The alternative empowers and produces energies for the party-form, which is vital to build affective infrastructure for the movement.
Bosworth 23 Bosworth, K. Ph.D. Geography, University of Minnesota, M.A. Geography, University of Minnesota, B.A. Environmental Studies, Macalester College. Bosworth is the author of "Pipeline Populism: Affective Infrastructures of Grassroots Environmentalism in the 21st Century," which examines the possibilities and limitations of pipeline opposition movements in the central United States in grounding the popular politics of climate justice. His ongoing research examines how environmental “protectors of the subsurface” intertwine data collection and environmental imaginaries in contesting the effects of oil and gas on underground spaces like aquifers and caves, thus inventing new cultures of conservation practice. (2023). What is ‘affective infrastructure’?. Dialogues in Human Geography, 13(1), 54-72. ut-ac
What sorts of organizational form might be sustained by an affective infrastructure? Dean’s retrospective on U.S. communist organizing in history and the present provides an analogous attention to the relationship between an affective infrastructure and political organization. Returning to crowd theory and group psychology, Dean’s goal is to reconstruct how the party form creates ‘practical optimism’ among its subjects, holding open not just collective endurance but also politics as a project of moving together in a certain direction (2016: 220). Building on this argument, Kamish (2021: 4) further analyzes the way that the Black Panther Party sought to become the vanguard ‘“affective infrastructure” for sustaining revolutionary feeling and political action’. Thus the ‘affective infrastructure’ that the party or the squat layers in and through its spaces augments the collective’s power of acting. It is the form which allows people to ‘become bigger, able to do more than they could have imagined’ (Dean, 2016: 209, emphasis added). Furthermore, it is through the organization of this infrastructure that such power coheres and is sustained, across time. The organizational form ‘provides an apparatus for this endurance’ (Dean, 2016: 217).2 Though in a politically divergent way from the analysis of anarchist organizing, Dean’s analysis of the party as a form still resonates: the point of an organizational infrastructure is to hold open space in which the energy of formative collective affects can be sustained rather than dissipate (as in crowd phenomenon) or become re-routed by the state.
Drawing attention to such affective infrastructures leads us to consider a fuller range of organizational forms which might sustain desiring subjects than the squat, commune, or party (Nunes, 2021: 230). Among these other forms might be the ‘infrastructures of feeling’ that Gilmore (2017: 237) suggests can be found in the long history of transnational abolitionist movements. For Gilmore, ‘infrastructure of feeling’ defines how ‘ideology becomes material as do the actions that feelings enable or constrain’ (2017: 237). Gilmore is concerned with understanding how abolition geographies and the Black Radical Tradition alike might build sustaining narrative arcs toward liberation, and further embed these arcs in spatial arrangements that reproduce and grow their power. Gilmore turns to infrastructure of feeling to elucidate the ‘consciousness-foundation’ which ‘underlies our capacity to select, to recognize possibility as we select and reselect liberatory lineages’ in a deliberately capacious manner (Gilmore 2017: 237, emphasis added). The practice of abolition geography, as a kind of organized historical materialism for liberation, mobilizes a movement ‘back in timespace’ to select and reselect ancestors as a kind of emotional sustenance, a way of finding ‘alternatives to the despairing sense that so much change, in retrospect, seems only ever to have been displacement and redistribution of human sacrifice’ (228). It is an open question what forces compose that which underlies our capacities to select, but it is clear again that these include ‘feelings [that] enable or constrain’ actions (237).
If Gilmore’s brief formulation is provocative, then Choi’s expansion of ‘infrastructure of feeling’ demonstrates its utility in different situations. In an examination of ‘sensory and affective infrastructures’ of post-tsunami crisis in Sri Lanka, Choi makes the argument that as ‘everyday scaffolding’ (2021: 86), humor and superstition become components of social survival of ongoing socio-ecological crisis. This argument resonates with contemporary analyses of Indigenous resistance to U.S. settler colonial infrastructure systems, in which scholars posit that against the life appropriating and destroying material infrastructure systems of settler colonialism (symbolized most potently by oil pipelines), Indigenous counterinfrastructures of care, solidarity, and resistance offer alternative ‘forms of politics’ (Barney, 2021; c.f. LaDuke and Cowen, 2020; Spice, 2018). While certain forms of insecurity, paranoia, and fear are crucial supports for right-wing populisms, and the security state and policing they desire (Bosworth and Chua, 2021; Woodward, 2014), it is not the case that ‘negative’ affects cannot be part of social endurance. Choi demonstrates that in contrast to extant concepts of ‘social resilience’, infrastructures of feeling allow for a more capacious understanding of how critical affects such as anger or indignation can still form elements of endurance (see also Henderson, 2008). This perceptive point is sometimes underplayed in ‘affirmative’ readings of affect influenced by Spinoza and subsequently Deleuze (though see Stolze, 2020). The question in any case is how the partial communications or ‘concatenations of affects’ (Balibar, 1994: 27) come to orient a collective such that it begins to act such that ‘the Minds and Bodies of all would compose, as it were, one Mind and one Body’ (Spinoza, 1985: 556 [EIII P18Schol]).
