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A carbon tax directly promotes neoclassical economics by initiating an incentive structure to individuals through market interaction. The assumption of perfect substitution ignores structural factors preventing adoption, guaranteeing more emissions.

Towler 19 – [Markey‐Towler, Brendan: Researcher, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia. Author of An Architecture of the Mind: A Psychological Foundation for the Science of Everyday Life (2018). PhD from the University of Queensland, Australia with a thesis entitled Foundations for Economic Analysis: The Architecture of Socioeconomic Complexity, advised by Professors John Foster, Peter Earl and Michelle Baddeley. Email: brendan.markeytowler@uqconnect.edu.au. "The new microeconomics: A psychological, institutional, and evolutionary paradigm with neoclassical economics as a special case." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 78.1 (2019): 95-135. Ghs – ib]

The new paradigm of psychological economics not only advances our understanding of socioeconomic systems from an institutional-evolutionary perspective. It also has significant practical value in improving the formulation and implementation of strategy and policy. It expands the means by which policy and strategy may be implemented, shows why traditional incentive-based methods may be limited, and proposes alternative or complementary methods. One such method has a readily applicable and simple algorithmic structure (Markey-Towler 2017, 2018a). We can see its practical value by applying it to some microeconomic policy problems. Predicates of Privatization: Institutional and Technological Knowledge Applying a psychological and institutional-evolutionary approach to the problem of privatization, we readily discover the truth of what Intriligator (1994) suggested with respect to the former Soviet Union: the success of shock therapy and especially privatization was predicated on a range of non-incentive factors. Without them, the predictions of incentives based neoclassical economics would not hold. There was no state of substitutability between modes of behavior in a Communist system and in a free-market system. Specifically, there was little knowledge of how to enter into markets with new businesses to challenge monopolies. In order for competition to operate, ex-Soviet citizens needed time to develop the knowledge of how to make use of Western production technology and how to meet regulatory requirements. They also need a relatively stable regulatory system, but that was not forthcoming. Even more basically, they needed knowledge of how to operate within the new legal system, but it first had to be formulated. In other words, there was insufficient knowledge of the radically new institutions within the former Soviet bloc, and the institutional system was too unstable for states of substitutability to exist between prior modes of socioeconomic behavior and new modes for any sort of meaningful competition to develop. The newly freed market failed to emerge before state capture occurred. The incentives-based neoclassical theory was not "wrong,” but it was rendered moot, for the necessary preconditions had not been established. If we take the Australian experience of privatization, now we see reasons why it was, relatively positive, while still mixed. The Australian regulatory and legal environment was stable for the period of privatization. Reforms were extensively debated in public and systematically planned before being implemented. Nevertheless, while knowledge was available of the technologies that allowed new entrants to markets, knowledge of how to apply them effectively was insufficient to guarantee a state of substitutability between previous modes of behavior in a monopolistic market and a competitive market. It is no small matter to go into competition with a major ex-government telecommunications monopoly like Telstra. One must have vast resources before being able to meet the requirements imposed by customers for telecommunications services, let alone provide complementarities like landline, mobile and internet packages. Or take the Big Four banks that monopolize the financial market, including the ex-government Commonwealth Bank. Regulatory requirements alone make it prohibitive for new banks to enter the market, and the only real competition they have encountered has come from allowing other financial institutions to offer banking services. Notwithstanding the ability to develop the requisite institutional knowledge to compete with newly privatized monopolies, technological and logistical knowledge are also essential before the incentives-based neoclassical theory could be applied to predict an increase of efficiency from privatization. Incentive-based neoclassical economic theory is not wrong so much as it is incomplete. That theory assumed a state of substitutability between behavior in a heavily nationalized economy and in a privatized economy that was open to competition. But it did not exist in reality because the institutional structure of society was too disrupted and unsettled for the requisite knowledge of how and why to behave in new ways to emerge. The failure to apply a psychological institutional-evolutionary economic perspective in both the Soviet and Australian experience left massive, inefficient institutions more or less unchallenged by competition. Effective Climate Policy = Markets x Technology x Framing Policies to produce emissions of greenhouse gases provides another arena in which to compare competing theoretical perspectives. Incentives-based neoclassical theory provides a disarmingly simple suggestion to solve this problem. To align private incentives and a given policy, neoclassical theory proposes to tax emissions directly, or to put a price on emissions to reveal the "true" incentive structure to individuals through market interaction. This is straightforward neoclassical economics. But rational choice theory about incentives is predicated on the theory of substitution, and there is no reason to assume that a state of substitution exists between existing technologies that create emissions and new technologies that do not. In Australia, neoclassical economics was directly applied to the formulation of climate change policy. An incentives-based policy was adopted, in which a tax was introduced (later to become a floating price) on carbon emissions, to be compensated by transfers (Jotzo 2012). Standard incentives-based modelling by Meng, Siriwardana, and McNeill (2012) predicted that the change of incentives would cause a substitution away from emissions-intensive industries with a mild economic contraction accompanying it. The policy was repealed after a change of government and replaced with a “command and control” policy, but the results from its brief existence suggest that the policy did not have the predicted outcomes. Carbon emissions increased by several megatons, even while household electricity prices increased by at least 10 percent (Robson 2014). This does not even account for an earlier price rise likely brought about by an uncertain policy environment. This is not especially difficult to understand with our psychological institutional-evolutionary perspective. Electricity is a necessity for most households and businesses, and they require a certain quanta of it regardless of prices (unless those prices become prohibitive). But there was no readily available substitute technology in Australia by which that electricity might be produced without incurring a substantial tax on emissions. The critical assumption of substitutability, on which neoclassical analysis in favor of the tax was based, was incorrect. The technologies exist by which emissions might be reduced (natural gas, solar, wind, water), but they were not adopted, in part due to regulated requirements of security, resilience and redundancy across the system, as well as simple, but massive infrastructure requirements imposed by engineering concerns. It may have been the case, were the tax implemented for longer, that such technologies might have emerged, though one might be rightly skeptical, since only a half-hearted attempt was made to stimulate and encourage investment in a renewable energy sector. Yet a further barrier to incentives-based policy existed which one would only notice by adopting a psychological institutional-evolutionary perspective. This is the problem of framing. Without the environment having been framed in such a way that households and business could substitute between electricity suppliers, all neoclassical incentive-based considerations were moot. Changing electricity suppliers is no small matter in Australia. It only became possible in the decade before the carbon tax was introduced, and the bureaucratic entanglements alone were a nightmare. Furthermore, there were few means of comparing supply contracts (which can be complex even for persons with knowledge of the market). That might have constrained perception of the possibility of changing suppliers. The Australian government made no effort to frame the environment of households and businesses in a way that they could perceive the possibility of substitution to a low-emissions supplier. Without that possibility, all theories about substitution from high to low emissions technologies were entirely moot. Once again, the incentives-based neoclassical theory of how one might respond to climate change was not wrong but rather incomplete. The assumption of substitutability upon which it was predicated was not met in reality due to regulatory and engineering requirements, and very little consideration was given to framing choices so that consumers could consider alternative electricity supply technologies. The results of not considering a psychological institutional-evolutionary perspective on the socioeconomic system were that many families, especially poorer ones, faced higher electricity prices, and very little was achieved by way of emissions reduction.

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