Only the alternative solves – centering neoliberalism is key to produce new transformative processes to research and politics. Our pedagogy invigorates action to disrupt flows that maintain “hope” and “normative structures” and reorient the meaning of “radical change” – this independently turns all DAs to the perm.
Fletcher 23 Fletcher, R. Robert Fletcher is Associate Professor of Sociology of Development and Change at Wageningen University. He is the author of Romancing the Wild: Cultural Dimensions of Ecotourism and a coauthor of The Conservation Revolution: Radical Ideas for Saving Nature beyond the Anthropocene. (2023). Failing Forward: The Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Conservation. Univ of California Press. pp. 210-220. ut-ac
This conclusion responds to a growing call within the social sciences for researchers to move beyond merely critiquing “things that they do not like” (Igoe and Brockington 2007: 445) and instead also contribute to formulating practical proposals for positive future directions. In the process, it also helps to advance discussion of the more intimate (both intra- and interpersonal) aspects of the transformation needed for degrowth to become possible. Thus far, growing discussions of the potential for degrowth have largely neglected in-depth attention to how this potential resonates at the level of (inter) personal subjectivity, notwithstanding notable exceptions pointing in this direction.1 Yet psychological perspectives, most prominently psychoanalysis, have long explored how a demand for infinite growth can be seen to inhere at both personal (Žižek 1989) and societal levels (Kapoor 2015; Bjerg 2016). The following discussion builds on these insights to explore how they might also help chart a path toward embrace of a post-capitalist transformation in pursuit of degrowth as well.
The Critique of Critique
Calls for critical researchers to move beyond mere critique are of course not wholly novel. Foucault, for instance, was himself frequently criticized for merely deconstructing dominant discourse rather than providing alternative proposals for progressive collective action. In responding to such criticism, he claimed that this strategy was intentional, asserting: “I am not looking for an alternative; you can’t find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that’s the reason why I don’t accept the word ‘alternative’” (1984b: 343).2
The point of critical analysis, Foucault maintained, was to highlight the relations of power with respect to which alternatives must be organized. As he explained: “And if I don’t ever say what must be done, it isn’t because I believe that there’s nothing to be done; on the contrary, it is because I think that there are a thousand things to do, to invent, to forge, on the part of those who, recognizing the relations of power in which they’re implicated, have decided to resist or escape them” (Foucault 1991b: 174). From this perspective, Foucault claimed that his intention was not to pronounce “that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism” (Foucault 1984b: 343).
Yet many social theorists, even those working in the Foucauldian tradition, have become increasingly uncomfortable with this stance. Bruno Latour (2004), for instance, became self-critical of his own role as one of the most trenchant and incisive critics of Western science, observing that rather than providing an opening for progressive social movements, his work may have been most influential in actually providing support for the “post-truth” politics of the reactionary right. Hence, he worried “that a certain form of critical spirit has sent us down the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of allies” (Latour 2004: 231).
Such critique of critique has only multiplied in recent years in the face of the increasingly daunting range of social and environmental problems confronting us.3 Yet one must also remain careful not to move too quickly down the path from defining and analyzing problems to prescribing solutions. Despite his expressed opposition to this latter position, even Foucault could not resist the temptation at times, as exemplified by his curious if fleeting celebration of the progressive possibilities of the 1979 Iranian Revolution (e.g., Foucault 1999). With hindsight, it is easy to understand the seduction of this stance. At that historical moment, standing on the brink of the neoliberal onslaught he himself so presciently foretold (Foucault 2008), having witnessed the bitter failure of previous efforts to cast the Soviet Union in a progressive light as well as dissipation of the ’68 euphoria, it must have appeared, as it did to Horkheimer and Adorno (1998: xi) some three decades earlier in the midst of World War II, that humankind “instead of entering into a truly human condition, [was] sinking into a new kind of barbarism” once more. At that point, it would have been difficult not to succumb to the siren song of any movement that might offer a ray of hope in the gathering darkness. Similarly misplaced optimism has afflicted otherwise even-keeled critical analysts time and again, from disavowal of Soviet atrocities by Cold War communist sympathizers to Žižek’s (2008) praise of Chavez’s Venezuela despite growing evidence of that regime’s mounting totalitarian impulses.
