Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Neoclassical economics’ reliance on financialization and shareholder capitalism plunders the working class, guarantees economic, ideological, and analytic collapse.

Marszalek and Scarzec 22 – Pawel Marszalek is professor and Head of Department at Poznan University of Economics; Katarzyna Szarzec is a researcher and professor at Poznan University, [“The Good, the Bad or the Ugly: Financialization Through Heterodox and Mainstream Lenses”, Bank I Kredyt 54(3), 2023, 239-258, https://bankikredyt.nbp.pl/content/2023/03/BIK_03_2023_01.pdf]RA

The causes of financialization Bearing in mind this polarization of research methods and approaches, it is not surprising that no single determinant of financialization was identified and accepted as being the most important. Nor is it surprising that heterodox economists were those who paid more attention to financialization issues. They argued that when analysing the determinants of financialization it is necessary to consider a combination of many, mutually stimulating factors, both at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. The former refers to enterprises, households and specific markets, while the latter refers to the state’s decisions (i.e. those of governments and central banks) made in the area of social and economic policy, and regulations. The determinants of financialization identified by heterodox economists have often been divided into micro and macroeconomic ones (see e.g. Bhaduri 2011; Palley 2007). The micro causes of financialization can be further divided into changes in the structure and functioning of financial markets and changes in the behaviour of non-financial entities. Among the macro causes one might identify social and economic policy and socio-demographic factors. All the determinants are presented in Diagram 1, and the most important of them are briefly described below. At the very core of financialization stand financial innovations and technological changes that made it possible to trade money very quickly (Fiasanos, Guevarra, Pierros 2016). Technological factors (mainly IT technologies), leading to the so-called economy 4.0., were particularly eagerly used by financial institutions in projecting and distributing brand new types of financial instruments. Financial innovations (e.g. securitization and structured financial products like ABS, CDO’s or CDS), in turn, have played a key role in the development of recent financial practices. As Lapavitsas (2013) argues, innovations, financial liberalization, increasing pace and magnitude of financial transaction, speculative trading, asset securitization, shadow banking, internet finance, etc., have been shifting economic activities to financial markets (which has led to the gradual separation of finance from the real economy). All these factors have allowed the financial sector to overcome regulatory barriers and contributed significantly to the fast progress of financialization, both in individual countries and globally (Davis, Kim 2015; Pozsar, Singh 2011; Jurek, Marszałek 2014). Another boost to the creation of financial innovations was given by the liberalization of economies, which enabled massive capital flows. This process became visible in the US economy in the 1980s, and subsequently accelerated, with the Glass-Steagall Act being gradually relaxed by the Fed and eventually repealed in 1996. At the same time, US financial institutions, becoming increasingly active and aggressive in the global markets, lobbied for loose regulations (Komai, Richardson 2011). Finally, the reform of FDIC (The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) into FDICIA (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act) in 1991 institutionalized the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine (Komai, Richardson 2011) and increased incentives for moral hazard on the part of banks (see also Kregel, Tonvenarochi 2014; Orhangazi 2008; Toporowski 2010). The specific manifestations of financialization and, at the same time, its determinants, are also the aftermath of the following factors: the increase of the financial sector’s share in GDP (including banks and other financial institutions) as well as the increase of its share in total employment (Krippner 2005; Sawyer 2017). At the same time, it is also manifested in the high global penetration of financial institutions’ transactions among countries, the substantial financial penetration of developed countries into developing countries, and the faster growth rate of the total amount of international capital flows over the growth of world output (Bonizzi 2013). Among the microeconomic determinants of financialization connected with the activity of non- -financial agents, representatives of heterodoxy pointed to the increasingly important position of financial operations in the overall activity of non-financial enterprises. This means that financial 248 P. Marszałek, K. Szarzec products have become an element of the offer of these entities (Milberg 2008). Moreover, non-financial enterprises have started acting according to the ‘risk and return’ paradigm. Such phenomena as pharmacy financialization, commodity financialization, water financialization, financial talents, and financial investment funds controlling the scale of industrial capital, have gradually become more common (Basak, Pavlova 2016). As a result, a larger proportion of non-financial corporate profits was generated from financial channels (Krippner 2005). This was connected with another factor: the increased role of financial activities as a determinant of the pay packages of the top management of non-financial corporations. In