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Economic growth under a neoclassical model promotes asset bubbles, predatory loans, debt, and economic collapse through methodological individualism and financialization.

Marszalek and Scarzec 22 – Pawel Marszalek is professor and Head of Department at Poznan University of Economics; Katarzyna Szarzec is a researcher and professor at Poznan University, [“The Good, the Bad or the Ugly: Financialization Through Heterodox and Mainstream Lenses”, Bank I Kredyt 54(3), 2023, 239-258, https://bankikredyt.nbp.pl/content/2023/03/BIK_03_2023_01.pdf]RA

Regardless of some differences, within heterodox economics the core features of financialization were identified. Apart from the dominance of the financial sector in the economy, the following processes and phenomena can be indicated as more detailed distinguishing features (Brown, Spencer 2011; Hein 2012; Sawyer 2014): (1) the popularization and rapid expansion of financial markets; (2) the deregulation of financial systems and individual economies; (3) an ever-expanding range of financial instruments and institutions; (4) decisions in the field of economic and social policy favouring the development of financial markets; (5) an increase in credit sustained consumption; (6) the widespread and growing presence of institutions, instrument markets, and financial schemes in economic and social life, and (7) the development of a specific (individualistic, pro-market, utilitarian) financial culture. Those features of financialization have subsequently been analysed by other heterodox economists. As an empirical substantiation of those features, four stylized facts are usually proposed (Mavroudeas, Papadatos 2018): 1. The increased weight of the financial sector in contemporary advanced capitalist economies, exhibited in the increased share of this sector in GDP and profits, along with the proliferation and widespread use of new complex financial instruments (e.g. derivatives); 2. Big firms finance themselves through retained earnings and capital markets (rather than through banks), and the emergence of ‘shadow banking’; 3. The widespread adoption by firms of policies of shareholder value maximization that focus on enriching shareholders rather than addressing the productive prospects of any given enterprise. This reflects the rise in the prominence of institutional investors; 4. The increased indebtedness of working- and middle-class households in several advanced capitalist economies. Those stylized facts were developed and discussed along with formulated hypotheses, concerning, for example, the determinants and effects of financialization. Importantly, heterodox economics remains highly sceptical and wary of financialization and, as will be further elaborated, its consequences for society, political systems and domestic economies. As mentioned previously, in contrast to heterodox economists, mainstream economists did not initially view financialization as an interesting research topic. They tended to label this new environment, in which financial markets predominate over the outcomes of goods and factor markets, as ‘financial’ or ‘finance’ capitalism (DeLong 1991; Neal 1990). At best, mainstream economics 5 These issues are beyond the scope of the paper. One should mention only that different attitudes are presented by post- -Keynesians, Marxists, and evolutionary economists, among others. The good, the bad or the ugly... 243 noticed the phenomenon, but treated it as a natural form of market adjustment, in principle beneficial to the economy. Surprisingly, as Mavroudeas and Papadatos (2018) point out, mainstream economists abruptly dropped the inhibition of general equilibrium theory concerning a large financial sector, arguing instead that such a phenomenon contributes to economic growth (e.g. King, Levine 1993). They also praised the expanded role of capital markets, arguing that market-based financial systems are more efficient and less risky than bank-based ones. One might even say that mainstream economics, stuck in the assumptions of a new neoclassical synthesis, missed the systemic changes in the economy, brought about by a rapid development of the financial sector. A disregard for financialization was a part of the wider problem – the mainstream theories and models failed to keep up with the rapid and profound changes in the economy resulting from, among other things, technical progress. As Ratajczak (2012) emphasizes, the radical changes in the financial sphere and the entire economic world were not accompanied by adequate changes in the foundations of thinking about the functioning of the market economy. Thus, the main problem of mainstream economics was that it stayed in the circle of beliefs originating from neoclassical economics, which had been formulated in completely different institutional conditions, when society was very different. 