Dynamics like these warn us to be wary in our eagerness to start celebrating ostensive alternatives too quickly. Pushing back against this growing trend, Konings, for instance, echoes Foucault in asserting:
A major factor luring progressive intellectuals into the game of making policy proposals is the tyranny of “what is your alternative?”—that is, the notion that public intellectuals only behave responsibly if they do not only offer criticism but also put forward alternative policy proposals. However, in situations where we find ourselves at many removes from the levers of public authority, to prescribe policy alternatives is bound to be either presumptuous and pointless (because the political actors that we would like to carry our programs are nowhere to be found) or conservative in its political implications (because after many radical calls in the desert we learn to ratchet our ambitions down to a level where they can easily be taken up by existing agencies). Once we buy into the game of making policy proposals we can only sound ridiculous and irrelevant or end up participating in the legitimation of prevailing relations of power. We may be able to find a trade-off between these two extremes, but we will have structurally hobbled our capacity for the production of critical knowledge. (2009: 355)
Rather than succumb to this lure, Konings follows Hegel via Žižek (1993) in advising us to “tarry with the negative,” suggesting that, “For the time being, the most productive role that progressive intellectuals can play is to . . . trace and publicize the inconsistencies between prevailing practices of power and their idealized representation in the official institutions, narratives and symbols of our polity” (2009: 356).
I agree that this type of critical analysis has utility in its own right, and that to be effective it must be followed through to the point that one is certain one has fully understood the contours of the problem at hand—what Haraway (2016), as previously noted, calls “staying with the trouble.” But I also agree with Haraway that we need not stop at that point; we can instead attempt to tread the “fine line between acknowledging the extent and seriousness of the troubles and succumbing to abstract futurism and its affects of sublime despair and its politics of sublime indifference” (2016: 4). While avoiding Konings’ twin pitfalls of either vacuous utopian fantasizing or outlining politically pragmatic proposals—or alternately pursuing a diluted “trade-off between these two extremes”—we can, I believe, still continue to point toward the type of more radical change that would get us closer to the sort of world we truly want to inhabit.
In the passage (quoted in full in note 6 of chapter 2) made famous by Klein’s (2007) analysis of his perspective as a “shock doctrine,” Milton Friedman claimed that the “basic function” of his cohort of neoliberal ideologues was “to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable” (Friedman 2002: xiv). In pointing to this function, Friedman highlighted the interrelationship between ideational and material dimensions of social change, asserting, “Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around” (2002: xiv). It is astounding how prescient this prognosis now appears, looking back upon the neoliberal ascendance Friedman himself helped to orchestrate: how the 1973 accumulation crisis indeed created the space for Friedman and colleagues to promote the ideas they had been nurturing for decades prior as the basis of the new world order, and in this way transforming a philosophy that had indeed seemed “politically impossible” only a short time before into what has now been able to assert itself as the inevitable outcome of a teleological development.
In a parallel yet opposite strategy, therefore, we might follow Friedman’s lead in our own promotion of “vital alternatives” (Dressler et al. 2014) to neoliberal conservation.4 For the reality, as outlined in chapter 8, is that there is already a wealth of alternative “transition discourses” in development throughout the world, via both on-the-ground practice and more abstract conceptualization. The main current impediment to fully realizing these is that, from the perspective of a persistent neoliberal hegemony, they do appear politically infeasible at present. Yet as Friedman among others has taught us, such perceptions can be subject to dramatic transformation over time (see also Yurchak 2013). After all, one of the main functions of hegemony, noted in chapter 1, is precisely to “define . . . what is realistic and what is not realistic, and to drive certain aspirations and grievances into the realm of the impossible, of idle dreams” (Scott 1990: 73). A main strategy of both socialist and anarchist politics has thus been to make “impossible demands” of the current social order so as to challenge this hegemony and sustain the idea that, as the World Social Forum asserts, another world is possible beyond the impoverished horizons of neoliberal capitalism.
In addition to highlighting already existing alternative practices and proposals and helping to flesh out the contours of the alternative world(s) to which they point—the focus of the previous chapter—another productive role for critical scholarship beyond critique may be to explore the conditions of possibility that would allow such alternatives to become first imaginable and then realistic. This is my aim in the following.
