT is firmly Keynesian in conception, and it holds that stable non-inflationary full employment can be achieved and sustained on the basis of money financed deficit spending alone. Money financed deficit spending can pump up aggregate demand to deliver full employment, at which time the deficit can be closed to head-off inflation. All that can be accomplished without induced financial market instability or exchange rate instability
Noticeably absent in the MMT discourse are the issues of income distribution and class conflict. Consequently, from an MMT perspective there is no economic need to address income distribution, and nor does class conflict pose a problem for government’s ability to do as it wishes regarding spending and taxes.
Marxist economists (see Henwood, 2019) have focused on MMT’s blithe dismissal of the problematic of taxes. As noted above, if the economy reaches full employment (however defined), taxes become necessary to restrain AD and prevent inflation. Consequently, the reality is government programs ultimately have to be paid for via taxes, and MMT’s arguments are just an evasion of that reality. That makes MMT a new political strategy for finessing the politics of austerity rather than a new economic theory.
If taxes are ultimately necessary to finance government programs, delivering those taxes requires the appropriate politics be in place. Those politics inevitably involve class conflict. Viewed in that light, Marxists argue MMT is deficient on two counts. First, it fails to admit the ultimate necessity of taxes. Second, it fails to recognize that tax outcomes are ultimately shaped by class conflict and depend on power relations, which in turn are substantially determined by the economic fundamentals of capitalist economies.
Marxists, along with structural Keynesians (see Aspromorgous, 2000; Palley 2001, 2018c; Sawyer, 2003; Seccarecia, 2004), are also wary of MMT’s employer of last resort job program for a range of reasons. For instance, an overly generous JGP wage package would have non-neutral impacts on private sector employment and output. More importantly, as noted earlier, a JGP that delivers quasi-full employment will likely exacerbate income distribution conflict inflation, a problem identified long ago by Kalecki (1943) as part of his analysis of capitalist economies.
Returning to Figure 3, the structural Keynesian perspective adds arguments regarding economic constraints on fiscal policy. In particular, financial markets discipline governments and deter them from undertaking policies that markets disapprove of. That deterrence operates via the threats of asset market sell-offs, higher private sector interest rates, and credit contraction. Corporations also discipline governments with threats of investment cutbacks and relocation of capital. The disciplinary power of financial markets and corporations is most clearly seen via international comparison of countries. The US, with its exorbitant privilege, is the least subject to discipline. However, the discipline is omnipresent. Furthermore, the era of neoliberal financialization has entrenched and deepened those disciplines on policy via a process of lock-in of neoliberal economic arrangements (Palley, 2017/18).
A second concern of structural Keynesianism is income distribution, which has two major impacts. First, it impacts the AD generation process and the level of AD, and a deleterious income distribution can produce demand shortage and stagnation. Second, income distribution impacts the political system, which in turn impacts economic policy (both stabilization policy and policies affecting the structure of the economy).
From a structural Keynesian perspective, sustaining stable full employment requires attention to the structure of the economy, particularly income distribution and appropriate regulation of financial markets. Money financed deficit spending is an important policy instrument. However, absent the right structure, attempts to drive the economy to full employment with large money financed deficit spending will be undone over time. Moreover, in some economies such spending may not even be initially feasible because government is financially constrained.
The above differences in analytical perspective are evident in competing interpretations of the financial crisis of 2008. MMT proponents (e.g. Wray, 2009) interpreted the crisis through a purely financial lens, arguing it was explained via Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and the emergence of “money manager capitalism”. In contrast, structural Keynesians (e.g. Palley, 2010b) argued there was also an important real economy dimension to the crisis, whereby wage stagnation and rising income inequality combined with financial sector developments to generate a path that led to the crisis. Wage stagnation and rising inequality undermined the AD generation process. That was covered over by borrowing and asset price inflation which created AD that temporarily compensated for the structural AD shortage. However, that process of increasing debt and asset price inflation eventually exhausted itself, triggering the financial crisis of 2008.
The big implication of the structural Keynesian perspective is failure to attend to the structure of the economy means crises and unemployment will reemerge in due course despite money financed deficits. Furthermore, those deficits can be part of the reemergence story. That reasoning is a core part of the structural Keynesian critique of the policy response to the crisis of 2008. Money financed deficits have helped reflate asset prices and economic activity, but they have not resolved the underlying structural problems. There is a systemic problem that needs redress. Failure to remedy that systemic problem means it will reassert itself and, when it does, the accumulated financial legacy of past budget deficits can potentially have adverse effects. Such considerations are absent in MMT.
6. Conclusion: MMT as political polemic
The above criticisms reflect MMT’s over-simplification of the macro economy and exaggeration of policy capabilities. All macroeconomic models are highly simplified representations of reality. MMT implicitly takes the Keynesian macro model and further assumes away the real world challenges of the economy and policymaking. The resulting over-simplified static model makes it look as if government is financially unconstrained and full employment without inflation is an easy reach for policy.
In contrast, Keynesian macroeconomic theory has long recognized the major positive policy significance of the power to issue state money, but the power to issue state money is not the economic panacea claimed by MMT. Structural Keynesian macroeconomics further elaborates the economic constraints, adding concern with income distribution and financial market disciplinary powers.
Despite MMT’s analytical economic deficiencies, it has made huge advances as popular political polemic. MMT’s simplistic printing press economics has provided a counter to the neoliberal polemic of fiscal austerity which has dominated political discourse for the past thirty years. Neoliberal polemic claims government has no financial space. It uses the persuasive but false analogy of government being akin to a private household, so that government must tighten its belt if households have to tighten theirs. MMT’s emphasis on the financial freedom provided by the power to create money exposes the falsity of the household analogy.25
Unfortunately, like almost all successful political polemics, MMT exaggerates and stretches things. That should be no surprise. Political success requires message simplification, and simplification often involves cutting corners and details. Thus, the ability to create money is transformed into the notion of government being financially unconstrained and not needing taxes or bonds to finance spending.
MMT’s political polemic works best in the US, where government is in a special position owing to strong current economic conditions, the current low inflation climate, and the unique position of the dollar as global reserve currency which diminishes the trade deficit and exchange rate problem. 26 However, the polemic is largely unpersuasive to economists in Latin America and emerging market economies. Those economies do not have the characteristics of the US, and their governments are visibly policy constrained by financial markets and foreign exchange concerns.
The success of MMT’s polemic poses difficulties for progressive economists. On one hand, the polemic is useful for advancing progressive economic policy, so that undermining it would be a step back politically. On the other hand, MMT’s economics is over-simplified and exaggerated. That creates a dilemma which often afflicts the middle ground, which gets squeezed by simplistic extremes that have persuasive traction in political discourse. In the fiscal policy debate, the extremes are MMT and austerity. The former argues government is financially unconstrained, while the latter argues government is akin to a household and has little financial space. Both are wrong.