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Carbon Taxation originates from a neoclassical perspective that focuses on internalizing the externalities of climate change. Despite appeals to social and political change, neoclassicism fails to understand the social conditions in which the 1AC is situated. It crowds out individuals’ intrinsic motivation to engage in climate-friendly activities, contributing to political polarization in response to conservative opposition

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[Jakob, Michael, et al. "Understanding different perspectives on economic growth and climate policy." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 11.6 (2020): e677., ]

The neoclassical perspective focusses on the concept of internalizing externalities related to climate change mitigation. This conceptualization of climate policy suggests that assuming otherwise perfectly operating markets, implementing a tax at the level of the marginal social costs of the externality—in line with the classical analysis of Pigou (1920)—will lead economic agents to reduce the externality to the socially optimal level. Among economists, the notion that the GHG externality constitutes the perhaps greatest externality the world has ever seen is increasingly gaining acceptance (Stern, 2008). Despite the intense debate on whether carbon taxation or emission trading is the better option to internalize this externality (Goulder & Parry, 2008), broad consensus among climate economists and even beyond about carbon pricing being the most important climate policy instrument prevails (Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2017; IPCC, 2014). This is due to its feature of incentivizing all available mitigation options in a cost-efficient way by setting harmonized marginal cost of abatement that would ensure the lowest cost options are used. In contrast, all other policy instruments would either only incentivize some subset of available mitigation options, or might trigger implementation of more costly options. It is also widely accepted among environmental economists that additional market failures (e.g., in innovation markets) can justify additional policy instruments such as subsidies for low-carbon technology R&D or deployment (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005). In terms of governance, the central agent in this perspective is the nation state, assumed of being capable of implementing welfare-maximizing policy instruments (Dorsch & Flachsland, 2017). To address international free-riding concerns resulting from the global commons nature of the climate problem, the importance of international agreement to ensure cooperation is emphasized. The difficulty of overcoming the free-rider effect is reflected in the slow progress of international climate negotiations. Critiques have pointed out the neoclassical perspective fails to take into account the social conditions necessary for the implementation of its recommendations. This concerns in particular the various constraints central state actors are facing due to opposition by vested interest groups. For instance, Ervine (2018) depicts carbon markets as “expressions of specific power relations rooted in the political economy of advanced capitalism, with low prices ensuring minimal disruption to business as usual”. Carbon pricing is also sometimes critically regarded as inhibiting fundamental social and political changes (Gunderson, Stuart, & Petersen, 2018) and crowding out individuals’ intrinsic motivation to engage in climate-friendly activities (Jakob, Kübler, Steckel, & van Veldhuizen, 2017). The main critique of the view of policy instruments to internalize environmental externalities is that much broader measures are required to tackle the fundamental problems related to climate change mitigation and human well-being. For instance, Jacobs and Mazzucato (2016) have argued that “[p]ublic policies are not ‘interventions’ in the economy, as if markets existed independently of the public institutions and social and environmental conditions in which they are embedded”. At an abstract level and in the long-term, degrowth proponents aim at undermining the legitimacy of the current “rules of the game” (see Section 5.3) through academic and cultural critique, with a view to establishing radical future alternatives with significantly diminished constraints to strong climate policy (Kallis et al., 2018). These include critiques of capitalism and its core drivers of social and environmental crises (domination, profit, and accumulation) (Gunderson et al., 2018). In this regard, policies aiming at altering the dynamics driving GDP growth and GHG emissions are advocated. Salient examples include policies and governance reforms addressing consumerism, inequality, and excessive luxury consumption, campaign finance, and lobbying reform, reductions in work hours, and growth dependencies. It has been pointed out that welfare states tend to depend on economic growth to finance increasing pension and healthcare spending (Bailey, 2015), especially in countries with an aging population. To avoid contradictions between fiscal and environmental sustainability, modifications to consumption, and work policies within integrated “eco-welfare states” have been proposed (Gough, 2016). From the perspective of sustainable investment, divestment campaigns are considered as a promising means to change financial market outcomes as well as societal norms (Braungardt, van den Bergh, & Dunlop, 2019). Fundamental norm and value changes are suggested as prerequisites for ambitious climate and sustainability policy (Green, 2018). In terms of governance approach, direct democracy approaches are highly valued (Kallis et al., 2018). A critical perspective of these proposals might point out that their broader adoption will simply take too long to solve the imminent climate problem, even if eventually successful. Also, linking the climate and broader degrowth agendas may intensify opposition to climate policy from more conservative constituencies and intensify political polarization instead of reducing it. Hence, one could argue in favor of policies directly aimed at emission reductions instead of aiming for more fundamental social, institutional, and political changes.

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