What Is Critique Today?
To the extent that critique remains useful in its own right, however, a Lacanian perspective reminds us that it must be approached in a particular way. Acknowledging the implications of the public secrecy dynamic discussed in previous chapters, Žižek echoes Taussig in cautioning that “we must avoid the simple metaphors of demasking, of throwing away the veils which are supposed to hide the naked reality. We can see why Lacan, in his seminar on The Ethic of Psychoanalysis, distances himself from the liberating gesture of saying finally that ‘the emperor has no clothes’” (1989: 25). Rather, Žižek suggests, the aim of critique must be “to detect, in a given ideological edifice, the element which represents within it its own impossibility” (1989: 143), to undertake a “symptomal reading” that seeks to “to discern the unavowed bias of the official text via its ruptures, blanks, and slips” (1997: 10). Or as Kapoor (2005: 1205) paraphrases, “this means tracking and identifying ideology’s Real—its slips, disavowals, contradictions, ambiguities.”
In other words, this Lacanian stance challenges the conventional approach to critique often termed the “education model of social change,” entailing a conviction that provision of more facts concerning the realities of a situation will lead to greater awareness of the problem and, in turn, more effective action (cf. Weintrobe, 2013a). Yet a growing body of research in behavioral economics, social psychology, and related fields demonstrates what psychoanalysts have long asserted, namely that human behavior deviates substantially from this ideal and hence that rather than developing greater awareness and commitment to action, subjects often react to new information by becoming more firmly entrenched in their existing perspective (see Lakoff 2009). For psychoanalysts, this is explained by the fact that attachment to the status quo is commonly cemented by the promise of jouissance that it offers. While this jouissance, as previously noted, is rarely unequivocally pleasurable, rather offering pleasure and pain in equal measure, the fleeting pleasure it does provide reinforces commitment via the fantasy that the pain can be overcome and pure pleasure eventually attained.
Breaking attachment to ideology, therefore, requires loss of both this fantasy of total fulfilment and the limited jouissance actually experienced. Facing this loss requires a process of mourning, entailing acceptance of both the pain of separation and deprivation of pleasure. To avoid this pain, subjects tend to retain attachment at all costs, or when forced to endure loss, to turn away from and repress the suffering, in which case mourning is replaced by melancholia, a state of low-level depression precipitated by the inability to mourn and therefore dissipate the negative affect (Freud 1925). Melancholia is characterized by the movement from desire to drive in that one continually relives failure to attain the object in question. It is supported by a variety of defense mechanisms, one of the most significant of which is disavowal, allowing subjects to half-acknowledge their pain while simultaneously denying its full significance. Manifest as “perversion,” this entails, paradoxically, a (largely unconscious) “‘choice’ to feel pain rather than suffer the painful truth” (Layton 2009: 309). One of psychoanalysis’s most important insights is that this dynamic occurs even with respect to circumstances we consider negative and may explicitly claim to want to end. In short, psychoanalysis suggests, as Žižek phrases it in the epigraph to this conclusion, that attaining “freedom hurts.”
To pursue such freedom nonetheless, the quintessential Lacanian injunction is to encourage subjects to “traverse the fantasy.” As Brearley (2013: 160) summarizes this process, “the task of the ego is to wean itself away from its early reliance on magical and wishful thinking and painfully attempt to represent to itself what really is the case.” With respect to neoliberal conservation, this would entail fully acknowledging the Real of capitalism as a self-destructive system driving us toward the brink of ecological catastrophe. And to break the cycle of melancholia and perversion, this would, of course, require consciously confronting the pain resulting from both the loss of attachment to a capitalist society of enjoyment and the recognition of the environmental devastation this society has wrought. As Mishan asserted some time ago: “The psychic cost of such a move into recognition is the cost of the move from the paranoid-schizoid toward the depressive position. The cost is the psychic pain of guilt at damage done, and the necessity of mourning of our grandiose fantasy of self-sufficiency and immortality. Without such a move we risk eco-catastrophe, because we cannot assess the true threat” (1996: 65).
