Turn – we’re predicated to always want more, which means capitalism is solely a natural consequence of our desires.
Terzi 22 Terzi, A. Alessio Terzi is Economist at the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Prior to this, he was an Affiliate Fellow at the think tank Bruegel and a Fulbright Scholar at the Harvard Kennedy School. His research and commentaries have appeared in leading media outlets including BBC World News, Financial Times, and the Wall Street Journal. (2022). Growth for Good: Reshaping Capitalism to Save Humanity from Climate Catastrophe. United Kingdom: Harvard University Press. pp. 121—124. ut-ac
Harking back to the opening of this chapter, capitalism is blamed for many ills, but it is better understood as a great enabler. It is an efficient way to foster growth. It rewards ingenuity. It prods people to invent practical things and add to the store of useful knowledge. When firms compete for customers, they have an incentive to master the latest technology and learn how to produce it as cheaply as possible. This appeals to consumers, who display all the emulation and status-signaling behaviors we have discussed. In short, capitalism is efficient at delivering what people want, and people seem, due to cultural-evolutionary traits, to constantly want more. This did not start with the Industrial Revolution. The quest for more has characterized most of human history, both in periods when growth was achieved, and when it was not
Climate change and value systems
Not everyone finds examples drawn from the past to be persuasive. Today, thanks to advanced science, people know that current methods of production and consumption of goods and services are harmful to nature.
THE HAPPINESS PARADOX EXPLAINED
Degrowth advocates often point out that economic growth does not map neatly to changes in happiness as measured by various surveys—a lack of correlation known as the Easterlin paradox. Their rushed conclusion is that, at least in rich countries, dialing back economic growth would have limited, or perhaps even positive, impact on happiness and well-being.
We can resolve this apparent paradox with the help of relative needs and income theory, which emphasizes the role of social comparison. If everyone’s income increases in a country, they may be materially better off but average happiness levels don’t rise by much. Whatever joy results from the intertemporal comparison fades quickly because of another psychological effect: habituation. As people have more, they rapidly get used to it. What used to be desires are recast as needs, and people move on to wanting more. This is known as the “hedonic treadmill.”
Like the ones in health clubs, the hedonic treadmill works in only one direction. Habituation is not symmetric; losses are harder to live with than gains. People’s unhappiness at being deprived of something—say, a dollar of income from an initial reference point, is much greater than their happiness on receiving a windfall. The power of this cognitive bias, known as “loss aversion,” has been documented by Daniel Kahneman (2013) and Amos Tversky in a vast variety of experimental settings—a line of work acknowledged by the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics.
Even as it seems clear, however, that any happiness gains from economic growth are not direct but rather intermediated by relative income theory, there are still some facts worth keeping in mind:
• In advanced as well as developing countries, richer people are on average happier than poorer people. • Econometric studies at the level of individuals find strong correlations between boosts in income and positive changes in happiness.
• Populations grow unhappier in times of recession.
• Studies spanning multiple economic cycles of rise and fall in inflation rates and GDP growth find fluctuations in happiness tracking with these ups and downs.
These basic patterns of human sentiment lend no support to a degrowth agenda, or any transition to a “less is more” paradigm. Particularly hard to sell would be directives for rich countries to reduce their consumption to open up space for poor countries to expand. The idea of forcing such change might make perfect sense from a moral perspective, but from the standpoint of relative income theory it will trigger loss aversion and social comparisons across countries—a recipe for widespread unhappiness.
This is especially true given that the reductions needed in rich countries would be huge. Calculations by degrowth advocate Peter Victor show that, to respect planetary boundaries at the global level and at the same time open space for poor countries to catch up, an advanced country like Canada would need to shrink its income per capita to half its 2005 level by 2035—leaving their people earning just a quarter of what they would have in a business-asusual scenario (Victor, 2012). The same simulations can be used to show that a shift to no-growth would fail to result in sufficient CO2 reduction, bringing it down only to roughly 80 percent of 2005 levels by 2035—and that a steadystate economy as a middle-ground solution would fail to achieve the climate targets set by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Between basic arithmetic and foreseeable unpopularity, it is not surprising that very few mainstream parties worldwide have so far embraced a full-blown degrowth agenda. “Make America Small Again” just doesn’t work as a campaign slogan—and nor does shrinking hold appeal in other nations.
Therefore, as the message spreads, and global protests such as Fridays for Future are noticed, people will simply stop wanting more, and will resist the pressures of relative income theory. Rationality will surely prevail over vague psychological instincts, will it not?
While the trend is surely positive, and we see younger generations enthusiastically embracing the environmental cause in ways their older siblings and parents did not, there are reasons to believe that a complete turnaround in preferences remains unlikely.63 For a long time, the presumption in climate change communication has been that, once scientific evidence was made available, people would quickly act upon it. But being aware and concerned about climate change does not necessarily jolt individuals into action.
Over the past twenty years, as a large gap between knowledge, concern, and action developed, so did a wide literature on the topic. A review of over two decades of research, ranging from behavioral and environmental economics to cognitive sciences, social psychology, health policy, and marketing, finds many scholars trying to understand the cognitive traits that hold people back.64 With regard to climate change specifically, the problem is that shared gains, often erroneously perceived as far in the future, are constantly weighed against personal, immediate costs. Given that, in our current technological state, CO2 emissions originate from basically every aspect of modern lifestyles, most of the actions required to bring them down clash with elements that have been, until recently, at the core of our values, identity formation, and belief system.
These are the same human traits we saw above as we explored the nonfunctional utility of consumption. For example, for over half a century, it has been a status symbol to have a luxury car, and jet-setting around the globe has been a clear marker of success—think of the iconic James Bond with his deluxe Aston Martin and secret missions involving travel to exotic locations. It has been the tradition in many countries for people’s diet to center on meat, a very CO2 -intensive form of nourishment. Such norms do not evolve quickly. No matter the level of education or degree of climate awareness, when systems of beliefs clash, individuals experience cognitive dissonance and look for ways to avoid change. This conflict has not boded well for climate action, as people have relied on all sorts of justifications to evade a sense of guilt and stick to their carbon-intensive habits. Some feel compelled to question the science behind climate change, and stress the wide uncertainty surrounding estimates. Others fall back on fatalism (“we are all going to die in any case”), or the odd argument of being too busy to act. Yet others engage in wild discounting of the timeframe and geographic scope involved (“it’s going to affect people far away from here, in a future far away”), or use blame-shifting techniques (“why should I do something when China /politicians/ corporations are not doing anything?”).
Fighting climate change will surely require changes in behavior by citizens, which will hinge on a complex set of incentives and regulations, as Chapter 8 will explore. We should not hold our breath, however, waiting for a spontaneous and complete turnaround of current value systems. Much less should we make this, as the degrowth agenda implicitly does, the central element of the fight against climate change and environmental degradation.