3. General assumptions and research methods Such a remarkable discrepancy between the two theoretical approaches to financialization, as signalled in the previous section was, to a large extent, the consequence of the accepted assumptions and the applied research methods. Different attitudes and methods for analysing financialization resulted in different conclusions and perceptions of finance growth. The representatives of heterodoxy considered financial markets and capitalist societies to be inherently unstable. The acceleration and proliferation of financial institutions and instruments, along with financial engineering and changes in the money creation mechanisms available in the contemporary economy, were assumed to generate imbalances and lead to a deterioration in the structure of economic agents’ incentives, thus hampering the functioning of the economy. Various strains of heterodoxy analysed different aspects of those issues. For instance, post-Keynesians (e.g. Minsky) stressed that the fundamental uncertainty of agents’ decisions, financial investors’ tendency towards speculation, the procyclicality of credit extension are sources of financial crises. Marxists introduced research on power and class relations, and considered their impact on economic interactions in the face of financialization. Institutionalists focused, in turn, on how institutions (organisations, conventions and, more generally, rules) influence economic interaction. Taking those aspects into account, heterodox economists described financialization – its sources, nature, process, and consequences – in a rather narrative-oriented manner, without the use of formal models or advanced quantitative research. Above all, they tried to capture and understand the essence of this phenomenon in a broader economic and social context. They believed that mathematics – typical of mainstream economics – only simplified the real picture and led to false conclusions, especially with reference to such complex issues as financial and monetary areas. As a consequence, in heterodox works, issues connected with financialization have not been thoroughly operationalized and modelled econometrically. The narrative approach, which combines 244 P. Marszałek, K. Szarzec one’s own narrative of historical events, tends to dominate (Shiller 2019), or only descriptive statistics of any given times series are presented, without any rigorous econometric analysis. In contrast, mainstream economists present a rigorous mathematical and quantitative apparatus which in many cases demands adopting very strong (even counterfactual) assumptions on the market structure and behaviour of economic agents. Believing in the portfolio theory and the theory of efficient markets, they perceive markets and financial systems as always efficient and sustainable, and individual agents as rational. Therefore, the development of financial markets and the growing importance of the financial sphere are regarded as positive, in line with the needs of all market participants. Surprisingly, despite the dominance of monetary issues in mainstream macroeconomic theory, observable since the monetarist school, as well as the growing importance of monetary and financial problems, there was no serious attempt to include the institutional foundations of money creation and financial institutions in the mainstream macroeconomic models. The economists of the new neoclassical synthesis used and recommended DSGE modelling as the main macroeconomic method. However, its application did not allow for identifying the sources of monetary disorder or for proposing effective remedial actions. The social nature of money and the influence of sociological and psychological factors (including ‘animal spirits’) on its value were also ignored. As a result, those models presented the problem of money in an increasingly simplified manner and reduced the monetary system almost entirely to the monetary policy strategy of the central bank. Simultaneously, financial instruments, institutions and systems have only been analysed on a microeconomic scale, with only a few attempts to introduce them to macroeconomic models. According to Spencer (2013), the methodological foundations of mainstream economics, such as methodological individualism, the rational expectations hypothesis and the assumption of the efficiency of financial markets, contributed to promoting excessive risk and disregarding the roots of the crisis (and later to primarily downplaying problems). Assuming that investors always maximize their total expected utility, the possibility of them making a wrong decision or being guided by other premises was eliminated. These problems were also raised by Sławiński (2010a, 2010b). He emphasized that the belief in market discipline and the self-regulating economy is a result of the application of the efficient market hypothesis also to decisions made by households. It was assumed that they would not only have all the information at their disposal, but also be able to analyse it and use it appropriately in their decisions. This turned out to be quite dubious, especially with regard to the increasing complexity of the monetary and financial spheres. Investors – contrary to the efficient market hypothesis – had to deal not only with risk, but also with the uncertainty resulting from the inability to estimate the probability distributions of many variables. In this situation, their expectations were short-term and were only an extrapolation from the changing situation (see also Palley 2012; Vercelli 2019). In this context, Sławinski (2010b) drew attention to two other issues. First, he stressed that the efficient market hypothesis implied a certain attitude and behaviour of