Though some of these authors still include analysis of concrete infrastructure systems, what defines their attention to a second ‘side’ of affective infrastructure is a much more metaphorical, analogical, or even allegorical use of the concept of affective infrastructure to indicate, as it were, the ‘pipes of all sizes’ (Jameson, 2020: 49) that make up transindividual political psychology. Nonetheless, in surveying these some conceptual questions emerge. First, what would differentiate the concept of ‘affective infrastructure’ in these analyses from the generic concept of an ‘affective condition’? There need not be a difference, but I wager the alternative is perhaps more interesting. If affective infrastructure does indicate something more specific than condition or atmosphere, a second question arises: does ‘infrastructure’ denote simply the channeling or circulation of affect (as in one reading of ‘pipes and cables’)? Or is there something in the technological materiality of infrastructure that helps us understand political organization? I return to these questions in section three after addressing first the question of determination.
Interlude: base, superstructure, determination
Frequently when reading contemporary infrastructure studies one encounters the argument that we are far from Marxist conceptions of economic foundation, not least structuralist ones (see Murawski, 2018 for a review). These are taken to subscribe to overly-deterministic causalities in which an economic foundation or material Basis (a Marxist term translated as ‘infrastructure’ in French) ultimately supplies the impetus for technological and social form alike (most briefly expressed in the 1859 Preface to Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy). Ensuing debates in 20th century Marxism (and critiques from the outside) have evacuated the possibility of such a simplistic understanding of base-superstructure causality. Yet the accounts of affective infrastructure outlined above bear somewhat similar quandaries to those Marxists faced, both in their origins and in the subsequent conceptual problems. These include debates on base and superstructure in both the British New Left and French Marxist philosophy, while the latter include questions concerning how we ought to understand the primacy of materiality with regards to culture or language, as well as between structure and transformation. Indeed, as Carse (2016: 35) suggests, the 1960s ‘use of infrastructure in Anglophone social theory highlights the influence of Francophone scholarship’.
Though an oft-cited and truly wonderful article, Humphrey’s (2005: 40) question remains generative today and somewhat unanswered in infrastructure studies: ‘We are still left with the issues posed by Marxist materialism: what was the generative import of the [Soviet] physical infrastructure, and did this (how did this) interact with the imaginative and projective inner feelings of the people?’ To me, this is a question of determination. This interlude returns to outline these problematics not to make the argument that theorists of affective infrastructure ought to be Marxist, but rather to show that the general problematic concerning the relationship between infrastructure and affect might find both broader purchase and more specific methods when the shared problem space with Marxism is acknowledged rather than disavowed. I am by no means claiming to be the first to have brought these questions or thinkers together. Instead, I am prying old questions open again to see if they can shed new light on the present.
The general problematic of understanding the relationship between material infrastructure (or the base of political economy) and political and cultural superstructure was a major theme in British cultural studies (Hall, 2021 [1977]; Williams, 1978, 2005 [1980]). Within the broader outlines of this debate, Williams sought to push against a completely synchronic account of ‘formed wholes’ like state institutions (which preoccupied some structuralists) by also attending to what he called ‘forming and formative processes’ (1978: 128). The latter, which Williams deemed as crucial to a ‘structure of feeling’, included ‘embryonic’ ‘affective elements of consciousness’, which were ‘emergent or preemergent’, most curiously described as ‘social experiences in solution’ (131–133). The thrust even in these short pages of Marxism and Literature is to understand mood as a social element which is at once the ‘structure’ and ‘process’ for what is available to be felt in a given collective era or generation (132). As Gilmore (2017) put it, this is the ‘structure’ which is capacitated by the capaciousness in selecting and reselecting one’s ancestors, thus recomposing the Black Radical Tradition. The conditions for such selection would be the ‘infrastructure of feeling’ which Gilmore – like Williams – maintains are no less material. This infrastructure still ‘underlies our capacity to select’ – indeed, infrastructure is defined by how it ‘underlies productivity’ (Gilmore, 2017: 237, emphasis added). Further compellingly for these and other theories of infrastructure, Williams defines the power of social feeling to ‘exert palpable pressures and set effective limits on experience and on action’ (1978: 132). Interestingly, the exertion of pressures and setting of limits are the exact terms he earlier used to describe the ‘full concept of determination’ in Marxism (87, emphasis added). What seems to be at stake here is how feeling or affect is both generated and further determines insofar as it underlies and conditions, exerting pressures, setting limits, and making allowances.