Disavowal of Death
While within neoliberal conservation discourse it may indeed be easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism, this seeming acknowledgment of the grave existential threat posed by our mounting environmental crisis—which has in fact been interpreted as portending a sixth global extinction event or even “biological annihilation” altogether (see, e.g., Ceballos et al. 2017)—may not be so substantial as it appears at first blush. Rather, the dominant policy response to this acknowledgment embodied in neoliberal conservation and similar approaches, understood in Žižek’s terms as considering the current situation “catastrophic but not serious,” suggests something far more ambivalent at work here. For psychoanalysts, such ambivalence calls to mind what is considered a common human tendency to avoid acceptance of one’s own future death (Becker 1973). As Becker (1973) explains, all people are ostensibly aware of the inevitable fact that they will eventually die, yet this fact, and the existential fear it provokes, are usually suppressed in the course of everyday life. Zilboorg describes this stance as follows:
In normal times we move about actually without ever believing in our own death, as if we fully believed in our own corporeal immortality. . . . A man [sic] will say, of course, that that he knows he will someday die, but he does not really care. He is having a good time with living, and he does not think about death and does not care to bother about it—but this is a purely intellectual, verbal admission. The affect of fear is repressed. (1943: 468–471)
Rather than wholesale denial, this description speaks more to the presence of disavowal, as conceptualized in previous chapters. What analysis in these terms suggests, therefore, is that a particular form of ambivalent disavowal that the environmental crisis wrought by capitalism represents an existential threat to humanity as well as other forms of life on Earth serves to shield us from the fear of death that a deep awareness of this reality might otherwise provoke. Unable to receive full acknowledgment and expression, such fear may instead manifest itself in the growing “ecological anxiety disorder” that Robbins and Moore (2013) diagnose among environmentalists. This disavowal of death may partly explain our widespread failure to truly appreciate and hence act on knowledge of the reality of the impending biological annihilation we face—and thus to take refuge instead in fantasies of future salvation via neoliberal conservation.
The End of Hope
Requisite to the process of both facing our existential fear and mourning for loss of attachment to the status quo, consequently, may be abandoning all hope for redemption within the bounds of a capitalist political economy. In The Courage of Hopelessness, Žižek (2017) draws on the example of a smoker who promises to quit in the future to illustrate the problem of a politics based in hope. As he explains this dilemma, “My awareness that I can stop smoking any time I want guarantees that I will never actually do it—the possibility of stopping smoking is what blocks the actual change; it allows me to accept our continuous smoking without bad conscience, so that the end of smoking is constantly present as the very source of its continuation” (Žižek 2017: ix). It is this promise of future change, in other words, that allows one to disavow one’s inability to actually change in the present. In a similar way, neoliberal conservation can be seen to offer hope for capitalism’s eventual transformation into a sustainable form, allowing us to continue to engage in (inevitably) unsustainable capitalist practices in the (continually extended) here and now by reassuring ourselves that these will be compensated for in a “net zero” future. As with Žižek’s smoker, then, in neoliberal conservation “the possibility of change is evoked to guarantee that it will not be acted upon” (2017: x).
In addressing this dilemma, Žižek contends, “It is only when we despair and don’t know any more what to do that change can be enacted—we have to go through this zero point of hopelessness” (2017: x). Hence, he concludes that “true courage is to admit that the light at the end of the tunnel is probably the headlight of another train approaching us from the opposite direction” (Žižek 2017: xi–xii). The train in this case, I have argued, is neoliberal capitalism; hence, escape from the tunnel is only attainable by traversing the neoliberal fantasy entirely in pursuit of a wholly different social reality. More than a lack of practicable alternatives, the preceding discussion suggests, it may be a largely unconscious attachment to the contemporary capitalist order that helps to hold it in place (McGowan 2017). This raises the sobering prospect that many of us may not be nearly as willing to make the dramatic changes we know are necessary to develop a just and sustainable world as we would like to believe. From the psychoanalytic perspective advanced in this book, achieving effective change therefore requires generating the desire for pursuit of a new situation sufficient to motivate subjects to face the painful emotions and undergo the process of mourning necessary to break attachment to present circumstances and the cycle of drive it precipitates. This is the strategy Lacan captured in his famous maxim, “Don’t compromise your desire!” (see de Vries 2007). As Rustin phrases this dilemma, “Moving out of the paranoid-schizoid into more depressive ways of thinking and feeling can be found too painful to endure, if there are no internalized good objects to sustain a belief in the existence of good objects outside the self ” (2013: 175).
