Cap solves scarcity – asteroid mining alone solves – the estimates are conservative.
Pethokoukis and McAfee 19 Pethokoukis, James. Senior Fellow DeWitt Wallace Chair Editor, AEIdeas Blog, Podcast Host @ Political Economy Podcast. McAfee, Andrew. Andrew McAfee is the co-founder and co-director of the Initiative on the Digital Economy and a principal research scientist at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He studies how digital technologies are changing the world. He has also written The Second Machine Age and Machine, Platform, Crowd. Transcribed Podcast Episode 150 from: “Andrew McAfee on Capitalism, Tech Progress, and the Environment | Ep. 150 — Political Economy with James Pethokoukis” 2019 Oct. 15. https://www.aei.org/economics/how-can-innovation-and-capitalism-save-our-planet-a-long-read-qa-with-andrew-mcafee/.
Pethokoukis: I don’t know if you’ve been following the global voyages of the Swedish teen activist, Greta Thunberg, who’s very worried about global warming. When she came to America and was talking about climate change, she said one phrase that really stuck in my brain. She was very worried about these “fairy–tales of infinite economic growth.”
Your book actually gets at that issue. One reason that you have people who are concerned about economic growth is because they feel that we are running out of earth. That there’s no way that we can have a planet where everybody lives like Americans. It’s a very common criticism that I hear when I talk about economic growth: “We only have one earth, and unless you’re going to bring in asteroids full of resources, we will run out of earth.”
McAfee: Which people do talk about. Asteroid mining is a topic these days.
Yes, I think we may have talked about it on one of our recent podcasts, actually. But the focus of your book is that we’re really not running out of earth, are we?
That’s exactly the focus of my book. In particular, there’s a weird new chapter, I believe, in the debates that go back and forth about resources, economic growth, and the using up of the planet. And more fundamentally, it’s about the nature of the relationship with the planet that we live on. That’s why I wrote More from Less.
But, Jim, I want to back up about half a century, because that was the first time where people really started to get worried about using up the earth. As you know, it was 1968 when Paul Ehrlich wrote The Population Bomb, we had the first Earth Day in 1970, the book Limits to Growth came out in 1972, and man, there was a lot of alarmism about very fast population growth in many parts of the world.
You could look ahead and see what the earth’s population was going to do, those new people would probably want to improve their standard of living, and you could look at the resource-use trajectories and come to some really dire conclusions. That was the first weave of us thinking we were going to use up the earth. And when you read Limits to Growth, it is an unbelievably bleak book because the MIT modelers that wrote it modeled the entire world economy and said, “Hey, we can’t model a version of the economy where the world doesn’t run out of resources and crash sometime in the mid–21st century.”
[Image: Homes built on a former surface strip coal mine sit above piles of coal in Norton, Virginia, REUTERS/Brian Snyder]
But they did something important in Limits to Growth: they listed what the known global reserves were of many important resources. You know, aluminum, gold, petroleum, iron ore, and things like that. But the known global reserves were from 1972.
Fast-forward, here we are just about 50 years later — the weird part of the story is that known global reserves of just about all of those resources are much bigger today than in 1972, even though we’ve had a half–century of very rapid global economic growth.
And we’ve not imported any asteroids filled with stuff.
That’s correct, we’ve landed zero asteroids on the Earth, and we’ve mined nothing from Mars yet. So the only explanation for what happened there is that those initial estimates were way, way too conservative because they underestimated what Julian Simon got right: as things become scarce, we go looking very hard for more resources. The price of copper rises because it’s scarcer, for example. And then we can go prospecting around the world for copper.
While we do live on a finite planet, our planet is huge — the crust of the Earth weighs 5 trillion tons, which is the weight of all of humanity put together. So there was this notion in the 60s of a Spaceship Earth that was really thinly supplied as it hurtled through the cosmos. It’s a really compelling image, but I think it’s wrong. And I think it’s extremely unhelpful.
Especially because of what I write about it More from Less, which is one version of us becoming smarter in the rich world, particularly in America where the data is really clear. We are now using less resources year after year even as we grow our economy.
Now, this is one of your key findings, so let’s make sure that people are exactly clear about what you’re saying. It’s not that the rate of usage is declining, but that we’re actually using less stuff even though the economy is much bigger.
That’s exactly what I’m saying. So you can think of two ways that resource–use could slow down. We could either be using less per person, or, more strikingly, we could be using less by all people put together. That’s what I’m saying, and I think the evidence is really clear on this.
Jim, to be clear, I am not the first person to point this out. I got started on the project of this book because Jesse Ausubel started pointing this out a few years ago. And I looked at his essay and I said, “Look, that can’t be right. Economies grow, and they need more stuff — more resources, molecules, and materials in order to generate all of this prosperity that we enjoy year after year.”
But I double–checked to make sure that he was really clear about his sources, and sure enough he was right. If anything, he was being very circumspect about the phenomenon. I think it is a big phenomenon, and it’s pretty clear in the United States. Other researchers have found it in the United Kingdom, and I think it is a rich-world phenomenon, and what I want is for the rest of the world to get rich so that it also goes through this resource transition.
They’ll start treading more lightly on the planet in just about all of the ways that I can think to care about. We Americans have a shrinking total footprint on the planet year after year. Now, maybe it should be shrinking more quickly when it comes to carbon and greenhouse gases, but we are not fouling up the Earth and stripping it bare to fuel our growth anymore.
Give me a few examples of commodities that we’ve already peaked usage on and now are going the other way.
The data are super clear about resources or commodities where we don’t import and export a lot of finished goods that contain those resources. For example, we can’t account for all of the steel that shows up in car bodies that we import form Germany and Japan. Now, I still think that we’re post-peak steel, but let me not talk about that.
Let me talk about, for example, timber, and all other wood products put together. I think we’re 30 percent below our 1990 peak in timber. We are about, at least, 20 percent below our 1999 or 2000 peak in paper. When you look at the data for paper, you can just see the smartphone age appear. For about the past ten years — again, not per person, but our total use of paper has been declining really quickly.
Our total use of fertilizer in America is now going down even as our agricultural output measured in tons continues to go up. In fact, agriculture is a great microcosm of this phenomenon. American crop tonnage goes up while water used for agriculture and irrigation goes down. Fertilizer goes down, and crop land goes down, too. We have returned an amount of crop land to nature equal in size to the state of Washington since the early 1980s.
We are just trading more lightly on the planet. Total energy use in this country has been basically flat for about a decade, even though our economy is, I think, at least 15 to 20 percent bigger.
So it’s not just the Great Recession?
No, it’s not at all — we can just throw that hypothesis out. A lot of this started before then, and a lot has also started since then as well.
A lot of this book is about the role of technological progress and capitalism. When we started, you talked about the emergence of these environmental concerns starting in the late 1960s, early 1970s. The sorts of solutions suggested back then weren’t “We need to have more capitalism.”