Reject neoclassical models for addressing climate change – they are self-referential and intentional exclude datasets and climate scientists from their studies to establish their conclusions
Keen 2020 – University College London
Steve Keen “The appallingly bad neoclassical economics of climate change” Globalizations · September 2020 DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2020.1807856
Nordhaus conducted the only two surveys of ‘expert opinions’ to estimate the impact of global warming on GDP, in 1994 (Nordhaus, 1994a), and 2017 (Nordhaus & Moffat, 2017). The former asked people from various academic backgrounds to give their estimates of the impact on GDP of three global warming scenarios: (A) a 3°C rise by 2090; (B) a 6°C rise by 2175; and (C) a 6°C rise by 2090. The numbers used by the IPCC from this study in Figure 1 were a 3°C temperature rise for a 3.6% fall in GDP. Expert opinions are a valid procedure to aggregate knowledge in areas that require a large number of disparate fields to be aggregated, as the climate scientist Tim Lenton and co-authors explained in their paper ‘Tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system’ (Lenton et al., 2008): formal elicitations of expert beliefs have frequently been used to bring current understanding of model studies, empirical evidence, and theoretical considerations to bear on policy-relevant variables. From a natural science perspective, a general criticism is that expert beliefs carry subjective biases and, moreover, do not add to the body of scientific knowledge unless verified by data or theory. Nonetheless, expert elicitations, based on rigorous protocols from statistics and risk analysis, have proved to be a very valuable source of information in public policymaking. It is increasingly recognized that they can also play a valuable role for informing climate policy decisions. (Lenton et al., 2008, p. 1791) I cite this paper in contrast to Nordhaus’s here for two reasons: (1) it shows how expert opinion surveys should be conducted; (2) Nordhaus later cites this survey in support of his use of a ‘damage function’ for climate change which lacks tipping points, when this survey explicitly rejects such functions. Lenton et al.’s survey was sent to 193 scientists, of whom 52 responded. Respondents were specifically instructed to stick to their area of knowledge, rather than to speculate more broadly: ‘Participants were encouraged to remain in their area of expertise’ (Lenton et al., 2008, p. 10). These are listed in Table 2. Nordhaus’s survey began with a letter requesting 22 people to participate, 18 of whom fully complied, and one partially. Nordhaus describes them as including 10 economists, 4 ‘other social scientists’, and 5 ‘natural scientists and engineers’, but also notes that eight of the economists come from ‘other subdisciplines of economics (those whose principal concerns lie outside environmental economics)’ (Nordhaus, 1994a, p. 48). This, ipso facto, should rule them out from taking part in this expert survey in the first place. One of them was Larry Summers, who is probably the source of the choicest quotes in the paper, such as ‘For my answer, the existence value [of species] is irrelevant – I don’t care about ants except for drugs’ (Nordhaus, 1994a, p. 50). Lenton’s survey combined the expertise of its interviewees in specific fields of climate change to compile a list of large elements of the planet’s climatic system (>1000 km in extent) which could be triggered into a qualitative change of state by increases in global temperature of between 0.5°C (disappearance of Arctic summer sea ice) and 6°C (amplified En Nino causing drought in Southeast Asia and elsewhere), on timescales varying from 10 years (Arctic summer sea ice) to 300 years (West Antarctic Ice Shelf disintegration) (Lenton et al., 2008, p. 1788). Nordhaus’s survey was summarized by a superficially bland pair of numbers – 3°C temperature rise and a 3.6% fall in GDP – but that summary hides far more than it reveals. There was extensive disagreement, well documented by Nordhaus, between the relatively tiny cohort of actual scientists surveyed, and, in particular, the economists ‘whose principal concerns lie outside environmental economics’. The quotes from the economists surveyed also reveal the source of the predisposition by economists in general to dismiss the significance of climate change. As Nordhaus noted, ‘Natural scientists’ estimates [of the damages from climate change] were 20– 30 times higher than mainstream economists’’ (Nordhaus, 1994a, p. 49). The average estimate by ‘Non-environmental economists’ (Nordhaus, 1994a, Figure 4, p. 49) of the damages to GDP a 3° C rise by 2090 was 0.4% of GDP; the average for natural scientists was 12.3%, and this was with one of them refusing to answer Nordhaus’s key questions: Also, although the willingness of the respondents to hazard estimates of subjective probabilities was encouraging, it should be emphasized that most respondents proffered these estimates with reservations and a recognition of the inherent difficulty of the task. One respondent (19), however, was a holdout from such guesswork, writing: I must tell you that I marvel that economists are willing to make quantitative estimates of economic consequences of climate change where the only measures available are estimates of global surface average increases in temperature. As [one] who has spent his career worrying about the vagaries of the dynamics of the atmosphere, I marvel that they can translate a single global number, an extremely poor surrogate for a description of the climatic conditions, into quantitative estimates of impacts of global economic conditions. (Nordhaus, 1994a, pp. 50–51) Comments from economists lay at the other end of the spectrum from this self-absented scientist. Because they had a strong belief in the ability of ‘human societies’ to adapt – born of their acceptance of the Neoclassical model of capitalism, in which ‘the economy’ always returns to equilibrium after a ‘exogenous shock’ – they could not imagine that climate change could do significant damage to the economy, whatever it might do to the biosphere itself: One respondent suggested whimsically that it was hardly surprising, given that the economists know little about the intricate web of natural ecosystems, whereas natural scientists know equally little about the incredible adaptability of human societies… There is a clear difference in outlook among the respondents, depending on their assumptions about the ability of society to adapt to climatic changes. One was concerned that society’s response to the approaching millennium would be akin to that prevalent during the Dark Ages, whereas another respondent held that the degree of adaptability of human economies is so high that for most of the scenarios the impact of global warming would be “essentially zero”. An economist explains that in his view energy and brain power are the only limits to growth in the long run, and with sufficient quantities of these it is possible to adapt or develop new technologies so as to prevent any significant economic costs. (Nordhaus, 1994a, pp. 48–49; all emphases added) Given this extreme divergence of opinion between economists and scientists, one might imagine that Nordhaus’s next survey would examine the reasons for it. In fact, the opposite applied: his methodology excluded non-economists entirely. Rather than a survey of experts, this was a literature survey (Nordhaus & Moffat, 2017), which ipso facto is another legitimate method to provide data for a topic subject that is difficult to measure, and subject to high uncertainty. He and his co-author searched for relevant articles using the string ‘(damage OR impact) AND climate AND cost’ (Nordhaus & Moffat, 2017, p. 7), which is reasonable, if too broad (as they admit in the paper). The key flaw in this research was where they looked: they executed their search string in Google, which returned 64 million results, Google Scholar, which returned 2.8 million, and the economics specific database Econlit, which returned just 1700 studies. On the grounds that there were too many results in Google and Google Scholar, they ignored those results, and simply surveyed the 1700 articles in Econlit (Nordhaus & Moffat, 2017, p. 7). These are, almost exclusively, articles written by economists.