Several commentators contend that many members of the political left have indeed largely compromised their desire for radical progressive change over the past several decades (Brown 1999; Dean 2012; Fisher 2012). Thus, Dean suggests that a prominent strain of leftist thought
has given way on the desire for communism, betrayed its historical commitment to the proletariat, and sublimated revolutionary energies into restorationist practices that strengthen the hold of capitalism. This Left has replaced commitments to the emancipatory, egalitarian struggles of working people against capitalism—commitments that were never fully orthodox, but always ruptured, conflicted, and contested—with incessant activity (like the mania Freud associates with melancholia) and so now satisfies itself with criticism and interpretation, small projects and local actions, particular issues and legislative victories, art, technology, procedures, and process. . . . For such a Left, enjoyment comes from its withdrawal from responsibility, its sublimation of goals and responsibilities into the branching, fragmented practices of micropolitics, self-care, and issue awareness. (Dean 2012: 173–174)
To counter this trend, Dean asserts, requires a “refusal to give way on desire and wallow in melancholia” (2012: 183). And for this to happen, Fisher contends, “the libidinal attractions of consumer capitalism need to be met with a counterlibido, not simply an anti-libidinal dampening” (2012: 134).
Yet if this new post-capitalist desire is merely for further unfulfillable fantasies, nothing will have been gained (McGowan 2017). After all, abstract notions of an idealized communist—or degrowth—future can become just as phantasmic as the promises of capitalist redemption they contest. And as Dean (2012) points out, perpetual failure to enact such a future can become just as much an object of attachment as the failure to redeem capitalism via neoliberal conservation that I have highlighted in this book. In dynamics such as these, consequently, post-capitalist desire may transform into a drive pursuing continual failure to attain the object in question, in a manner quite similar to the capitalist drive to which it ostensibly stands opposed.
Hence, the aim must be to instead stimulate novel forms of “postfantasmatic” enjoyment (Byrne and Healy 2006) capable of traversing attachment to fantasy. As Gibson-Graham qualify, what is envisioned here
is not a truly post-fantasmatic condition (since fantasy is the mode of integration of the subject into the symbolic order and the anchor of identification), but a more distanced and reflective relation to fantasy. . . . This new positioning brings a different relationship to both identity and desire—less trapped and invested, more aware of and open to possibilities of change. . . . Desire is set in motion again, though with somewhat less force, and disappointment is distanced from disillusion. (2006: 237)
In pursuit of post-capitalism, such post-fantasmatic enjoyment must be connected to a vision of “a world without exploitation; a world characterized by equality, justice, freedom, and the absence of oppression; a world where production is common, distribution is based on need, and decisions realize the general will” (Dean 2012: 203–204). And given that “capitalist subjectification, the desire it structures and incites, is individual,” Dean asserts that post-capitalist desire, by contrast, “can only be collective, a common relation to a common condition of division” (2012: 191). In other words, post-capitalist desire can be understood as essentially “a collective desire for collectivity” (Dean 2012: 158), or what Gibson-Graham (2006) calls a desire for “being-in-common.”
Gibson-Graham (2006: 239) outline a variety of initiatives “aimed at mobilizing desire for noncapitalist becomings” in their diverse community economies. As they explain, these were projects intended to provide participants with “opportunities to encounter each other in pleasurable ways— creating multiple spaces of engagement, offering activities and events that promoted receptivity. What took place in these spaces was the awakening of a communal subjectivity and a faint but discernible yearning for a communal (noncapitalist) economy” (2006: 239). This strategy can be understood as endeavoring to cultivate what Durkheim (1995) called a “collective effervescence” generated by group interaction, a dynamic also evoking Freud’s (1962) famous “oceanic feeling” that can be further related to a more recent body of research exploring such experiences as a state of “flow” or “transcendence.”5 Such a state is experienced as intrinsically enjoyable (Csikszentmihalyi 1974) and hence encourages pursuit of further experiences promising a similar affective payback.