Federal pre-emption of environmental laws fail and affects state priorities.
Adler 5 Jonathan H. Adler is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and inaugural Director of the Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. “Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism” , Case Western University School of Law, https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=faculty_publications, [Accessed: 6-24-2021]//cblasi
The jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy distorts state environmental policymaking and can have significant environmental consequences. As a result of extensive federal involvement in areas best left in state or local hands, state policy development is heavily distorted. 178 The lack of a match between the scope of environmental problems and the political jurisdictions asserting authority over such concerns leads to poor prioritization. The over-centralization of environmental policy further compounds the problem of excessive rigidity created by excessive uniformity. 179 The extension of federal authority into areas more properly left under state and local control does not extinguish the demand for greater environmental protection at the state and local level. It does, however, rechannel it. One consequence of the mismatch is that state and local policy makers increasingly tum to environmental issues and concerns where the case for federal dominance is stronger. The most obvious way federal action influences state environmental protection efforts is when federal rules preempt conflicting or varying state rules. For example, section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act prohibits states from adopting "any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles." 180 Similarly, the Energy Policy Conservation Act preempts any state regulation of automotive fuel economy . 181 Preemption can be express, as in the above examples, or implied. 182 Where implied preemption is found, federal regulation will typically preclude any state or local regulation whatsoever. 183 Because preemption operates to prevent state regulatory activity, the net effect of federal preemption is for there to be less regulation than there would have been otherwise. 184 Where federal measures are insufficiently protective, or where federally imposed uniformity is inefficient, there will be suboptimal results. As a recent environmental group report concluded, " [ f] ederal preemption of states' ability to go above and beyond the federal floor suppresses states' creativity in developing new approaches to solving public policy problems, such as air pollution."185 Sometimes federal preemption may be justified by economies of scale. In other cases, however, preemption precludes the adoption of state-level standards that are more tailored to local or regional conditions and needs. As a practical matter, a federal regulatory "floor" can become a ceiling. The existence of a federal standard may discourage state policyrnakers from adopting and maintaining more stringent measures of their own, even where such measures could be justified. Many states have adopted legislation to prevent state environmental agencies from adopting regulatory standards that are more protective than federal rules. 186 New Mexico and Colorado, for example, have statutes prohibiting the promulgation of air pollution controls more stringent than what would be required by federal law. 187 Virginia law bars state regulatory authorities from requiring greater amounts of water treatment than mandated under the federal Clean Water Act. 188 Others states have general prohibitions against agency promulgation of environmental rules more stringent than federal law. 189 Insofar as federal standards are not based upon accurate, up-to-date scientific assessments of environmental problems, and such information about the nature and extent of environmental problems is not available to state and local policymakers, the federal regulation may have an even greater distorting effect on state priorities. The mere existence of a federally mandated,_ floor also preempts contrary state policies and environmental priorities. If a local community has different health and environment-related regulatory priorities, it still must meet the requirements of federal law. 190 In 2000, for example, the outgoing Clinton Administration proposed lowering the federal standard for arsenic in drinking water from 50 to 10 parts per billion (ppb ), largely to reduce the risk of bladder cancer from arsenic consumption. 191 While the leaders of national environmental groups cheered the proposed reduction in the federal arsenic standard, many communities faced with high compliance costs were less enthusiastic. 192 In Los Lunas, New Mexico groundwater naturally contains 12-19 ppb of arsenic. Local officials estimated that reducing arsenic levels to the new 10 ppb standard would cost $14 million. 193 Local experts also noted that while New Mexico has among the highest natural concentrations of arsenic in groundwater in the country, it also has among the lowest rates of bladder cancer, leading many to question whether spending millions to reduce local arsenic levels was the most cost-effective way to safeguard public health. 194 There is even evidence that the federal arsenic rule will increase risks to public health in some communities insofar as the higher water rates necessary to pay for the change induces some families to opt for water from their own wells. 195 Yet insofar as residents of Los Lunas, or any other community, wish to adopt different drinking water standards that are more in line with their environmental and public health needs, and lack the resources to pursue every laudable public health or environmental goal, the federal standard precludes them from acting on their preferences. While the federal government may preempt state regulatory action, and may require state compliance with a general regulatory scheme that does not target states-as-states, it cannot force states to adopt federally desired regulations. It can, however, offer various inducements to encourage state "cooperation." The federal government may, for instance, condition funding on state cooperation or threaten to preempt state and local regulations if such measures do not meet federal requirements. This approach is ~typically referred to as "cooperative federalism," 196 though many analysts question whether the relationship can be properly described as "cooperative."197 Particularly where the consequence of state refusal to cooperate is the imposition of a federal regulatory scheme, the "cooperative federalism" model does not leave much flexibility in the scope and design of regulatory programs. Even where federal involvement is supposed to be "cooperative," states are often precluded or at least discouraged from adopting environmental policies that would be more efficient or effective at addressing their particular environmental concerns and demands. