Neoclassical economic models rely on specific market conditions to demonstrate any reliability – not only are these models unrealistically utopian, but they exacerbate inequalities by dismissing any challenge.
Ackerman and Beggs 2013 – editor @ Jacobin and editor at Jacobin and a lecturer in political economy at the University of Sydney
Seth Ackerman and Mike Beggs 09.03.2013 “Don’t Mention the War” https://jacobin.com/2013/09/dont-mention-the-war
But beyond the abstract debates over ethical systems or the narrow empirical disputes, the picture that emerged from this noisy exchange was, if you looked closely enough, one of broad agreement over certain unspoken fundamentals. Mainstream economics, despite its image of bloodless scientism — and despite its own denials — possesses what can properly be called a unified “social vision”: a coherent moral-philosophical account of how our society works, and how it ought to work. This is not an economic theory that dispenses some uniform set of policy conclusions. It’s a meta-theory. And this meta-theory is almost universally shared by both liberal and conservative economists. Like many philosophers, economists begin their story by imagining a fictional utopia. Mankiw calls it the “classical benchmark.” But there are other names for it — “the standard competitive model,” “perfect markets,” “an Arrow-Debreu world.” The central principle of this utopia is that it’s an absolutely free market: a pure night-watchman state, with no restrictions on voluntary exchange between self-interested individuals, hence no minimum wages or rent controls, and no income taxes. It’s further assumed that in such a market, everyone earns the marginal product of their labor — or, as Mankiw puts it, “compensation congruent with their contributions.” Now, ever since its birth more than a century ago, there’s been debate about whether the theory of marginal productivity actually constitutes an ethical theory of just deserts, as Mankiw believes. Certainly several of its late nineteenth-century architects agreed with him, seeing the doctrine’s conservative implications as one of its main attractions — most famously John Bates Clark, one of the founders of the American Economic Association. The theory holds that under perfect markets, competition will drive the market wage for a given type of worker toward that worker’s marginal productivity, which can be defined as the amount of revenue a firm would lose, due to foregone output, if one such worker were removed from production. (An analogous process involving the “marginal product of capital” is said to determine the profit rate.) Figures like Clark and Mankiw have held that this marginal increment of revenue can be regarded as the worker’s “contribution” to production, thus legitimating her wage. Others, such as Alfred Marshall, have seen this last step as an ethical leap of logic, since the theory itself points to a whole range of factors that will help determine a worker’s marginal product but have nothing to do with her own personal actions or attributes: fluctuations in the prices of various goods, the structure of demand, random shifts such as harvests or the weather, technological changes inside or outside the worker’s own industry. And, of course, the theory says nothing about how individuals acquired their endowment of factors (labor or capital) in the first place, or why the alleged contribution of capital should be regarded as the contribution of its owner. But whether or not it actually does justify capitalist income distribution, the marginal productivity theory certainly sounds like an ethical theory — especially to impressionable freshmen in lecture halls or traveling businessmen browsing the op-ed page. As Mankiw’s textbook puts it, in answer to Ricardo’s classic question: “We can now explain how much income goes to labor, how much goes to landowners, and how much goes to the owners of capital. . . . Labor, land, and capital each earn the value of their marginal contribution to the production process.” For eight decades, starting in the 1870s, many of the finest minds of economics tried to prove mathematically that if this imaginary perfect free-market economy did exist, it would be both rational and beneficent; that through the blind workings of the free market, supply and demand for every good would spontaneously match and the results would be desirable. (Or at least they tried to discover what conditions would be necessary to guarantee that outcome.) The culmination of that work, in Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu’s Nobel Prize-winning 1954 proof, was long seen by many as the profession’s defining achievement. Arrow and Debreu proved that such an economy would always contain at least one potential configuration of prices and products in which supply and demand would match in every market, and that this configuration would be “optimal,” in the sense that no one could be made better off without someone else being made worse off. This is where the neoclassicals derive their moral-philosophical vision of society: they posit a quasi-metaphysical thought experiment in which our real-life capitalist economy is held up as merely a messy, imperfect copy of the perfect benchmark. Then they stipulate that we can never really deem anything in our own economy unsatisfactory (“suboptimal”) without first showing that it results from some specific divergence from the fictional utopia. The logic of this move is impeccable: since the pure-market model produces optimal results on paper, those who claim our own society falls short must identify the specific impurity at fault. The same goes for wages, which must be assumed equal to marginal productivity — “congruent to contribution” — unless a specific “distortion” or “imperfection” can be documented. In the words of Franklin Fisher, an eminent MIT theorist, the theorems underpinning this thought experiment constitute “the central set of propositions that economists have to offer the outside world — propositions that are, in a real sense, the foundations of Western capitalism. . . . They underlie all the looser statements about the desirability of a free-market system.” Politically, the communicants of this faith divide sharply over the question of how often “imperfections” actually occur in real life — and therefore how much human meddling in nature’s plan should be allowed. For example, Professor Mark Thoma, a Paul Krugman-style liberal with an influential economics blog, strenuously disputes the idea that markets are always the best solution: “There is nothing special about markets per se — they can perform very badly in some circumstances. It is competitive markets that are magic.” Some free-market policies could actually be harmful: they could “move the outcome further from the ideal competitive benchmark rather than closer to it.” This is where the discipline’s technocratic and philosophical sides collide: any policy proposal may be advocated; but the moral-philosophical framework must be respected. We can fail the model, but the model can never fail. And yet the model does fail. All models in social science are unrealistic. But the “ideal competitive benchmark” (the Arrow-Debreu world and its family of general equilibrium models) is not just unrealistic. It depicts a world that is neither possible nor imaginable — and yet it is also undesirable. Here are some of its assumptions: All markets must be perfectly competitive (whereas most of ours are not); if such a world existed, the requirement of perfect competition would rule out any division of labor or long-run economic growth. There must be an infinite number of futures markets — one for every good in existence, delivered at every future date, for the rest of time. And yet, in the model, time doesn’t really exist: all economic decisions for all of human history were made in an auction at the beginning of the world. Moreover, far from being harmonious, this theoretical world has been discovered to be chaotic — perpetually in random motion, never actually arriving at any of its “optimal” configurations except by accident. This finding alone nullifies the very meaning of the theory. That is why some of the leading theorists who developed these models — towering figures like Frank Hahn and Kenneth Arrow — use words like “sterile,” “arid” and “empty” to describe them. Yet this is the benchmark — the light in the sky by which our ships are supposed to be guided. Counterfactuals play a useful role in any science. But the model on which economists claim to base so many judgments is not a counterfactual. It describes a state of the world that could never actually exist, and would be undesirable if it could. Such judgments, and the entire intellectual framework that generates them, represent not scientific conclusions, but a system of belief — no more true or false than the statement “Man is born free but is everywhere in chains.” This belief system — this social vision underlying mainstream economics — is deeply flawed. Its analytical foundations are broken and its moral vision venerates as its highest ideal an impossible laissez-faire dystopia. We need to seek our vision from other sources.