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Turn – Growth is key to all your impacts – pointing the finger at capitalism builds hubris for the “next step taken” and preconditioned on surface-level engagement.

Terzi 22 Terzi, A. Alessio Terzi is Economist at the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Prior to this, he was an Affiliate Fellow at the think tank Bruegel and a Fulbright Scholar at the Harvard Kennedy School. His research and commentaries have appeared in leading media outlets including BBC World News, Financial Times, and the Wall Street Journal. (2022). Growth for Good: Reshaping Capitalism to Save Humanity from Climate Catastrophe. United Kingdom: Harvard University Press. pp. 93—101. ut-ac

We started with a set of paradoxes, and we will conclude with one last one. Several of the current grievances against capitalism and the growth imperative identified by ecosocialists and others are actually problems that result from a slowdown (or, in Italy’s case, complete lack) of growth. Degrowth advocates got a first taste of this from one of their own prophets. Thomas Piketty’s argument for why wealth inequality is increasing and the rate of return on capital (r) is higher than economic growth (g) is actually that there has been a slowdown in the latter. As we learned from the Italian case, this same logic can be extended to a variety of dimensions. If you think your current society is already fractionalized, litigious, and gridlocked, having less or no economic growth will make the problem worse. In this respect, note that what matters is scarcity vis-à-vis your neighboring countries or your own past trend, not some absolute monetary (or moral) threshold. By absolute measures, Italy remains one of the largest economies in the world, and if we use the entire global distribution of income as a benchmark, its citizens are rich. But this simple fact does not protect the country from the toxic political and economic dynamics outlined above. The reasons for this will become more clear in Chapter 5.

This book’s Introduction laid out other grievances against the current economic order, including the plights of so many young people: they do not have enough opportunities, they are underemployed, and home ownership is nothing but an impossible dream to them. They are forced to seek help from their parents, and the government does not allocate enough resources to help them out. These are also problems that an absence of economic growth will make even worse. More broadly, if you think there should be more redistribution, then you should hope for the economic growth that makes that politically easier to achieve. When the economy enters into a steady state and faith in progress wanes, every group in society becomes highly risk averse, and assigns top priority to the defense of its present entitlements. It might very well be, as Galbraith remarked, that economic growth emerged as a powerful substitute to redistribution, as it eases social tensions. But at the same time, the relationship is not symmetric: redistribution is not a substitute for growth. Redistribution alone, in an environment of no growth, cannot serve the function of easing social tensions. It is instead bound to exacerbate them.

If you think tackling climate change and environmental degradation will inevitably require an acceleration in innovation and new cutting-edge technologies, then you must see that a lack of economic growth will make that harder to achieve. Investment is choked off in times of scarcity, and when the most inventive and high-skilled members of a workforce look around and see poor reward and no opportunities, they progressively move away. Finally, you may think that climate change and environmental protection is a shared problem of humanity, requiring international collaboration, long-term planning, and a willingness to make some short-term sacrifices for benefits that will accrue to future generations. If so, you should also know that without growth all of this is less likely.

Whatever your primary concern—social, economic, political, or environmental—lack of economic growth can hardly be the answer. Conversely, in light of the toxic dynamics it prevents, economic growth should be seen as a force for good.

The Green Plan to Avoid Disaster

THE TRUE ORIGINS OF THE GROWTH IMPERATIVE

Human nature will be the last part of Nature to surrender to Man. —C. S. Lewis, 1943

It’s an evergreen joke among Italians that, whenever in doubt on whatever the issue, one should always blame the government. Even for bad weather, the response applies: Piove? Governo ladro! But there is another option. It is just as easy to blame capitalism.

As Francesco Boldizzoni has shown, the charges leveled against capitalism are as old as capitalism itself. Whether the problem is poverty or excessive affluence, imperialism or delocalization, globalization, war, human rights infringement, inner-city poverty, lack of affordable housing, climate change, environmental degradation, loss of morality, long working hours, misogyny, white supremacy, or some other wrong, fingers inevitably point to the usual culprit. The push for “unnecessary economic growth” is no exception, as degrowth sympathizers see behind it the evil juggernaut of capitalism. Blaming something on an abstract concept, or on its vaguely identified supporters (“capitalists”) can surely feel liberating, in the way that attacking a generic “establishment” does. It allows the blame to shift outward, releasing individuals from personal responsibility. In the words of degrowth guru Jason Hickel, “People are victims of the system.”1

At the same time, such an approach is highly unhelpful, because it prevents engagement in deeper inquiry. We saw when we delved into the mechanics of capitalism in Chapter 2 that, while there are some inbuilt features such as competition among firms which feed the growth imperative, our economic system could in principle be just as compatible with zero growth if this were what consumers desired. Along similar lines, we saw in Chapter 3 how ecosocialism could in principle be made to work if a “less is more” ideology were embraced at once by the entire population of a country (or, ideally, all of humanity).

Typically, however, such lines of thinking are not developed very far before the critics of capitalism throw up their hands in helpless gestures. Going back to square one, capitalism is portrayed as the puppet master forcing human beings to act in ways they would not choose, for example by generating “artificial scarcity” to drive levels of consumption they do not even enjoy. Consumers are presented as behaving contrary to the wishes of humans, despite these being the same population.2 Even John Kenneth Galbraith, fine economist that he was, fell back on this defenseless posture, arguing that people kept consuming more only because they were victims of advertising. And capitalism has more arrows than advertising in its quiver. From spurring shoppers with sales promotions to conjuring up new gift-giving traditions, it has untold ways to generate unnecessary purchases. Worst of all, perhaps, is that prime suspect: planned obsolescence.3

To the contrary, I see pervasive advertising and planned obsolescence— but also marketing and branding more generally—as practices that firms engage in to escape the mechanics of capitalism and the tough logic of innovation-based competition.4 They are attempts to win some reprieve from the sentence to “innovate or die,” and while important, their effects are circumscribed.5 Rather than the evil tools of capitalism, they are, at worst, by-products of a system in which firms discover that product and process innovation are hard to accomplish. In any case, they are in no way central to capitalism’s survival. Indeed, if we look at degrowth advocates’ favorite examples of limiting these practices, such as the Norwegian ban on advertising to children under twelve, or Paris’s ban on advertising near schools, it is notable that they all come from advanced capitalist countries.

This leaves us wondering: If these practices aren’t the origin of the infinite desire for more, then where does it come from? As we shall see, we’ve had the answer under our noses all along.

Before we start, it is important to stress that reaching useful conclusions will not require us to render a verdict on human nature—whether it is good or bad, and what it should be—as Rutger Bregman does in Humankind.6 We can leave that perpetual philosophical debate to others. Rather, our focus here is on some basic anthropological, cultural, and evolutionary traits observable in humans and how these relate to the growth imperative. If we can understand these we can avoid the risk of creating a dysfunctional society with policies that make assumptions about human morality and capacity for moral improvement—always dangerous to rely on, even in service of such a noble cause as avoiding climate catastrophe. In Chapter 6, we will build on the understanding we gain to explore how human traits and impulses could be deliberately leveraged (rather than combatted) to achieve an environmentally sustainable society.

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