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, the federal government uses the . threat of sanctions to impose federal air pollution control priorities on state governments. Bpecifically, the threatened loss of highway flli1ds induces states to adopt that mix of air pollution control measures preferred by federal policymakers, even when an alternative mix of pollution control measures may produce greater environmental results. The adoption of one air pollution control measure may increase other forms of pollution or otherwise contribute to other environmental problems. 198 Although ostensibly designed to reduce automotive emissions, there is substantial scientific evidence that oxygenated fuels provide little environmental benefit, 199 and can even cause environmental harm.200 This is not the only instance in which the Clean Air Act mandates may impede the achievement of optimal levels of environmental protection. Because the formation of tropospheric ozone ("smog") is in part dependent upon ratios of ozone precursors in the ambient air, measures that reduce ozone levels in some cities increase ozone levels elsewhere?01 Some earlier measures had similar effects. For instance, air pollution control provisions adopted as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 were tailored to advantage regional coal producers at the expense of their competitors, and air quality suffered as a result. 202 Federal inaction can alter state environmental policy priorities just as much as federal action. In some cases, federal failure to conduct scientific research leaves states without the scientific and technical information necessary to set environmental priorities in accordance with local preferences. The failure of federal policymakers to address new or emerging environmental concerns has encouraged states to become more aggressive in their approach to such problems. 203 New York State, for example, sought to restrict the sale of sulfur-dioxide emission credits under the Clean Air Act due to concerns that such sales could increase pollution within the state. 204 Yet because the federal government is disproportionately active in those areas where there is no strong case for federal involvement, states may be disproportionately active in those areas where federal action, and perhaps even federal preemption, would be preferable. Global climate change policy is a prime example of increasing state activity where federal action would provide for a greater jurisdictional match. In recent years, state governments have become quite active on climate change, both for and against greater action to control greenhouse gas emissions.205 As of 2004, 28 states had begun developing greenhouse gas emission policies.206 Some, such as New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, adopted emission reduction targets. In July 2002, California adopted legislation requi1ing the California Air Resources Board to "develop and adopt regulations that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles."207 The state has also embarked on an ambitious plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25 percent over the next fifteen years.208 Others states have adopted voluntary plans. New York and seven other states, mostly in the Northeast, also filed suit directly against various Midwestern utilities alleging that their failure to control greenhouse gas emissions constitutes common law nuisance.209 This activity is the result, in pari, of relative federal inaction on climate change.210 Setting aside the question of whether regulatory action to control greenhouse gases is worthwhile, it should be clear that any such action is best undertaken at the national (if not international) level, rather than by state and local governments. policies indicate that a "bottom-up approach to addressing global climate change" is inevitable for "a nation as physically large and economically diverse as the United States”. CONCLUSION Environmental protections would be more successful if responsibility were divided between the federal and state governments in a more justifiable manner.211 Ideally, the federal government should reorient its efforts toward those areas in which the federal government possesses an institutional advantage, due to economies of scale, or where state and local governments are incapable of addressing environmental problems, such as where there are substantial interstate spillovers. A greater "match" between the scope of environmental problems and the institutions entrusted with addressing such concerns would enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of existing environmental protection efforts. The jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy was not created overnight, nor can it be cured easily.212 Numerous reports and studies have identified the deficiency in federal research and scientific knowledge relevant to environmental concerns, and there is some evidence of progress on this front. Addressing the jurisdictional mismatch will be more difficult; at present there is little interest in revisiting the basic structure of federal environmental law in the legislative or executive branch. Nor are courts likely to force wholesale revisions in existing federal environmental regulations.213 One possible means of addressing the jurisdictional mismatch would be to create greater opportunities for states to free themselves of inappropriate federal requirements. Elsewhere this author has proposed a policy of "ecological forbearance," under which states could petition federal agencies for waivers from federal requirements where no compelling reasons exist to enforce the federal rule. 214 Such a policy would enable states to experiment with alternative means of environmental protection, which could reopen the laboratories of democracy in enviromnental policy. It also would have the potential to free up federal resources to focus on those areas m which interstate spillovers or economies of scale reqmre greater federal involvement. However it is accomplished, fixing the current jurisdictional mismatch should be a high priority for environmental reform. Despite the environmental successes of the past three decades, the overlapping and contradictory state and federal rules do not lead to efficient or effective environmental protection. It is in some senses an historical accident that state leadership in environmental policy was supplanted by federal regulation, and environmental policy could be improved if states regained more of their historic role. The federal government did not come to dominate environmental policy because a more decentralized system was leading to environmental ruin.215 Yet environmental protection could be improved if federal dominance was confined to those areas in which the federal government has something unique to contribute.