particular this includes corporate CEOs, whose incentives shifted towards more risky decisions and financial investments (Lazonick 2013). When it comes to the macro determinants of financialization, the economic and social policies introduced in developed countries since the 1990s are indicated. They were a projection of the predominant neoliberalist worldview that contributed to market liberalization and subsequently to the acceleration of the supremacy of finance. Two terms – neoliberalism and financialization – became closely related in the political and economic debates. In particular, one should mention here the actions of policymakers being made in accordance with the principle of the limited role of the state in economic life6 (e.g. by departing from the welfare state doctrine and economic interventionism, to liberalization, privatization, and changes in pension systems). Those actions resulted in making the labour market more flexible (e.g. by weakening the role of trade unions, limiting the level of the minimum wage and unemployment benefits), rigorous price stability, and promoting globalization by the liberalization of capital flows and macroprudential policy (Palley 2012; Hein 2012; Toporowski 2010). Some of the macro determinants are connected with institutional changes, such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the expansion of flexible exchange rates, the full dominance of fiat money within monetary regimes, the new political agendas set forth by Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s, as well as the creation of the ECB (gradually) leading to central bank independence, zero inflation targeting, and the abandonment of the goal of full employment in favour of the so- -called New Consensus Monetary Policy (Arestis, Sawyer 2005). These processes brought about a clear deflationary policy bias in central banks (Palley 1996). At the same time, the tendency towards free market orientation was succeeded by a policy regime in which fiscal instruments played a critical role in economic activity, which additionally created demand for financial instruments. It is worth noticing that many of the described micro and macroeconomic causes of financialization were a consequence of applying the principles and recommendations (and ideological optics) of mainstream economics in practice. Thus, one might say that mainstream ideas contributed in a way to spreading and fostering financialization. For mainstream economists, the growth of the financial sector is a natural process of market development and tends to bring benefits for the economic system as a whole. They were aware of financialization but did not perceive the phenomenon as a problem in any way. Quite the contrary, they supported the development of finance as being consistent with the mainstream theories and their policy recommendations (based on the New Neoclassical Synthesis). It would be an oversimplification to state that mainstream economists did not devote much attention to the causes of financialization. It would be rather more accurate to say that they perceived those causes from a completely different perspective than did heterodox economics. They regarded them not as factors contributing to the harmful and disastrous phenomenon of financialization, 6 Yet, the role of the state (government) in financialization is rather ambiguous and very complex (see Ratajczak 2020). The good, the bad or the ugly... 249 but rather as factors allowing for the introduction of a desirable mainstream political agenda. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, one might state that both theoretical strains of theories agree on the causes of financialization. The difference lies in their perceptions of financialization and its consequences: mainstream economists treat it and its effects as a natural economic phenomenon,7 while heterodox economists focus on its harmful nature and negative effects. 5. The effects of financialization It should come as no surprise that the effects of financialization are multifaceted and complex. The main effect is the importance of financial institutions and markets, and their growing autonomy in relation to the rest of the economy (including supervisory and monetary authorities). Among heterodox economists it is believed that the effects of financialization are purely negative. According to them, it generates serious problems that are economic and social in nature. In the first case, the process has: complicated business activities outside the financial sector and contributed to a greater dependence of economic entities on what happens on volatile financial markets; shortened the time horizon of economic decisions; created the pressure to undertake risky ventures; and accelerated the pace of economic life. Under such circumstances, enterprises (especially small and medium-sized ones) and households depend to a large extent on the financial system, and modify their activities according to the requirements of financial institutions that provide them with financial services.8 Those entities also embody a specific “financial culture” and behaviour. Financialization also involves the complicated activities of policy makers and financial supervision institutions. It became increasingly difficult to enforce the prudential compliance of financial institutions due to the blurring of differences between types of financial institutions, the emergence of large financial holdings, the use of various “creative” accounting techniques, and the extensive use of financial engineering. Moreover, the growing burden of public debt has also made many governments dependent on funds raised in financial markets. Governments have, in