The belief that fiscal tinkering can somehow create an egalitarian society is a logical fallacy that motivates privatizing of the social. The assumption of equality inherent to neoclassical economics is a cop out, that obscures inequality in service of asset acquisition and profit maximization.
Ban 20 [Cornell Ban, Cornel Ban is an associate professor of International Political economy at Copenhagen Business School., Scandinavian Social-Democracy and the Economics of Reformism, https://revistatransilvania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/01.-Cornel-Ban.pdf, LTEC]
“First, fiscal policy was to be restrictive rather than countercyclical, because a policy of general reflation would simply produce inflated profits and wage drift. Correspondingly, profits were deliberately squeezed to push employers to resist inflationary wage claims. Second, despite profit capping, wages still had to be controlled, so Rehn and Meidner proposed the solidarity wage; that is, unions would operate a centralized wage policy that stressed the principle of equal pay for equal work across sectors. This policy effectively raised the reservation wage of low productivity sectors, which in turn forced inefficient firms either to increase productivity or to go bankrupt, while at the same time furthering redistributive policy goals.44 The third element of the model, an active labor-market policy, was designed to make profit capping and the solidarity wage more effective by promoting labor mobility through supplyside training, relocation, and investment programs. The point was to encourage further industrial adjustment and employment growth as two sides of the same coin.”45 This inclusive growth regime forged by SAP at Saltsjöbaden was attractive to labor because it brought public pay-as-you go pensions, paid vacations, public works to prop up working class wages and mop up unemployment. It was also attractive to a capitalist class who was shocked by the effects that the deflation and strike activity had on their assets and profits and who was promised that private property and business 9 concentration would be left untouched and that labor would be pacified via union-employer negotiations that would deliver not just social peace but also predictable labor costs while serving the imperative of stable domestic demand and efficient use of all available resources. Even the introduction of progressive taxation was designed so as to serve both the demands for downward income redistribution as well as business interest in increasing investment. Thus, high marginal income, wealth and inheritance taxes pushed capital owners’ resources into investment rather than consumption while the SAP gave up on its longstanding progressive corporate income tax policy and devised a tax regime that favored large firms (via deductions for reinvested profits) in the name of rationalizing the private economy, a move that made Saltsjobaden stick with big capital.46 Overall, in recognition of the fact that social democratic reformism depended on private investment, the tax system gave Swedish capitalists one of the lowest corporate income tax rates in Europe while having the highest taxes on was not central to growth: luxury consumption and wealth holdings. As Mark Blyth put it: “What enabled these new ideas to be accepted by both business and labor, which at that time had some of the most fractious industrial relations in the world, was the ability of the state to use these new ideas to recast the problem of deflation in terms of the interdependency of business, labor, and the state, rather than as the fault of any one of them.”4 Like in Sweden and Denmark, the political moderation of Norwegian social-democrats enabled an alliance with a small farmers’ party and proto-Keynesian economics gave the left a toolbox to rule the capitalist economy with. Norwegian economists such as Ole Colbjørnsen and Ragnar Frisch agreed with the Swedish and Danish economics of reflation but went further, advocating for state planning, albeit without the multi-layered policy architecture of that their Swedish counterparts had devised. The result was an employment-based stimulus and a Saltsjobaden-style class compromise. Unlike the economic irrelevance of the SPD’s ideas about how to counter the Great Recession, the Norwegian Labor Party’s homegrown para-Keynesianism locked in transformations that would deeply transform statemarket relations in Norway from the 1930s onwards.48 In other words, the Scandinavian model of social democracy had a lot of “class collaborationism” in it. At the same time, although the welfare state proper did not arrive until the end of the war, in the 1930s this political angle convinced capital owners to share with workers the benefits of growth through limits to personal wealth accumulation, while making the labor market work as in the idealized neoclassical economics model. Liberal economics, it seems, needed big government and big unions to work as promised. It is important to stress that this Nordic tightrope walk between the imperatives of capitalism and the imperatives of delivering extensive social goods for a broad social block had benefitted from an extraordinarily favorable condition: bourgeois parties with relatively progressive ideas about market-society relations and who in fact laid the foundations of the welfare state and labor-capital coordination via democratic corporatism. Indeed, the early history of the Nordic welfare (1890- 1920) was largely the work of these parties, with the Social Democrats having a more scattered influence. This should not be confused with the oft claimed Bismarckian social reforms. Scandinavia developed differently, with a universalist welfare model funded by way of general taxes, which uncoupled access to benefits from their financing. Or, the evidence indicates that the bourgeois parties, and in particular those representing agrarian interests, also played a significant role in this regard during this period and, occasionally later on as well. The battle for universalism and tax funding in early Swedish welfare policy was fought primarily by the peasantry and in Denmark liberals and conservatives supported critical elements of the budding welfare state and social policy the SD governments wanted. Indeed, even the fundamental bases of corporatism had been laid with the support and often the initiative of these parties.49 The contrast with the known reactionary positions of the bourgeois parties in France, Germany, Austria or Britain is manifest. Conclusions During the first half of the twentieth century, Nordic social-democracy was an ideologically unambitious and ruthlessly pragmatic reformist movement that ended up being only loosely steeped into revisionist Marxism. This political movement may have lacked the theoretical spark of their continental and especially of their German comrades. But in retrospect, it seems that this conceptual aloofness in the realm of ideology proved to be an asset in terms of practical political gains once nationalization ceased to be focus of economic policy. Indeed, the German-Nordic contrast as well as the internal variations in the Norwegian case leads one to realize that the most ambitious and long-lasting transformations of capitalism in the direction of decommodification and the highest quality of life available for “the many” were engineered by these philosophically inconsistent but economically astute “class collaborators.” Through achieving political hegemony for more than half a century and pushing through their agenda without morphing into mere progressive liberals, these parties and their labor union allies managed to change for the better the fate of ordinary people more than the scintillating and occasionally tragic minds of the SPD could ever change theirs. Of course, it would be ludicrous to attribute the German political disaster to the disastrous economics of the SPD during the Weimar Republic. Material factors, context, culture, location and other factors played a critical role in the buildup of this hegemony. But letting the Nazis be the party of unemployment-mopping public works, rejecting the stimulus program proposed by the bread-and-butter economists of the unions and shunning the alliance with the farmers (so essential in Scandinavia) certainly did not help. Marxist-Leninists have been sarcastic with the blandness of the melioristic and utilitarian ambitions of the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian descendants of Bernstein. They have also piled mordant criticism on Nordic social-democrats’ anti-communism. The MarxistLeninists’ ire is understandable. To paraphrase Sven Steinmo, what remains is that by making capitalism a lot more humane and compatible (at least for a while) with the interests of wage earners, women, the unemployed, farmers and the precariously self-employed, Nordic Social-Democrats also made capitalism harder to topple by the Marxist-Leninist left, a political current that in Scandinavia was reduced to irrelevance not by state repression but by the social-democrats’ success as decommodifying labor to an extent that was unimaginable under liberal democratic conditions elsewhere.50 Bernstein would certainly have deplored the abandonment of their ambition to surpass capitalism.