Uncooperative federalism BEST for addressing climate – CONFLICT spurs positive action
Osofsky 11 https://www.law.ua.edu/pubs/lrarticles/Volume%2062/Issue%202/OSOFSKY-Diagonal_Federalism.pdf sociate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School; Associate Director of Law, Geo- graphy & Environment, Consortium on Law and Values in Health, Environment & the Life Sciences and Affiliated Faculty, Geography and Conservation Biology, University of Minnesota
Cooperativeness, like the other dimensions, serves as just one factor in a regulatory scheme, and may vary at different stages. As I have described in depth in the preceding companion article, California's waiver request and the EPA's denial have formed a part of conflicts over the appropriate role of states in motor vehicle emissions regulation. n219 However, the Obama Administration EPA's reconsideration of both the granting of the waiver and the results thereof, in tandem with harmonization efforts with respect to fuel economy standards, have created a cooperative diagonal scheme. n220 Recent federalism scholarship explores the complex mix of cooperation and conflict that arises in a variety of contexts, including with respect to climate change. n221 Cooperative federalism's greatest advantage as a basis for climate change regulation is its ability to create coordinated multiscalar action in which each actor provides its unique contribution. A number of scholars and policymakers have taken significant steps to sketch a framework for cooperative action. They are exploring the nuances of how collaboration might work among specific entities in particular policy areas. This analysis makes clear that cooperative approaches, if crafted well, incentivize action while making room for innovation. For instance, a Center for Progressive Reform study by William Andreen and others presents how localities, [*286] states, and the federal government can work together on this problem. n222 Alice Kaswan has also published an interesting cooperative federalism proposal bringing together these three levels of government, and Holly Doremus and W. Michael Hanemann have argued that the Clean Air Act provides a cooperative federalism model that could be used in crafting effective climate change legislation. n223 Some dynamic environmental approaches combine cooperative federalism with other theories. For example, Brad Karkkainen's analysis of information-forcing environmental regulation brings together cooperative federalism and new governance approaches to consider how "properly structured, penalty default rules might be used to induce meaningful participation in locally devolved, place-based, collaborative, public-private hybrid, new governance institutions, aimed at integrated, adaptive, experimentalist management of watersheds and other institutions." n224 This particular combination of cooperative federalism and new governance approaches allows for innovative structures that encompass the multidimensionality of these problems. However, other dynamic federalism scholars have questioned the extent to which cooperative models can capture the disagreement over climate change policy choices, and as a result, a stream of scholarship focusing on uncooperative federalism has emerged. This scholarship includes those directly terming their model "uncooperative," such as Karen Bridges, Kirk Junker, and Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken. n225 But the literature also contains work like that of Ann Carlson and Robert Schapiro, which incorporates conflict in the dynamics they highlight. n226 In addition, some scholars, such as William Buzbee, Ann Carlson, Robert Glicksman and Richard Levy, Alexandra Klass, and Bejamin Sovacool have looked at these questions of cooperation and conflict in a preemption context, arguing for the important complementary role that state and local efforts and state court common law litigation play in the broader environmental regulatory picture. n227 Overall, this scholarship dealing with the [*287] limits of cooperative models explores the way in which disagreement over time should be brought into a federalist regulatory scheme. This scholarship on conflict within federalism highlights two potential difficulties facing cooperative schemes. First, conflict exists. As Robert Schapiro has noted, cooperative schemes may struggle at times to address differences adequately and to include all relevant actors. n228 Certainly, in the U.S. climate change context, states have and continue to vary greatly in how they want to approach the problem, as represented by the states on both sides of Massachusetts v. EPA. n229 Second, and at least as importantly, conflict has value. Regulatory schemes that include opportunities for dissent, such as through citizen suit provisions, can potentially incorporate divergent views more effectively, as well as make sure that pressure remains on policymakers to think through tough issues. n230 In two recent high-profile examples of conflict over motor vehicle emissions regulation--Massachusetts v. EPA and the California CAA waiver dispute--the change in presidential administration during their ultimate resolution helped to shape more rigorous national approaches. These approaches will continue to evolve as the Obama Administration develops its regulatory approach more fully over time in collaboration with California and automobile companies and attempts to navigate the intense partisan politics of climate change. n231 However, as these examples illustrate, the Obama Administration will often need a mix of cooperation and conflict in this evolution over time to achieve effective multiscalar climate regulation; the conflict helps to air differences and to create pressure for action, while the cooperation allows for coordination and collaboration. In sum, an effective diagonal strategy could be developed further through a combination of approaches skewed in any of the four dimen [*288] sions. The key to creating the needed crosscutting interactions is to ensure that incentives for a variety of skews exist in a situationally appropriate fashion. Part IV examines what those incentives might be in the context of the Obama Administration's approach to motor vehicles regulation. It builds upon this Part's assessment of where skews lie in each of these dimensions to examine future possibilities for diagonal strategies in this area.