a way, become “hostages” to financial institutions. Implementing monetary policy has also become more complicated, as financialization has changed the institutional foundations of money creation, the form and nature of money, and the relationship between a central bank and commercial banks. All these economic consequences of financialization were reflected in the following three processes: the weakening of economic growth (Assa 2012; Jayadev, Epstein 2005), the changing shape of the business cycle (Palley 2007), and the growing vulnerability of economies to financial crises, with the most expressive manifestation of this being the Global Financial Crisis 2007–2009 (Hein, Detzer, Dodig 2016; Toporowski 2010). Financialization also generates serious problems of a social nature. It creates specific attitudes, previously inherent only in the market economy, particularly in its aggressive variant. This in turn, contributes to social exclusion (Lavoie 2013), increases inequalities in society (Kedrosky, Stangler 2011; Sawyer 2017), causes unfavourable tendencies in the structure of wages and their amount (Orhangazi 2008; Palley 2012) and promotes egoistic, extremely utilitarian attitudes (Fine 2013). While heterodox economists are very critical of financialization, the mainstream, as was already mentioned, usually praised financialization, suggesting it contributed to increasing the overall prosperity through so-called ‘financial deepening’ (development of financial markets and instruments). For them, financialization is a manifestation of market efficiency and the effective allocation of resources.9 Financialization was also praised as a factor conducive to globalization – which for mainstream economists is clearly a positive process – and a remedy for the so-called ‘financial repression’ hypothesis (Shaw 1973). The deregulated and liberalised financial markets following (but also accompanying) financialization were greeted with the approval of mainstream economists, the World Bank and the IMF, becoming a key part of the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990). Those institutional solutions were recommended for implementation as a part of the financial systems reforms package for developing countries, aiming at getting ‘interest rates right’ (World Bank 1989). Deeper and liberalized financial markets, larger financial institutions operating on the supranational level, and the intense financial activity of non-financial entities, were welcomed as a new, successful stage of the capitalist economy. With the so-called Great Moderation (Bernanke 2004) in the global (and especially the US) economy since the mid-1980s and the triumph of free market liberal democracy, this finance-led capitalism, approved in a way by mainstream economists, appeared to be good for the whole economy as well as for individual agents. Mainstream economists also praise and support the impressive increase in private households’ stock market participation – even through institutional investors rather than direct ownership. They described it as the ‘democratization of ownership’, and as ‘shareholder’ capitalism. Therefore, all the arguments in favour of allegedly negative financial attitudes and behaviour were rejected. Instead, they argued that greater involvement in financial investments and operation might rather be interpreted as a manifestation of rationality and seeking the best investment decision. Such an optimistic perception of financialization and its effects, presented by mainstream economists, was undermined by the outbreak of the global financial crisis. It brought about profound changes in the financial systems and the real economy in many countries, changes in the hierarchy of financial institutions, and decreased trust in banks and other financial institutions. These shed new light on the conditions necessary to ensure economic stability. Importantly, mainstream economists finally admitted that it was financialization and the processes and phenomena connected with it, identified and described by heterodox economists, which were the cause of the crisis. According to Vercelli (2019), the consensus point of view of mainstream economics on the causes of the crisis was that: – the subprime crisis triggered a “bank run” in the shadow banking system; – the effects of this bank run were rapidly transmitted and amplified by the new “originate and distribute” model of banking, which created incentive problems; – the excessive risk generated by the two abovementioned factors contributed to the collapse of the world financial system. These problems, however, have not been treated as contrary to the mainstream agenda. As Mishkin (2010) pointed out, “none of the lessons from the financial crisis in any way undermines or invalidates the […] basic principles of the science of monetary policy developed before the crisis.” Yet, as Vercelli (2019) stresses, after the initial critical self-evaluation of mainstream economics, the criticism started to fade rather fast in favour of a re-assertion of its validity, and since 2010 the financial system has been progressively discharged of its responsibilities. The crisis came to be explained as an aftermath of some mistakes in economic and social policy, and the result of some factors deviating from mainstream recommendations on organization and functioning of the financial and economic system, not as the consequence of the flaws in the overall mainstream programme. Heterodox economists, on the other hand, for several reasons, were not able to impose their narrative and convincingly express and explain the problems brought about by financialization.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.