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Increasing regulatory taxes undermines the delicate balance of competitive federalism between the federal government and the states

Mason ’11 — Ruth Mason (Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Associate Professor of Law and Nancy and Bill Trachsel Corporate Law Scholar, University of Connecticut Law School); “Federalism and the Taxing Power;” California Law Review, Volume 99, 2011; JSTOR, Accessed via KU Libraries

If Congress uses tax expenditures and penalties to regulate areas traditionally or constitutionally reserved to the states, then such tax regulation raises federalism concerns similar to those raised when Congress makes conditional grants to the states.95 Thus, to the extent that we are concerned about the federalism impact of conditional grants, arguably we also should be concerned about the federalism impact of tax expenditures and penalties. Among the values that federalism promotesis horizontal competition among the statesfor residents who are free to move to any state in the Union. Competition forces state governments to respond to the political preferences of their residents.96 The states’ smaller size compared to that of the nation also may facilitate political participation,97 at least when a single voter’s voice carries more weight in state than federal elections.98 Similarly, the smaller size of states, coupled with uneven distribution of voter preferences across the country, facilitates policy diversity: each state can adopt policies that reflect the preferences of its residents, which may differ from national preferences or from preferences of residents of other states.99 Closely related to this is the idea that states may devise different ways to pursue similar policy goals, thus serving, in Justice Brandeis’ famous words, as “laborator[ies]” for “social and economic experiments.”100 Federalism also promotes vertical competition between the federal and state governments. Although the federal and state governments do not compete for residents, James Madison predicted that they would compete for the affections of the governed.101 For any regulatory area not exclusively assigned to the federal or state governments by the Constitution, Madison envisioned that the people would choose their regulator.102 If they trusted the federal government more, the people would invest more power with the federal government, or vice versa. 103 In this way, Madison believed that the federal and state governments would check each other, so that neither would become oppressive.104 It is not necessary to repeat at length here the well-known claim that conditional federal spending jeopardizes federalism values.105 Instead, it should suffice to draw the analogy between federal grant spending and federal tax spending. When it conditions grants upon states’ implementation of particular policies, the federal government thereby reduces the scope for state policy experimentation and competition. Similarly, when the federal government uses federal tax law to reach past the states to regulate private taxpayer behavior though tax expenditures and penalties, it may leave less room for states to implement different or contrary policies. Where federal tax incentives reward taxpayers for engaging in particular activities, such as education,106 home ownership,107 and the purchase of private health insurance,108 those tax incentives may displace the expression of local values and local political preferences. Similarly, to at least some extent the federal government may override local political decisions when it uses tax penalties to discourage certain activities, such as smoking, gambling, and driving. If, in order to secure federal subsidies or avoid federal penalties, taxpayers strive to meet federal (rather than local) standards, then the taxing power raises concerns similar to those raised by the spending power.109 Specifically, if the federal government uses its taxing power to enlarge the scope of its regulatory influence beyond its constitutionally enumerated powers, it reduces the areas in which the states can compete with the federal government and with each other. Thus, just as commentators have accused Congress of using conditional federal grants to crowd out state regulation,110 so too may Congress use federal taxes to crowd out state regulation. Ultimately, the extent of this problem depends on unanswered empirical questions regarding the extent to which federal taxing and spending displaces state and local regulation in similar substantive areas. The impact of federal taxes on state legislative choices also depends on legal questions, such as whether the federal government may use taxes to achieve ends that lie beyond its other constitutionally enumerated powers, and whether such regulation can preempt state taxes and regulations. Parts II and III consider these legal issues

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