supervisory institutions over financial markets. For if it is assumed that the prices of financial assets (and the risk premiums included in them) correctly reflect the most likely course of events in the financial markets, then to ensure the stability of the banking system it is enough that banks maintain their capital at slightly higher levels than would be necessary for covering potential losses. In such a situation, supervisors should only focus on the loss calculation process and the amount of regulatory capital. Such action, however, in practice led the supervisors to disregard the erosion of prudent lending rules, which occurred when banking institutions focused on increasing the rate of return (Sławiński 2010a). The good, the bad or the ugly... 245 Secondly, adopting the efficient market hypothesis eliminates the need to include the financial sector in a model. If all the participants of economic life make rational decisions, then they make optimal decisions also with regard to the amount taken in loans – they never take them in an amount exceeding the possibility of their repayment. As Sławiński adds, in the world of the assumptions of general equilibrium models, the chances of households making optimal decisions are neither limited by any barriers to accessing sources of financing nor by the lack of futures markets that would allow them to hedge against risk. In such a situation, the financial system is so effective that it only plays the role of a neutral intermediary in the processes of production and exchange. Therefore, it is not necessary to include it in the formal analysis (Sławiński 2010b). Moreover, according to Allington, McCombie and Pike (2001), within the framework of the new neoclassical synthesis, constituting the very core of mainstream economics, it is presumed that the market essentially regulates itself. This, in turn, prompted the poor regulation of the financial sector (so-called ‘light regulation’). Meanwhile, according to these authors, the speculative bubble in the US mortgage market, which directly contributed to the crisis, was an endogenous factor, resulting from the development of financial innovations and their mass use. This allowed, along with the lack of regulation, a leap in moral hazard among subprime operators (see also, e.g. Rajan 2005). As a result of these different attitudes to research and neglect of the issue in the mainstream approach, only heterodox economists undertook macroeconomic studies on the functioning and instability of financial systems and the consequences of these phenomena. Surprisingly, the Global Financial Crisis 2007–2009 allowed the agenda of these heterodox economists to enter into wider awareness, introducing financialization as a source of the fragility and instability of individual economies, thus contributing to the outbreak of the crisis and its contagion between countries. As Spencer (2013) points out, the critique of economics – as in other crisis periods – came not only from the outside, but also from within. According to Palley (2012), it was the lack of pluralism within mainstream economics, and the neoclassical dominance within it, that caused such misdiagnosis and the inability to correctly assess the increasing threats stemming from financialization. In this context, it is above all the neoclassical core of mainstream economics that was criticized. But even after the crisis, only a few adjustments were made to the mainstream methodology and research agenda. Furthermore, they were rather modest and did not go beyond its core paradigm (Allington, McCombie, Pike 2011; Dembiński 2009; Palley 2012; Mehrling 2000). Mainstream economists still fail to incorporate the imperfections of financial markets into their macroeconometric models. Admittedly, after the crisis mainstream economists agreed in principle that financial markets could generate inefficient outcomes, but these critiques have had little impact on either the broad thinking about financial markets or the direction of economic policy. They have remained driven by the belief that deregulation and the expansion of financial markets is good for the general welfare. Moreover, the critique of financial markets was generated within mainstream grounded theoretical foundations, hence it remained structured by them. This means that the assessment of financial markets continues to be made in terms of the neoclassical hypotheses of market efficiency and rationality. They have not been seen as a part of an overall economic system that distributes power and affects the character of production and the distribution of income (Palley 2007). During this theoretical interregnum, heterodox economists were unable to propose a coherent, precise methodological framework for research on financialization, focusing rather on a narrative- -approach. The acceptance by heterodoxy of the social nature of financialization without more quantitative research on its determinants (taking into account all the shortcomings of the overly formalized approach) makes it difficult to fully understand this phenomenon and its evolution over time. The counterattack of mainstream economics contributed to a relative (unjustified) weakening of interest in financialization at the end of the previous decade.

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